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This thesis presents my contribution to the three main topics of CEO 
succession research: the antecedents of succession, the selection of a new 
CEO, and the impact a new CEO has on post-succession organisational 
performance, all through the unique lens of social capital theory. Using the 
English NHS as a case study, I test the theories of succession from the 
private sector in a new context, that of large and complex public sector 
organisations. I find that internal social capital, as proxied by CEO 
insiderness and reputational social capital, as proxied by organisational 
performance, are important factors in determining both length of tenure and 
exit destination for those CEOs who leave their posts. I find that the selection 
of a new CEO has a non-linear relationship with performance such that trusts 
with both high and low baseline performance will appoint a CEO with higher 
insider social capital, but that this does not hold when reputational social 
capital is used. Finally, I find evidence to support both the disruptive and 
adaptive theories of CEO succession when the baseline performance of the 
trust is taken into account as a contingency factor.  
My thesis makes several valuable contributions to the research area in terms 
of the scarcely used lens of social capital theory applied to CEO 
successions, extending the evidence base from the predominantly private 
sector research, methodological advancements for antecedents research by 
focusing on actual exits rather than intention to leave and the inclusion of exit 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an introduction to my research area and signposts to 
the rest of the thesis. It provides the objectives and motivations for my 
research and the contributions stemming from it. The main purpose for my 
research is to explore how important social capital is when looking at Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) successions. This encompasses social capital in the 
context of the antecedents of succession, the choice of a successor, and the 
impact the successor has on organisational performance. Each of these 
three scenarios is explored in separate empirical chapters. The English 
National Health Service (NHS) is used as a case study for this research, a 
unique context to compare against the more common private sector 
organisations used in most previous studies and the limited research from 
the English public sector.  
The structure of the rest of this chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 covers the 
motivations for my research. Section 1.3 covers the contribution my research 
makes to the extant literature. Section 1.4 provides an overview of the NHS 
as the case study context used throughout. Section 1.5 provides a brief 
summary of the results from each of the three empirical chapters. The 
structure of the rest of the thesis is provided in section 1.6. 
1.2 Motivations for this research 
The primary motivation for my research is to apply the lens of social capital 
theory to the field of CEO succession research. The definition of social 
capital used throughout is that provided by Adler and Kwon (2002) which 
states that social capital is ‘the goodwill available to individuals or groups’ 
(pg. 23). Social capital has received relatively little attention in the extant 
literature for CEO successions yet seems an obvious and valid explanatory 
variable for why some CEOs leave their roles sooner than others, why some 
CEOs are more attractive to recruiting organisations than others, and why 
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some CEOs are more successful than others. Social capital has been 
explicitly referenced as a reason to help explain why some people are more 
successful than others (Adler and Kwon, 2002) so it is surprising that it has 
received so little attention from scholars.  
Within the extant literature on CEO successions there is a stream focused on 
human capital theory as an explanation for the relationships observed 
between CEOs, tenure, selection and organisational performance. This 
makes the assumption that human capital is inherent in the possession of 
certain types of career history such as previous CEO experience (Elsaid, 
Benson, and Worrell, 2016; Hamori and Koyuncu, 2015; Desai, Lockett, and 
Paton, 2015), inside-industry experience (Bailey and Helfat, 2003; Harris and 
Helfat, 1997; Phan and Lee, 1995), and education level (Phan and Lee, 
1995). There is another stream of CEO successions literature focused on 
social capital as an explanatory theory. Whilst human capital is accumulated 
through investment in personal attributes, social capital is accumulated 
through investment in social networks (Sauerwald et al., 2016). In reality, a 
CEO might be expected to hold a combination of both human and social 
capital (Fitzsimmons and Callan, 2016) yet there are very few studies taking 
a dual approach to these concepts.  
Within the context of my research I use two proxies for CEO social capital. 
The first, insider status, assumes that a CEO who worked in the organisation 
immediately prior to being appointed its CEO has accumulated internal social 
capital. The second uses the organisational performance of their current or 
previous organisation to indicate whether a CEO has reputational social 
capital. CEO insider status as a proxy for social capital builds on the 
approach used in the extant literature whereby insiderness and board 
membership are assumed to equate to having social capital (Phan and Lee, 
1995). Other proxies include the number of ties a CEO has with others (Kim 
and Cannella, 2008) and inclusion on ‘best CEO’ lists (Schepker and Barker, 
2018). These proxies all make the assumption that having a connection with 
others, or having the opportunity to connect with others, will equate to 
holding social capital. My proxy of insider status assumes that being an 
insider will expose a person to those same social networks and thus will 
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imbue them with the same social capital. This assumption is in line with 
proxies used elsewhere whereby social capital is assumed to be present 
simply by virtue of having attended an Ivy League school (Schepker and 
Barker, 2018). 
My second proxy makes the assumption that having a good track record of 
performance will give a CEO reputational social capital through their 
perceived superior managerial ability. Managerial ability has been proxied in 
the literature by both previous organisational performance (Wangrow et al., 
2017; Fee and Hadlock, 2003, Cannella et al., 2002) and previous CEO 
experience (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007). Having superior perceived 
managerial ability will confer prestige or status on an individual which, 
according to Johnson et al (2012) is a type of social capital.  
Implicit in the use of social capital in the wider literature is the assumption 
that capital is accumulated over time as a consequence of participation in 
social networks (Haynes and Hillman, 2010). My proxies make no allowance 
for time. Insider status is a binary variable which ignores the length of time a 
CEO was an insider before becoming CEO. This is a recognised caveat to 
my research and adding in a time element is suggested as a potential 
avenue for future research. However, my operationalisation of the insider 
concept is commensurate with the literature for both social capital theory, 
where insider is a binary variable (Phan and Lee, 1995) and human capital 
theory, where experience is a binary variable (Hamori and Koyuncu, 2015; 
Bailey and Helfat, 2003), which could arguably also be thought to be time-
dependent (Adler and Kwon, 2002).  
A second motivation is the lack of research using public sector organisations. 
Despite a large body of academic literature looking at CEO successions in 
the private sector, there remains a limited number of comparable studies 
using the public sector as a case study, particularly in the UK. What public 
sector research does exist tends to focus on smaller organisational forms 
such as schools (Grissom and Andersen, 2012; Grissom and Mitani, 2016) 
rather than larger and more complex organisations with limited exceptions 
such as the work of Boyne et al. (2011a; 2011b; 2010a; 2010b; 2008) using 
English local authorities and the civil service. The NHS, along with the rest of 
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the UK public sector, has been subjected to New Public Management (NPM) 
reforms which have brought them closer to the structures and functions of 
the private sector, yet they remain non-profit seeking, thus the drivers in the 
public sector can be very different to those of the private sector. For this 
reason, although there may be commonalities with the theoretical arguments 
applied to the private sector, the public sector has marked differences which 
render it worthy of separate research. This can help determine whether the 
theories from the private sector are applicable to the public sector (Boyne et 
al., 2010b). 
1.3 Research contribution 
This section discusses the contribution my research has made to the extant 
literature and future policy making. My research makes an original 
contribution to the literature in several ways. Firstly, it is, to the best of my 
knowledge, one of very few CEO succession studies to explicitly use the lens 
of social capital theory. This provides a unique insight into the factors that 
may affect a CEO’s tenure, their attractiveness to new employers, and their 
ability to effect change once in a new role (Cao et al., 2006).  
Secondly, although there is a large body of literature looking at CEO 
successions, there are still unanswered questions about why CEOs leave, 
how new CEOs are selected, their impact on organisational performance, 
and what effect their reputational social capital has on their performance and 
the likelihood of selection to a CEO post. Specifically, there seems to be no 
research that factors in a CEO’s reputational social capital in terms of their 
current or previous organisations’ performance, other than in literature using 
sports teams as a case study (Grusky, 1963; Gamson and Scotch, 1964; 
Wangrow et al., 2018). However, sports teams are generally thought not to 
be comparable to private sector organisations due to the significant 
differences in organisational form (Day and Lord, 1988) and because sport, 
unlike business, is a zero sum game (Gammelsæter, 2013). 
Thirdly, I use the NHS as a case study, a context which has been largely 
ignored in CEO succession research to date, with the exception of a recent 
paper on the impact of CEO successions in the NHS (Janke et al., 2018). 
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This provides valuable insights into the public sector and allows for theories 
from private sector succession research to be tested in a different setting. By 
testing hypotheses in this new context it helps broaden the applicability of 
theories thus far only tested in the private sector and thus adds to the 
richness of evidence available (Rowe et al., 2005).  
Fourthly, for the antecedents chapter, I go beyond the exit destination 
definitions used so far in existing succession research and thus provide 
greater granularity whilst also linking them to the social capital agenda. My 
research into the antecedents of CEO turnover is unique in that it uses exit 
destinations which are designated as social capital enhancing, diminishing or 
neutral. The destinations considered to enhance a person’s social capital 
were CEO roles in another trust and roles in the private sector. The 
destinations considered to diminish a person’s social capital were self-
employment/unemployment and non-CEO posts elsewhere in the public 
sector. Retirements were viewed as a neutral destination that neither 
enhanced nor diminished a person’s social capital.  
Finally, since the NHS is a non-profit making organisation, I have had to 
utilise a wider range of performance metrics than those traditionally used in 
CEO succession research. The primary performance metric reported 
throughout this thesis is the average attainment of the four-hour Accident 
and Emergency (A&E) waiting time target, but alternative metrics spanning 
financial, operational, and clinical realms are also included, specifically: 
operating surplus, reference cost index (RCI), average inpatient waiting 
times (in days), Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) 
infection rates, and mortality rates. By reproducing the analysis for all five 
alternative metrics I have been able to draw conclusions about the effect that 
different types of performance measurement have on succession, a hitherto 
unexplored facet of the research area and an interesting comparison to the 




1.4 Case study context 
This section discusses the institutional framework of the NHS, the case study 
context in which my research was conducted. There is a wide body of 
literature looking at CEO successions. However, most of this uses private 
sector organisations as case studies. The preponderance of literature using 
private sector organisations as case studies means that findings can be 
generalised across many industries. However, it lacks rigour in ensuring that 
those findings are equally as applicable to other sectors. Because of this, 
there have been calls in the literature to test these findings in other industries 
and particularly in countries outside of the USA (Giambatista et al., 2005). 
Research using public sector organisations is limited, although the work of 
Boyne et al. (2010a; 2010b; 2011a) has made a significant contribution to 
this by using English public sector local authorities as a case study. The 
public sector offers a largely untapped field of study for CEO succession 
research. Although distinct from the private sector in some ways, it has 
moved closer in recent decades due, in large part, to NPM reforms. NPM is 
the label given to a range of public sector reforms which advocated for the 
adoption of private sector management practices in the public sector (Hood, 
1991). In particular, this wave of reforms imbued the role of NHS CEO with 
more autonomy to run their trusts outside the immediate control of 
government. This encouraged movement between trusts (Janke et al., 2018) 
as evidenced by the oft cited revolving door for NHS CEOs (Dunhill, 2018). 
Despite these NPM reforms bringing the public sector closer to the 
governance models of the private sector, there remains a key difference in 
the principle-agent relationship. Whilst in the private sector shareholders take 
on the role of principle, in the public sector this role is held by the Secretary 
of State for Health and Social Care as the minister in charge of the 
Department for Health and Social Care. Even within the public sector the 
NHS stands out from other organisations in that it has limited involvement 
from the public as stakeholders.  
It is important to test the external validity of theories by applying them in new 
contexts (Rowe et al., 2005) hence using a public sector organisation 
contributes to this goal. The NHS is a large and complex organisation (Janke 
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et al., 2018) which further adds to its importance as a case study context. 
There are several types of public sector organisation that could be used as 
case studies for this type of research, for example, schools, prisons, 
councils. The attraction of the English public sector for this type of research 
lies in its transformation from an overly bureaucratic monolith to a more 
nuanced network of organisational forms. Over recent years, the public 
sector has seen a shift towards the governance structures of the private 
sector with corporate-style boards becoming commonplace. This has been 
accompanied by the corporatisation of those same organisations, that is, 
they have taken on a more business-like structure and operate more like 
private sector businesses. This is particularly evident in the NHS, which has 
been operating in a quasi-market with a separation between purchasers, or 
commissioners, and providers of care. Although constrained in practice by 
geographical limitations, commissioners can choose to purchase healthcare 
services from any provider.  
The NHS has a long history, but hospital trusts have been subjected to the 
same history of reform and laws governing what they can do and what 
performance criteria they are assessed against. Therefore, this makes them 
an ideal candidate for this type of research since the extant literature is clear 
that CEO succession research requires: 
‘a substantial number of formal organisations that, ideally, were 
identical in official goals, size, and authority structure’ (Grusky, 1963, 
pg. 21) 
These requirements were formulated to justify the use of sports teams in 
CEO succession research since it is only really sports teams that could 
possibly meet all three aspects. In any organisational research, it is desirable 
to use organisational forms that are as similar as possible but asking them to 
be identical is too limiting. The private sector firms used in much of the extant 
literature certainly do not comply with this requirement despite attempts to 
homogenise samples. Boyne’s research using English Local Authorities was 
a step closer to this since the underlying function and structure of one local 
authority is pretty much the same as any other. This argument applies 
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equally to NHS trusts hence they make an ideal organisational form for this 
particular type of research. 
There is, to my knowledge, no literature looking at the antecedents of CEO 
turnover or CEO selection in the NHS, although there has been one recent 
working paper published on the impact of CEOs in the NHS (Janke et al., 
2018). As England’s largest employer, and the fifth largest in the world (NHS 
Employers, 2017), one might expect more attention to have been focused on 
the leadership of an organisation that lies at the very heart of British society. 
However, whilst the academic field has so far ignored NHS CEO departures, 
there has been some interest from think tanks and executive search 
agencies, both of which conducted surveys of CEOs, boards and chairman, 
and the occasional thought-piece in industry journals. Despite this, there 
remains a lack of scientific rigor applied to this field in the context of the 
NHS.  
1.5 Summary of empirical chapters 
This section provide an overview of the findings from each of the three 
empirical chapters.  
1.5.1 Antecedents of CEO succession 
The first empirical chapter, Chapter 4, explores the antecedents of CEO 
succession within the NHS through the dual lenses of labour market theory 
and social capital theory. It addresses the research questions: how does 
reputational social capital affect a CEOs ability to influence their tenure and 
their destination on exiting the CEO role, and how does a CEO’s internal 
social capital affect the likelihood of them exiting their post and their exit 
destination? It was posited that CEOs with internal social capital would have 
a lower risk of exit than outsiders to all non-retirement exit destinations and 
partial support was found for this. This chapter used competing risks survival 
analysis as the analytical method through which the hypotheses were tested, 
and I found that the pooled models and exits to other NHS CEO roles did 
demonstrate a lower hazard of exit for insiders. I also found that the hazard 
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of exit to retirement was much higher for CEOs with internal social capital 
than those without. 
The relationship between reputational social capital and the risk of exit was 
predicted to be non-linear such that CEOs with low reputational social capital 
would have a lower risk of exit to destinations that enhanced their 
reputational social capital, but a higher risk of exit to destinations that 
diminished their reputational social capital. Conversely, it was suggested that 
CEOs with high reputational social capital would have a higher risk of exit to 
destinations that enhanced their reputational social capital but a lower risk of 
exit to destinations that diminished their reputational social capital. The 
results provided some support for the proposed relationship between CEOs 
with low reputational social capital and their risk of exit, with the pooled 
model showing a higher hazard of exiting for CEOs with low reputational 
social capital. However, the competing risks models only provided partial 
support, with a higher hazard of exit to self-employment. The proposed 
relationship between CEOs with high reputational social capital and their risk 
of exit was not supported in the main analysis but some support was found 
when using an alternative performance metric and when using continuous 
performance data rather than the dummy variables differentiating between 
relatively low and high performance. 
1.5.2 Selection of a new CEO 
The second empirical chapter, Chapter 5, looks at the selection of a new 
CEO following the previous CEO’s departure, again though the lens of social 
capital theory, with a CEO’s internal social capital and reputational social 
capital being used to help explain any variations in appointments. It 
addresses the research questions: is social capital valued by recruiting 
trusts, and does the baseline performance of the trust affect the value placed 
on social capital by the recruiting trust? Within the NHS, the CEO labour 
market is relatively small and it is rare for newly appointed CEOs to come 
from outside the NHS. Fewer than 3% of newly appointed CEOs in my data 
sample came from outside the NHS. This means that in most cases, a board 
is deciding between candidates from within the trust and those external to 
the trust, yet within the wider NHS. It was assumed that working in the trust 
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would give a candidate an advantage since they would already have internal 
social capital specific to that trust, hence would be more likely to be selected 
for the CEO post compared to an outsider with no internal social capital. 
However, I found no support for this and the data showed that more than 
three-quarters of new CEOs were outsiders to the recruiting trust. 
The baseline performance of the recruiting trust was felt to be an important 
contingency factor and it was suggested that a trust with high baseline 
performance relative to others trusts in that year would be more likely to 
recruit a CEO with internal social capital, an insider, whereas a trust with low 
baseline performance would be more likely to recruit an outsider. The results 
varied depending on which performance metric was used, and a non-linear 
relationship was found to exist between baseline performance and CEO 
insiderness rather than the linear relationship suggested. When using A&E 
target achievement as the performance metric, both relatively high and low 
baseline performance of the recruiting trust was found to be positively 
associated with the likelihood of appointing an insider. When using operating 
surplus as the performance metric, both high and low baseline performance 
were associated with a decreased likelihood of appointing an insider. 
Reputational social capital was also proxied by the performance of the 
CEO’s previous trust and it was suggested that those with a better 
reputation, that is, those from higher-performing trusts, would be more 
sought after by trusts with low baseline performance. The results showed 
that it was high performing trusts who were more likely to appoint CEOs with 
a good reputation. This implies that good CEOs will not want to diminish their 
reputational social capital by moving to a trust that is not performing well. I 
also found that when using operating surplus and inpatient waiting times as 
the performance metric, trusts with poor baseline performance were much 
more likely to appoint CEOs with low reputational social capital than those 
with high reputational social capital. This implies that a poor-quality CEO 
may not be able to attract offers from better trusts and can only find a job in a 
trust that cannot attract a better calibre of applicant. 
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1.5.3 Impact of new CEO on post-succession organisational 
performance 
The third and final empirical chapter, Chapter 6, focuses on whether a new 
CEO has an impact on organisational performance by testing the main 
theories of succession, that of a disruptive or adaptive effect. Whilst the lens 
of social capital theory is applied in this chapter, the first two hypotheses do 
not take account of social capital but are instead intended to test the broader 
principles of CEO succession underpinning the later hypothesis looking at 
social capital. It addresses the general research questions: does CEO 
succession make a difference to organisational performance, and does the 
impact of a new CEO change depending on the baseline performance of the 
trust? It also addresses a research question focusing on social capital: how 
does social capital affect the impact a new CEO has on organisational 
performance? 
The first hypothesis posited that a new CEO would make a difference to 
performance, but the direction of this difference was not specified since the 
extant literature is inconclusive as to whether CEO succession has an 
adaptive or disruptive effect on performance. I found support for this using 
two of the performance metrics, both of which showed an improvement in 
performance following a CEO succession. Thus, I concluded that there was 
some evidence that the adaptive theory of succession held true. However, 
the other metrics showed no support for either theory but this could be 
because there are both adaptive and disruptive effects, but they cancel each 
other out, giving the impression of no effect.  
Contingency factors were added in to try and tease out the true effects. 
Specifically, the baseline performance of the trust immediately prior to the 
succession event. It was suggested that CEO succession in a trust with high 
baseline performance would lead to a decline in performance as the 
disruptive effects of succession would dominate. When using A&E target 
attainment as the performance metric this relationship was supported in the 
year following a succession, but the effects did not continue into a second 
year of the new CEO’s tenure. It was also suggested that succession in 
trusts with low baseline performance would lead to an improvement in 
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performance as the adaptive effects of succession would dominate. Support 
was also found for this relationship when using the A&E metric, but again, 
this did not last into a second year of tenure. However, two of the alternative 
metrics exhibited the opposite effects with performance declining further 
when baseline performance was low and improving when baseline 
performance was high. 
The lens of social capital theory was again applied in this chapter with the 
suggestion that the effect of CEO succession on organisational performance 
would be moderated by insider status. I found support for this hypothesis 
when using A&E target attainment and MRSA infection rates as performance 
measures. As an extension to this, contingency factors were considered 
such that it was suggested that the relationship between insider succession 
and organisational performance would vary across levels of baseline 
performance such that under conditions of low baseline performance an 
outsider successor would be expected to improve performance and under 
conditions of high performance an insider successor would be expected to 
improve performance. However, I only found limited support for there being 
an interaction and even more limited for the proposed direction of that 
interaction. Social capital was also proxied by the performance of the CEO’s 
previous trust, that is, an indication of their reputation as a leader. Based on 
the assumption that a CEO from a trust with high baseline performance was 
responsible for that good performance through their enhanced leadership 
ability, it was suggested that they would oversee a greater improvement in 
performance in a new trust than CEOs with a worse reputation, that is, from 
a low performing trust. I found no evidence to support this and performance 
was actually improved more when the CEO was from a low performing trust. 
1.6 The structure of the thesis 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides an 
extensive review of the literature on CEO succession, which includes the 
three main topics of research addressed in my research – those of the 
antecedents of CEO succession, the selection of a new CEO, and the impact 
a new CEO has on post-succession organisational performance. It also 
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addresses social capital with a focus on the internal social capital 
accumulated by a CEO who worked in an organisation immediately prior to 
becoming its CEO and the reputational social capital gained by overseeing 
good performance in a previous or current role. Within this literature review I 
identify the research questions I am aiming to address with my research. 
Chapter 3 describes the data sample and variables used in this research. 
Chapters 4 to 6 each cover one of the three empirical topics of this research 
with Chapter 4 focusing on the antecedents of CEO succession. Chapter 5 
focuses on the selection of a new CEO and Chapter 6 focuses on the impact 
a new CEO has on post-succession organisational performance. The 
hypotheses being tested are specified in each of these three empirical 
chapters. The final chapter, Chapter 7, concludes the thesis with a 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of the literature covering the range of CEO 
succession topics explored in this research. Relevant papers were identified 
using a systematic search process across several databases. Various 
combinations of the terms ‘CEO’, ‘leadership’, ‘top management’, ‘executive’, 
‘succession’, ‘turnover’, ‘selection’, ‘antecedents’, ‘capital’, ‘social capital’ and 
‘social network’ were used to identify papers, with additional sources taken 
from the citations used in those papers. The databases used included: Web 
of Science, EBSCO Business Source Premier, and ABI/Inform Collection. 
Google Scholar was used to source any additional relevant papers. This 
search process was repeated at regular intervals throughout the duration of 
the study to ensure newly published papers were identified and included in 
this review. 
The CEO is the captain of the ship and finding the right person to take on 
that role is a major challenge for any firm (Davidson et al., 1990; Boeker and 
Goodstein, 1993; Datta and Guthrie, 1994; Datta and Rajagopalan, 1998; 
Lauterbach et al., 1999; Davidson et al., 2002; Bailey and Helfat, 2003; Rhim 
et al., 2006; Karaevli, 2007; Zhang, 2008; Hamori and Koyuncu, 2015). As 
stated by Finkelstein et al. (2009):  
‘the trajectories and fortunes of companies are often traceable to the 
actions (or inaction) of their top executives’ (pg. 3).  
The literature on CEO succession is extensive, spanning several decades 
and multiple disciplines. Yet despite its long history and numerous theories, 
the succession literature has thus far failed to provide conclusive evidence to 
support many of those theories, which leaves the field open for continued 
exploration. In particular, there has been very little attention paid to the role 
of social capital in CEO successions and it is this theory which provides the 
lens through which my research is undertaken.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, I provide definitions 
for the main concepts used throughout my research. Secondly, I review the 
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literature on social capital theory as the main theoretical lens used in my 
research. I then focus on CEO social capital, in particular the two proxies 
used throughout my research, those of CEO insiderness and organisational 
performance. Next, I provide an overview of the NHS and NHS trusts as the 
case study context. I then review the literature on CEO successions before 
focusing in on the three main topics of CEO succession: the antecedents of 
turnover, the selection of a new CEO, and the impact a new CEO has on 
post-succession organisational performance. These three topics address the 
literature in both the dominant private sector and the much less studied 
public sector. My research questions are derived from the gaps identified 
throughout the course of this literature review.  
2.2 Definition of key terms 
This section provides a brief definition of the key terms used throughout this 
thesis. Whilst most are discussed in greater detail in later sections of this 
literature review, a basic understanding of the definitions adopted here is 
important for the discussions that follow. Definitions are provided for the 
CEO, and the CEO labour market. 
2.2.1 CEO 
The CEO is often the public face of an organisation and can become 
synonymous with a brand, for example: Mark Zuckerberg at Facebook, Steve 
Jobs at Apple, and Elon Musk at Tesla. However, for many organisations the 
CEO has no such fame, yet their role is comparable to that of their better-
known counterparts. According to Finkelstein et al. (2009) a CEO is: 
‘the executive who has overall responsibility for the conduct and 
performance of an entire organisation.’ (pg. 9) 
The specifics of a CEO role can vary between countries and industries but at 
its heart it represents the pinnacle of the organisation, the leader from whom 
the organisation takes its direction. However, this does not mean that the 
CEO operates in isolation. The CEO, along with the rest of the top 
management team, is answerable to the board of directors. The executive 
directors, employees of the organisation, oversee the operational 
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management of the organisation whilst non-executive directors provide 
external accountability to keep those managers in check. In the UK, the CEO 
cannot also hold the role of chairman, although this dual role is permitted in 
other countries such as the USA. 
2.2.2 CEO labour market 
The labour market for CEOs is unique for three reasons. Firstly, it is 
dispersed such that executive search agencies act as a go-between for 
candidates and hiring firms. Second, information on CEO quality is difficult to 
ascertain. The performance of their previous organisation can be partly 
attributable to other executives, as per the upper echelon theory (Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984) or luck, for example. Finally, there are high transaction 
costs in replacing a CEO (Ang et al., 2003). 
The labour market for CEOs has both a supply element and a demand 
element. The supply side reflects the number of suitable candidates available 
in the market whilst the demand side reflects the availability of CEO jobs and 
also the extent to which the available candidates are attractive to the hiring 
firms (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2003). There is some dispute about whether 
there is a split in this CEO labour market. Davidson et al. (2002) suggest that 
“the choice between insiders and outsiders is a choice between internal and 
external labour markets” (pg. 297) yet Ang et al. (2003) state that: 
“There are reasons to believe that external and internal CEO 
candidates participate in an integrated labour marker, so both internal 
and external markets are efficient…Yet, there are also reasons why 
insider and outsider CEO markets may be segregated” (pg. 30) 
2.3 Social capital theory 
This section discusses the literature on social capital theory, the main 
theoretical lens through which my research is undertaken. The concept of 
social capital originates from the 19th century with three American 
sociologists providing three different definitions (Kim and Cannella, 2008). 
The first came from Coleman (1990) who described social capital as being 
generated ‘when the relations among persons change in ways that facilitates 
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action’ (pg. 304). This was followed by Burt (1992) who described it as a 
network of ‘friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom 
you receive opportunities to use your financial and human capital’ (pg.9). 
This was closely followed by Putnam's (1993) definition that it comprised:  
‘features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks 
that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinating 
actions’ (pg. 167) 
Since then, other researchers have used their own definitions of social 
capital, which has left the field with an ill-defined concept lacking agreement 
about not only the definition, but also its dimensions and measurement 
(Claridge, 2018). Depending on the focus of their research, authors have 
defined it in terms of its sources (Coleman, 1990), structure (Burt, 1992) and 
uses (Portes, 1998), or a combination of these facets (Putnam, 1993). Portes 
(1998) defined it as ‘the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of 
membership in social networks or other social structure’ (pg. 6). This has 
been expanded upon in recent years by Adler and Kwon (2002) to give the 
definition that is used in this thesis. This definition captures all three 
elements, that of the source, structure and use of social capital: 
‘Social capital is the goodwill available to individuals or groups. Its 
source lies in the structure and content of the actor’s social relations. 
Its effects flow from the information, influence, and solidarity it makes 
available to the actor’ (pg. 23) 
Different types of social capital have been defined depending on the 
researchers’ view of the nature of the social ties involved. External ties have 
been described as those that create a bridge to members of the social 
network situated outside the firm (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Kim and Cannella, 
2008; Johnson et al., 2012). Internal ties are those created within the firm, 
bonding ties, and are thus firm-specific in nature such that if one member of 
the social network leaves it may affect the value of the remaining network 
(Adler and Kwon, 2002; Kim and Cannella, 2008). Kim and Cannella (2008) 
suggest that individuals can increase one type of social capital only at the 
expense of the other since it is too labour intensive to maintain both types.   
18 
 
Despite its increasingly wide usage in a range of academic disciplines (Adler 
and Kwon, 2002), social capital theory has been criticised due to its 
perceived ambiguity (Claridge, 2018). This criticism is focused around three 
main claims, the first of which is that it is not social. Since it cannot be 
observed directly it often has to be proxied by observable measures 
(Claridge, 2018). Sources of social capital include other people and the 
obligations owed from them (Portes, 1998) but opportunity, motivation and 
ability are all required for that capital to be activated (Adler and Kwon, 2002). 
These are intangible concepts which, unlike economic capital, which is 
observable in people’s bank accounts (Portes, 1998), require some 
approximation of quantity and form.   
The second criticism is that it is not capital. Since it can have both positive 
and negative outcomes, it is not compatible with the accepted definition of 
capital (Claridge, 2018). However, this view is not shared by all researchers 
as some believe that social capital shares some commonalities with other 
types of capital. Like all other types of capital, social capital has a long shelf-
life. Actors can build their social capital over time with the expectation of 
some benefit deriving from it in the future (Adler and Kwon, 2002; 
Fitzsimmons and Callan, 2016). It can be a substitute for other types of 
capital and it requires maintenance, like human capital (Adler and Kwon, 
2002). It is appropriable (Coleman, 1988) and also convertible in that it can 
be converted to an economic or other advantage (Bourdieu, 1985; Machalek 
and Martin, 2015). Despite these similarities, it is also recognised that there 
are some differences between social and other types of capital. Namely that 
it can be a collective good where one person’s use of it does not reduce its 
availability for others in the network to use (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Further, 
it is located in social relationships rather than in the actor themselves 
(Portes, 1998; Adler and Kwon, 2002) and it can be difficult to quantify and 
measure (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Claridge, 2018). 
The third argument is that it isn’t a theory (Fine, 2002; Claridge, 2018) 
because it acts as an umbrella term (Haynes, 2009) for a collection of 
sociological concepts that have been grouped together merely for 
convenience (Portes, 1998). However, despite this, it is increasingly popular 
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in social science research as in organisation studies it can be used to help 
explain why some people are more successful than others (Coleman, 1988; 
Adler and Kwon, 2002). Its general acceptance as a theory is thus proven by 
its adoption in numerous studies looking at individuals in organisations 
(Harris and Helfat, 2007; Johnson et al., 2011; Sauerwald et al., 2016; 
Fitzsimmons and Callan, 2016). 
This section has provided an overview of the concept of social capital theory, 
the lens through which my research is undertaken. Having a common 
understanding of the definition used in this thesis is important for the 
discussions that follow in the subsequent sections of this literature review. 
The general discussion in this section is applied to the CEO context in the 
next section to provide a greater understanding of how and why social capital 
is important for CEO succession research.  
2.4 CEO social capital 
Whilst the previous section provided a general overview of social capital 
theory, this section applies it to the CEO context before separate sub-
sections address the operationalisation of this concept within my research 
through the use of two proxies: CEO insiderness and organisational 
performance.  
The definition of social capital set out in the previous section referenced its 
sources, structure and uses. Capital has been described as any source of 
power that can be used to benefit a person (Fitzsimmons and Callan, 2016) 
yet within the context of CEOs it is useful to differentiate between sources of 
social capital and human capital (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Haynes and 
Hillman, 2010; Sauerwald et al., 2016). Human capital is acquired through 
the knowledge and skills accumulated through previous work experience 
whilst social capital is derived from social relationships both external to the 
firm, within the firm, and through reputation and prestige (Johnson et al., 
2012). The two concepts of social and human capital are linked such that 
social relationships can be viewed as resources that can help develop and 
accumulate human capital (Machalek and Martin, 2015). Individuals can 
compensate for a lack of human capital through having greater social capital 
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(Adler and Kwon, 2002), although this can only get a person so far before the 
need for human capital will outweigh the benefits derived from social capital 
(Fitzsimmons and Callan, 2016). 
External social ties can come in the form of appointments to other boards 
(Johnson et al., 2012) or through connections to external bodies such as 
regulatory organisations, suppliers or competitors (Fitzsimmons and Callan, 
2016). Internal ties refer to the personal relationships the CEO forms with the 
board and other senior managers in the organisation in which they work. 
These internal networks can be a source of power for the CEO, enabling 
them to influence decisions to suit their own interests (Adler and Kwon, 2002; 
Harris and Helfat, 2007; Sauerwald et al., 2016). By their nature, internal ties 
are firm-specific and will be devalued if a member of the social network 
leaves (Kim and Cannella, 2008). Directors with high social capital will be 
sought after (Kim and Cannella, 2008) hence their social standing is an 
important facet of social capital. Reputation, prestige and stigma act as an 
informational signal to external stakeholders (Certo, 2003) who view social 
capital as a marker of success (Fitzsimmons and Callan, 2016). 
As discussed in the previous section, social capital is an intangible concept 
which lends itself to the use of proxies to provide observable and measurable 
indications of the level of social capital a CEO may have. A CEO’s internal 
ties may be approximated by their insider status, that is, whether they 
worked in the firm prior to being appointed as CEO. A CEO’s reputation may 
be proxied by their previous track record of overseeing good or poor 
organisational performance. Both of these proxies are discussed further in 
the following sub-sections.  
2.4.1 CEO insiderness 
Through the lens of social capital theory, a CEO’s insiderness can be viewed 
as a proxy for having internal social capital, specifically, the internal bonding 
ties described in the previous section. These arise from the social 
relationships formed with the board which will ‘affect how both individual 
directors and the board as a whole function’ (Johnson et al., 2012; pg. 12).  
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Within the field of CEO succession research the insiderness of the CEO has 
been of particular interest as an explanatory variable but it has been 
conceptualised in many different ways. Although most often implemented as 
a dichotomous firm insider dummy variable, even this seemingly simply 
definition has been operationalised in several ways. For example, whilst 
some authors define an insider as anyone currently employed in the firm at 
the point of succession (Davidson et al., 2002; Boyne et al., 2011a; Desai et 
al., 2015) others use more complex definitions. An insider has been defined 
as: an executive who worked in the firm during the span of the predecessor 
CEO (Dalton and Kesner, 1983; Bommer and Ellstrand, 1996), someone with 
at least one year with the firm prior to succession (Ang et al., 2003; Fee and 
Hadlock, 2003; Huson et al., 2004; Hamori and Koyuncu, 2015), someone 
with at least two years with the firm prior to succession (Cannella Jr et al., 
1991; Bragaw and Misangyi, 2015), someone with at least five years with the 
firm prior to succession (Datta and Guthrie, 1994), and someone who was 
part of the firm’s senior management team or served on the board 
immediately prior to succession (Lauterbach et al., 1999).  
Fee and Hadlock (2003) extended their definition of an insider to include 
former employees, a view shared by Boeker and Goodstein (1993). Hill 
(2005) used Texas school districts in his study and defined an insider as 
anyone recruited from within the same district. Some researchers have tried 
to make the dichotomous insider/outsider concept more distinct by only 
including successors at the extremes of being an insider or outsider. For 
example Chung et al. (1987) defined an insider as someone who had been 
with the firm for at least five years, and an outsider as someone with less 
than one year with the firm. Any successor with between one and five year’s 
tenure at the point of succession was excluded from their study. Similarly, 
Davidson et al. (1990) used six years as the cut off for an insider and 
excluded any successor with between one and six years tenure. In some 
cases the insider status of a successor CEO was determined by the CEO 




The dichotomous insider/outsider categorisation has been criticised as being 
too simplistic (Davidson et al., 2002), particularly when it is operationalised in 
such different ways. It has been extended by some authors, for example, 
Guthrie and Datta (1997) and Datta and Rajagopalan (1998) used 
organisational tenure as a continuous variable. Shen and Cannella Jr (2002) 
used three categories, contender, follower and outsider, to better differentiate 
between insiders who were appointed after the previous CEO was dismissed 
(contenders) and those who were appointed after a retirement (follower). 
Zhang and Rajagopalan (2003) split the outsider category to differentiate 
between those from within the same industry and those from a different 
industry. Finkelstein and Hambrick's (1996) criticism of the overly simplistic 
binary insider/outsider conceptualisation resulted in a new approach using a 
continuum of insiderness. Karaevli (2007) built on this approach to define 
insiderness as: 
‘a continuum ranging from new CEOs who have a greater combination 
of firm and industry tenure to those who have no experience in the 
firm and the industry’ (pg. 694) 
Another conceptualisation of insiderness comes from Petrovsky et al. (2015) 
who propose the concept of publicness-fit. Specific to the public sector, this 
denotes the extent to which a manager’s past experience matches the 
requirements of the hiring organisation. Whereas Karaevli and Zajac (2013) 
define insiderness using a continuum of firm and industry experience, 
Petrovsky et al use three dimensions to reflect the degree of publicness for 
an organisation at any point in time: public ownership, the degree of public 
funding, and public control or regulation.  
For the purposes of my research a dichotomous definition of insiderness has 
been used such that a CEO is an insider if they worked in the recruiting firm 
immediately prior to being appointed its CEO. Whilst this simplistic definition 
easily differentiates between insiders and outsiders to the firm it takes no 




2.4.2 Organisational performance 
The second proxy for social capital used in my research is that of 
organisational performance. Here, a CEO’s reputational social capital is 
assumed to be enhanced by having a track record of overseeing good 
performance or diminished if overseeing poor performance. This correlation 
between performance and reputational social capital is facilitated by the 
personalisation of leadership in which CEOs are held directly accountable for 
the success or failure of an organisation (Anandaciva et al., 2018). CEOs 
with a good reputation are likely to want to maintain that status (Harris and 
Helfat, 2007; Johnson et al., 2011) hence it can affect their decisions which 
in turn can affect the performance of the organisation (Sauerwald et al., 
2016).  
The concept of organisational performance is difficult to apply to the public 
sector given the differences in what constitutes good performance. Unlike the 
private sector, which has clear financial benchmarks for performance, the 
public sector has myriad targets that could potentially be used to assess 
performance and opinions on which should be used often differ between 
stakeholders (McCabe et al., 2008). Further, the metrics that are deemed 
appropriate often change over time and will differ between agencies 
(Petrovsky et al., 2017). NHS CEOs are judged on the key deliverables of 
achievement of government targets for standards of quality service provision 
and managing finances. A more intangible deliverable is the quality of 
relationships with stakeholders (Hoggettbowers, 2009).  
The CEO, as the most senior executive, is often the focal point of any blame 
when things go wrong and admiration when things go well (McCabe et al., 
2008; Anandaciva et al., 2018). Because of this, it is important to consider 
organisational performance when looking at CEO succession. However, as 
stated by McCabe et al. (2008): 
‘Examining administrators’ actual performance in office is problematic, 
given the difficulty of defining and measuring good and bad 
performance’ (pg. 382) 
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This is particularly relevant in the public sector where measures of 
performance are diverse and changeable. To understand the actual 
performance of the CEO we would need to gather performance appraisals 
and subjective assessments from their peers and superiors. This is not 
practical for quantitative research, so the performance of the organisation is 
used as a proxy. Often, an organisation’s economic performance is used to 
mirror the choice of metrics in the private sector literature and to act as a 
proxy for the CEO’s performance (McCabe et al., 2008). However, a much 
broader range of performance metrics is available, encompassing clinical 
safety, staff satisfaction, operational performance and throughput measures 
(Janke et al, 2018).  
Throughout my research organisational performance is used in two different 
ways. The first, as described here, is to act as a proxy for CEO reputational 
social capital. This takes the form of the performance of the trust immediately 
prior to a CEO turnover event where that performance is assumed to be 
attributable to the CEO. It also takes the form of the performance of the 
CEO’s previous trust as a marker for their track record. The second use is as 
a moderating variable in the form of the baseline performance of the 
recruiting trust immediately prior to a CEO succession event where that 
event involves a new CEO being appointed (Kim and Cannella, 2008). In this 
latter use the performance of the trust is assumed to be attributable to the 
previous CEO. 
2.4.3 Summary  
This section has reviewed the literature on social capital with respect to 
CEOs and provided definitions for the two proxies used throughout my 
research, CEO insiderness and their track record of overseeing 
organisational performance. Social capital can help explain why some people 
are more successful than others (Coleman, 1988; Adler and Kwon, 2002) as 
it imbues them with power and influence that can be leveraged to ensure 
their preferences and needs are met over and above those of the 
organisation (Harris and Helfat, 2007; Sauerwald et al., 2016). The next 
section describes the case study context used in my research, that of the 
NHS and provides a brief history of its form and function. This is followed by 
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a review of the literature on the three main topics of CEO succession 
research: the antecedents of succession, the selection of a new CEO, and 
the impact a new CEO has on post-succession organisational performance.  
2.5 The NHS 
The NHS was formed on 5th July 1948 to provide healthcare that was free to 
all at the point of delivery. Despite multiple attempts over the years to 
restructure the system to be more integrated, it retains its original tri-partite 
separation between primary care, acute care and community care. Under the 
present leadership of CEO Sir Simon Stevens the NHS is moving ever closer 
to removing these historic barriers with tangible steps being taken to 
integrate care across all three elements of healthcare with the 
implementation of Sustainability Transformation Partnerships (STPs) and 
Integrated Care Systems (ICSs) (NHS, 2017). As a public-sector 
organisation, it is funded through general taxation, which makes it distinct 
from private sector firms. The public sector has unique organisational goals 
and values (Petrovsky et al., 2015). Whereas a private sector firm’s goal is 
profit maximisation, a public-sector organisation usually has goals of 
maximising efficiency, minimising costs, and maximising societal value. It is 
clear then, that using the NHS as a case study gives rise to additional 
considerations in the selection of performance measures and the general 
context of the research. 
In April 2013, the NHS underwent a significant restructure that saw 
responsibility for the NHS move out of the Department of Health into a new 
NHS Commissioning Board (swiftly renamed NHS England). Although this 
restructure is considered one of the most significant in its history, it had little 
impact on the organisational form of NHS trusts. The 211 Clinical 
Commissioning Groups (CCGs) formed in April 2013 have now reduced to 
135 as at April 2020, down from 191 in April 2019 as neighbouring CCGs 
choose to merge. These mergers are driven by the shift towards STPs and 
ICSs, larger geographical systems that take responsibility for the entire 
health and care needs of their population in return for more control and 
freedom in deciding how to deliver that care. The NHS deals with more than 
26 
 
one million patients every 36 hours (CONFED, 2017) and employs in excess 
of 1.2 million staff (NHS Digital, 2020) at a cost of £140 billion a year (King’s 
Fund, 2020). 
The NHS has been in a near constant state of reform for 30 years with barely 
a year passing without some part of it affected by a major upheaval. The 
NHS is a political jewel in the crown, used by a succession of politicians to 
further their careers by altering it in some way. This is evident even now in 
2020 with the current Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, seeking to take back 
control of the NHS from NHS England and return power to the Secretary of 
State for Health and Social Care (Campbell, 2020). The short-term nature of 
politics has meant that in the absence of any desire to make real long-term 
improvements to the NHS, instead a series of immediate structural changes 
have been implemented to at least give the impression of change. Quite 
often these reforms are not evidence based and, more tellingly, are not 
evaluated properly. The instant gratification of an easily implementable 
structural change taking precedence over any better options. No matter what 
reforms are implemented, the lines of accountability for the NHS still end up 
with the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and, by proxy the 
Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC). This means that there is a 
constant pressure to centralise control despite the impossibility of managing 
such an enormous organisation from the centre (Browne and Young, 2002; 
Walshe, 2003). This centralised control is facilitated by the funding of the 
NHS from general taxation and provides a valuable lever over its 
management (Greener, 2006). 
The most notable of these reforms is NPM, a range of public sector reforms 
occurring in the late 1970s to late 1990s (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; 
Christensen and Lægreid, 1999). NPM was partly underpinned by the theory 
of managerialism (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991; Keauden and Van Mierlo, 
1998; Kaboolian, 1998; Christensen and Lægreid, 1999; Gruening, 2001; 
Ward, 2010) which focuses on the belief that organisations can better 
achieve their objectives by the adoption of business practices from the 
private sector (Aucoin, 1990; Keauden and Van Mierlo, 1998; Kapucu, 2007; 
Ward, 2010). NPM can be classed as a two level phenomenon. At its highest 
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level it can be considered a theory in which the public sector can be 
improved through the use of private sector business practices; at a lower 
level it is simply a list of components as enumerated below (Dunleavy et al., 
2006; Pollitt, 2007). The first list of NPM components was compiled by Hood 
(1991) and he is also credited with creating the NPM label. Hood’s list, which 
is repeated in numerous other articles about NPM, contained seven 
components which he later split into two categories (Hood, 1995). The first of 
these, public sector distinctiveness, contained four components: splitting 
organisational units into smaller sub-units based on product lines, increased 
competitiveness, the adoption of management practices from the private 
sector, and greater discipline in the use of resources. The other category, 
rules versus discretion, contained the remaining three components: visibly 
involved top-management, performance measures, and output controls. 
These components were generated by the two paradigms credited with 
providing the theoretical basis for NPM. 
It is to its detriment that the NHS is most often portrayed as being on the 
brink of financial crisis, both by those seeking more money from the state 
and from the state itself, providing itself with a reason for reform (Portillo, 
1998). Understanding the political grip on the NHS is important since it can 
help explain the many differences between the NHS, a public body, and the 
private sector organisations most often referenced in the CEO succession 
literature. Although there are a few studies using hospitals as case studies, 
these tend to be in the USA, which has a very different health system to 
England. Only recently has a paper looking at CEOs in the English NHS 
been published (Janke et al., 2018), which provides an excellent reference 
point for this research and will be discussed later in this literature review and 
in the chapter on post-succession performance. 
2.5.1 NHS trusts 
NHS trusts were first formed in 1991 as a result of the NHS and Community 
Care Act (1990) which created an internal market. Health authorities were 
the purchasers and trusts became a supplier of secondary care. Trusts were, 
and are, independent organisations that have their own CEO, board and 
management. Initially, 57 trusts were created but by 1994 there were 391 
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with a further 44 in the pipeline (Lapsley, 1997). As of July 2017 there were 
135 acute non-specialist trusts and, although this figure varies over the 
years, these are the trusts included in the research described in this thesis. 
An NHS trust is responsible for the financial oversight of the one or more 
hospitals they manage, in addition to the strategic planning for those 
hospitals. All trusts share similar, if not the same, goals of prolonging and 
improving patients’ lives through the provision of secondary health care. 
Whilst the size of trusts can vary enormously, from a few hundred to a couple 
of thousand overnight beds (NHS England, 2020b), these size effects can be 
controlled for or the sample can be split into more homogenous groups. 
Trusts are governed differently depending on whether they have foundation 
trust status. The main difference between a foundation and non-foundation 
trust is that it is run locally rather than nationally. A foundation trust achieves 
that status after demonstrating the required degree of financial management 
success. This status gives them freedom from central government control, 
but they are still accountable to Parliament. Foundation trust governance 
involves members, a Board of Governors (elected by members) and a Board 
of Directors.  However, in reality, the foundation trust model has not devolved 
very far from non-foundation trusts in terms of its governance and, as stated 
by Collins (2016) in a scathing review of the subject: 
‘It is now increasingly difficult to describe a clear distinction between 
foundation trusts and NHS trusts, with foundation trusts subject to 
greater central control than at any time in their history. (pg. 1) 
This lack of distinction means that a trust’s governance structure is not 
substantively different regardless of whether it has foundation status and 
thus we can assume that the authority structures are suitably homogenous to 
meet the demands set forth by Grusky (1963). 
2.5.2 Summary  
This section has set out the NHS as the case study context for my research, 
highlighting the history of the NHS and the NPM reforms that have positioned 
it as a suitable case study. The rest of this literature review focuses on the 
three main topics for CEO succession research: the antecedents of 
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succession; the selection of a new CEO; and the impact a new CEO has on 
post-succession organisational performance. The literature on these three 
topics is discussed with reference to social capital theory as the dominant 
lens through which my research is undertaken. The next section provides a 
brief overview of the history of CEO succession research before focusing on 
the three main topics identified for future research.  
2.6 A history of CEO succession research 
Research into CEO successions originated in the 1960s (Grusky, 1963; 
Kesner and Sebora, 1994; Berns and Klarner, 2017) and quickly became of 
interest to strategic management scholars in addition to corporate 
governance and organisational behaviour researchers. Over the years there 
have been three key reviews of the CEO succession literature (Kesner and 
Sebora, 1994; Giambatista et al., 2005; Berns and Klarner, 2017). Kesner 
and Sebora's (1994) review of the previous 30 years of research in this field 
categorised papers into related strands of research. In the 1960s, the 
dominant themes were successor origin, organisation size and succession 
rate, succession rate and post-succession performance, and succession 
contingencies. In the 1970s, new streams emerged on successor 
characteristics, succession frequency, succession and boards, and 
frameworks and typologies. Further additions in the 1980s and 1990s 
included a focus on stock market reactions to top management change, 
succession planning, the succession process, the consequences of 
succession, and matching managers to roles.  
A subsequent review by Giambatista et al. (2005) looked at the literature 
from 1994 to 2004 and found that there were two broad categories of 
research: antecedents of succession, and consequences of succession. The 
antecedent literature includes studies looking at board related antecedents, 
firm performance, CEO characteristics and actions, firm and industry 
characteristics, and succession planning variables. The literature on 
consequences focuses on performance for sports teams and business 
organisations separately, looking at market-related consequences and other 
performance related consequences. A CEO’s characteristics include their 
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capital, what experience they have and how this enhances their value or 
attractiveness to an organisation. The most recent review by Berns and 
Klarner (2017) covers the entire history, from 1960 through to 2017, and sets 
out a conceptual framework garnered from the extant literature. This 
framework suggests that succession research is focused on four key strands: 
the antecedents of succession, the type of succession, the impact a new 
CEO has on post-succession strategy and performance, and the 
contingencies which may influence CEO successions.  
This framework reflects the current research interests in CEO succession 
with contingencies playing into the other three topics. The three main topics 
of interest are therefore: the antecedents of succession, the selection of a 
new CEO, and the impact a new CEO has on post-succession organisational 
performance. Each of these areas is addressed in turn in the following 
sections. The bulk of the extant literature uses private sector organisations 
as case studies so much of the discussion is on those private sector firms, 
but I also address the limited literature using public sector organisations.  
2.7 Antecedents of CEO turnover 
This section discusses the literature on the antecedents of CEO turnover, 
that is, are there factors that make CEO turnover more likely and if so, what 
are those factors? This is the first of the three main topics in CEO succession 
research and the focus of my first empirical chapter. It is structured as 
follows: firstly, the different types of turnover are discussed. These include, at 
a high level, both forced and voluntary turnover events. This is followed by a 
discussion on the various antecedents of turnover that have thus far been 
explored in the literature, alongside the results of those studies. These 
antecedents can include both push and pull factors which may help explain 
why some CEOs have a shorter tenure than others (Boyne et al., 2010a; 
Rutherford and Lozano, 2018). For completeness, evidence is also gathered 
from studies looking at turnover for other top executives in the top 
management team. The discussion looks at the literature from the private 
and public sector. It is important to include both types of organisations as 
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there are functional differences in organisational form which may be 
important.  
How CEOs leave their jobs is relevant to why they leave as not all CEO 
turnover events are equal. Broadly, a turnover event can be categorised as 
forced or voluntary, but each of these has several sub-categories to further 
explain the reason for leaving. A voluntary departure could be due to 
retirement or a new job, whereas a forced departure could be due to 
dismissal, death, or ill-health. From a theoretical viewpoint, some reasons for 
leaving are of more interest than others (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Campbell et 
al., 2017) and this is reflected in the literature with a heavy bias towards 
looking at dismissals. Dismissals are a type of involuntary turnover, where 
the CEO is pushed out, which are of both theoretical and practical interest. 
Dismissals can only occur when the board decides that the current CEO 
should be removed from their post. In these cases, the turnover is 
involuntary and they are removed in the hope that doing so will create 
opportunities for improved performance (Wangrow et al., 2018). However, 
dismissals are rarely reported as such with recent data showing that of 1,160 
CEO turnover events in USA firms during 2017, just 23 (2%) were reported 
as dismissals (Challenger et al, 2018). It is more common to find dismissals 
couched in more favourable terms in a face-saving effort to reduce 
embarrassment to both firm and employee (Gregory-Smith et al., 2009; 
Finkelstein et al., 2009). Other types of involuntary turnover are less 
theoretically interesting as they do not involve any element of choice. They 
are also likely to account for a very small proportion of leavers. Recent 
reports show that just 5% of turnover events are for involuntary reasons 
other than dismissal (Challenger et al, 2018).  
Voluntary departures do involve an element of choice and so might be 
expected to be influenced by external factors such as organisational 
conditions or events. This makes them more interesting to study, yet 
voluntary departures are an as-yet untapped research area for CEO turnover 
literature (Campbell et al., 2017). CEOs are less likely than other top 
executives to leave voluntarily. This is because they are already the most 
senior person on the executive team and so moving to another firm would 
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need to bring with it some other incentive, a pull factor, such as higher pay or 
more prestige (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Recent data shows that 30% of 
CEOs stepped down to another board level position, 28% retired, and 15% 
resigned (Challenger et al, 2018) so this offers a rich ground for future 
research. Particularly in the USA, CEOs can earn massive salaries, have 
access to fantastic perks and some even become celebrities. Therefore, why 
would anyone want to leave that position (Campbell et al., 2017)? This 
question is addressed by looking at the antecedents of CEO turnover.  
The antecedents of CEO turnover have been categorised in many ways over 
the years, with these categories becoming more refined as the research area 
matures. Harrison et al. (1988) looked at top management turnover and 
suggested that this was driven by the incumbent CEO’s characteristics, 
organisational characteristics or characteristics of the external environment. 
Giambatista et al. (2005) also identified CEO characteristics and 
organisational characteristics as types of antecedents, but also added board-
related factors and firm performance, both of which could admittedly be 
classed as organisational characteristics, along with succession planning as 
a fifth type. Finkelstein et al. (2009), in their wide-ranging review of the CEO 
succession literature, also grouped antecedents into five categories: firm 
performance, agency conditions, other organisational characteristics, 
external environment, and incumbent CEO characteristics. More recently, 
Wangrow et al. (2018) looked at themes of power and socio-political 
constructs in the context of coach turnover in the National Basketball 
Association. In their recent review of the CEO succession literature, Berns 
and Klarner (2017) also recognised four groups of factors: environmental, 
organisational, board level, and individual level. It is clear from this that there 
is broad agreement about the types of antecedents that are expected to 
influence CEO turnover, in the private sector at least. 
2.7.1    Labour market framework 
Within the public sector literature, Grissom and Andersen (2012) have 
developed a framework based on labour market theory to explain why CEOs 
leave. This framework has subsequently been adapted by other researchers 
and thus provides a firm grounding on which to conduct further research. The 
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framework assumes that a decision to stay or leave is determined by 
decisions made by two parties. In the case of Grissom and Andersen's 
(2012) paper these two parties are the school superintendent and the school 
board, that is, superintendent turnover can be considered an outcome in the 
labour market for superintendents. On the labour supply side, the 
superintendent considers the costs and benefits of staying in their post 
against the perceived value of the next best alternative. A decision to stay or 
leave is based on that equation and is considered to be voluntary turnover 
because any decision to leave resulted from the superintendent’s decision-
making process. On the labour demand side, a similar decision-making 
process occurs with the board weighing up the costs and benefits of retaining 
the superintendent against the potential costs and benefits of replacing them. 
Any turnover resulting from this process is determined to be involuntary since 
the decision to leave was not the manager’s. The decision-making process 
for either party is a black box to researchers with only the inputs and outputs 
visible. This means that any research can only focus on those inputs and the 
eventual outcomes. Therefore, the inputs feeding into that black box need to 
reflect the key factors that could sway a decision. By identifying the factors 
that contribute to high turnover, the organisation can develop strategies to 
tackle it (Grissom and Mitani, 2016). Within the context of the public sector, it 
is important to understand what factors affect CEO turnover as CEOs are 
faced with political and accountability pressures that other staff don’t have to 
deal with (Rutherford and Lozano, 2018), nor do their counterparts in the 
private sector.  
For the initial studies using public sector organisations, the inputs to this 
decision-making process were largely gleaned from existing research in the 
private sector. Boyne et al. (2008), although not explicitly following a 
structured labour market framework, grouped inputs into three organisational 
level categories: environment, politics, and performance. Essentially 
proposing that the causes of CEO turnover can be attributed to either the 
‘external context of an organisation or its internal characteristics’ (pg. 267). 
The three categories identified by Boyne et al. (2008) have been adapted by 
other public sector researchers and amended to suit particular contexts. 
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Grissom and Andersen (2012) identified four categories of inputs at district, 
board, and superintendent level, plus superintendent performance whilst 
Petrovsky et al. (2017) used individual, organisational, and environmental 
level factors. What becomes clear from the existing literature is that there are 
common themes for the factors most likely to influence whether a CEO stays 
or leaves and by synthesising with conclusions from the private sector 
literature a picture emerges of two broad categories of CEO characteristics 
that are important, namely: organisational level factors and CEO 
characteristics, each of which is discussed in more detail in the following 
sections.  
2.7.2 Organisational factors 
The most commonly studied antecedent from the organisational factor 
category is organisational performance and the research is clear that CEOs 
lose their jobs when organisational performance is poor, that is, poor 
organisational performance precedes CEO turnover (Giambatista et al., 
2005; Finkelstein et al., 2009) hence it can be considered a push factor. As 
discussed in a previous section, organisational performance can be viewed 
as a proxy for a CEO’s status and reputation, that is, a facet of their social 
capital. Most research into the antecedents of CEO turnover in the public 
sector have focused on organisational performance (McCabe et al., 2008; 
Boyne et al., 2008; 2010a; Grissom and Andersen, 2012; Grissom and 
Mitani, 2016) as a predictor of CEO exit, although they do not make an 
explicit link between organisational performance and a CEO’s reputational 
social capital.  
Performance is operationalised in various ways, but studies consistently 
show that the relationship is present, with poor baseline performance 
increasing the likelihood of CEO turnover (Grusky, 1963; Gamson and 
Scotch, 1964; Lauterbach et al., 1999; Huson et al., 2001; Crain et al., 2018). 
Some studies provided evidence of a relationship between poor stock returns 
and CEO turnover (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Warner and Watts, 1988), 
others between profitability measures and CEO turnover (Salancik and 
Pfeffer, 1980; Harrison et al., 1988), others still between both stocks and 
profitability and CEO turnover (Denis et al., 1997; Huson et al., 2001). 
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However, the explanatory power of poor performance is low and therefore 
explains little of the variance in turnover. A better approach might be to 
distinguish between types of poor performance, that is, are low performance, 
consistently low performance, steadily dropping performance equally likely to 
result in a CEO being dismissed (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Further, previous 
research has shown a negative linear relationship between performance and 
dismissal, but this relationship may not be linear across the entire range of 
performance (Wangrow et al., 2018), another area worth exploring. 
Performance has also been used as a moderator for other antecedents such 
as prior board level experience and board size (Ocasio, 1994). The 
conclusions from the private sector literature are mixed. Some studies found 
that poor performance was positively associated with the risk of exit (Furtado 
and Karan, 1990), others found that CEO dismissals were not well explained 
by poor performance (Fredrickson et al., 1988), whilst others found no 
support for a link between poor performance and exit (Ocasio, 1994). 
Methodological differences may help to explain these varied findings as 
some studies looked at just CEOs whilst others looked at the entire top 
management team.  
Within the public sector, even where there is no proof that the organisational 
performance is caused by the managers, poor performance has been found 
to be a predictor of managerial turnover (Boyne et al., 2008). Boyne is 
responsible for a large body of research on CEO turnover in English local 
authorities and built on his 2008 paper to look at the impact of organisational 
performance on both CEO and top management team turnover (Boyne et al., 
2010b). He concluded that performance has a negative effect on CEO 
turnover but the effect was stronger for the top management team than for 
the CEO, thus implying that poor performance really was to blame for 
turnover rather than there being an alternative explanation such as high 
performing organisations being better at retaining high-quality managers. 
Grissom and Andersen (2012) also found that performance was negatively 
associated with CEO turnover, although this used a subjective evaluation of 
the CEO’s performance conducted by the school board. A subsequent paper 
showed that the relationship between performance and superintendent 
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turnover is non-linear with both very low and very high performers more likely 
to stay in post (Grissom et al., 2016).   
2.7.3 Further organisational factors 
Although organisational performance is the main factor of interest for my 
research, other organisational level factors have been used in the extant 
literature to help explain differences in CEO tenure and are discussed in the 
following sub-sections. 
2.7.3.1 Firm size 
Firm size is has been studied relatively often (Giambatista et al., 2005). 
Grusky (1963) was the first scholar to look at firm size and found that larger 
firms experienced more executive departures than smaller firms. He 
concluded that larger firms can absorb the impact of a CEO departure better 
than smaller firms, who find it more disruptive. Therefore, larger firms may be 
more willing to dismiss the CEO if performance is poor. However, a limitation 
of Grusky’s study is that no very small firms were included in the sample and 
hence the result may be skewed. Subsequent attempts to duplicate Grusky’s 
findings have provided mixed results with some supporting his conclusions 
(James and Soref, 1981) and others concluding that organisational size has 
no effect on the likelihood of CEO turnover (Pfeffer and Leblebici, 1973; 
Boeker, 1992). Finkelstein et al. (2009) suggest that organisational size will 
be positively correlated with CEO turnover rates because CEOs in large 
firms are appointed when they are older yet work for firms with mandatory 
retirement ages. Although this only applies in countries where a mandatory 
retirement age is in force, such as the USA. 
2.7.3.2 Board composition 
The composition of the board and firm ownership are also expected to affect 
CEO turnover when considered through the lens of agency theory (Salancik 
and Pfeffer, 1980). Agency theory is concerned with the relationship between 
the owner of a company, the principle, and the manager of the company, the 
agent (Hill and Jones, 1992). It is predicated on the assumption that both 
principle and agent are utility maximisers and will choose to act in their own 
self-interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Chambers et al., 2013; Donaldson 
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and Davis, 1991). This means that the interests of the opportunistic agent will 
diverge from those of the principle (Hill and Jones, 1992) and thus the agent 
will make decisions that maximise his own utility rather than those of the 
principle because, under agency theory, the agent is not motivated to 
maximise profits (Davis et al., 1997). In the UK and USA, where companies 
tend to have widely dispersed ownership, shareholders delegate control to a 
board of directors, the classic separation of ownership and control. Because 
each shareholder might only own a few shares it is not cost effective for an 
individual to monitor their agent. Not only would it be expensive and time 
consuming, but all the other shareholders would benefit from their efforts. 
Each shareholder waits for another to carry out monitoring but inevitably 
none of them actually do it. Thus, corporate governance is necessary to 
provide oversight of managerial behaviour (Hart, 1995). One of Hart’s 
suggested control mechanisms is a board of directors. The board of directors 
is appointed by the shareholders to act on their behalf and to monitor the 
management layer beneath. Boards usually comprise internal managers, the 
executive directors, and external non-executive directors whose job it is to 
keep the executives in line. Therefore, the proportion of non-executive 
‘outsiders’ on the board might reasonably be expected to influence the 
likelihood of CEO dismissal when performance is poor since outside 
directors are expected to be more effective at monitoring managers (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983) than insiders who may feel beholden to the CEO for their 
own careers (Weisbach, 1988).  
A number of studies have looked at this with the assumption that an increase 
in outside directors would lead to an increase in the likelihood of CEO 
turnover (Boeker, 1992; Huson et al., 2001). This view is supported by 
several studies, for example, Salancik and Pfeffer (1980) found that higher 
proportions of insider board members was associated with longer CEO 
tenure. Weisbach (1988) found that the relationship between performance 
and CEO tenure was only present in firms with boards dominated by 
outsiders. Boeker (1992) found that when performance was poor, the 
proportion of inside directors on the board was negatively related to CEO 
dismissal. However, at least one study disagreed with these findings and 
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concluded that there was no relationship between board independence and 
CEO turnover under conditions of poor performance (Denis et al., 1997). 
Further, some studies actually found the opposite, that more inside directors 
increased the likelihood of CEO turnover under conditions of poor 
performance (Ocasio, 1994; Phan and Lee, 1995). 
2.7.4 CEO characteristics 
The second top-level category of antecedents is CEO characteristics, which 
can include tenure, managerial ability and career background (Giambatista et 
al., 2005), gender (Grissom et al., 2016; Petrovsky et al., 2017), age 
(Grissom et al., 2016; Petrovsky et al., 2017; Wangrow et al., 2018), and 
education (Grissom et al., 2016; Petrovsky et al., 2017). However, in the 
context of social capital theory, the most important CEO level factor is that of  
‘insiderness’, the amount of time spent in the firm prior to becoming the CEO. 
Being an insider can give a CEO greater power and an increased ability to 
influence the board’s decisions, particularly under conditions of poor 
organisational performance when one might expect a CEO to be pushed out. 
As stated by Boeker (1992): 
“CEO dismissal is more likely when organisational performance is 
poor, and the power of the CEO is low.” (pg. 400)    
Poor performance will lead to CEO turnover unless the CEO is powerful 
enough to prevent that from happening. Turnover can be because the CEO 
is scapegoated (Gamson and Scotch, 1964) or because the firm wants to 
change direction and needs to sweep out the current CEO and their 
strategies. Therefore, it is of interest to explore under what conditions the 
CEO lacks sufficient power to survive (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1980). Although 
Nath and Mahajan (2017) used Chief Marketing Officers as the unit of 
analysis rather than CEOs, their findings are likely applicable to CEOs. They 
looked at insiderness and found that the likelihood of turnover reduced as 
insiderness increased. Zhang (2008) found strong support for their 
hypothesis that outsider CEOs would have a higher likelihood of dismissal 
than insider CEOs.  
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Various theoretical lenses can be used to identify potential CEO 
characteristics, for example, Phan and Lee (1995) used social network 
theory to look at personal prestige and found that this did reduce the 
likelihood of CEO turnover. However, their proxies for prestige were 
membership of prestigious social circles such as the Ivy League, and holding 
multiple directorships of Fortune 500 companies. They also used human 
capital theory to look at educational background, specialised skills, and firm-
specific skills, but found no evidence that any of these factors influenced 
CEO turnover. However, having industry-specific skills did reduce the 
likelihood of turnover.  
CEO age has also been used (Harrison et al., 1988) although there is an 
obvious correlation between age and retirement. When looking at a 
dichotomous outcome for staying or leaving, Grissom and Andersen (2012) 
found that superintendent age was positively associated with an increased 
risk of exit but that attendance at a top university was negatively associated 
with leaving. When splitting this into retirement and non-retirement exits, they 
found that whilst age remained positively associated with retirement, it was 
not significantly associated with non-retirement exits. Attendance at a top 
university dropped out of significance for all exit types, but for non-retirement 
exits whether a superintendent was promoted from within the district was 
found to be negatively associated with exit. In a subsequent study, Grissom 
and Mitani (2016) criticised the 2012 paper on the grounds that it used cross-
sectional data, had a small sample size and excluded important variables 
such as salary. They built on this by using panel methods on longitudinal 
data over a 19-year period and allowing a further separation of exit types into 
movers and true exits from the profession. They found that leavers tend to be 
older and have more years of experience than stayers but concluded overall 
that superintendent characteristics differ in how they are associated with 
different exit types.  
2.7.5    Types of exit 
Within the private sector literature, the main distinction between CEO exits is 
whether they were forced or voluntary, but within the public sector it is rare 
for a dismissal to be declared as such. Therefore, public sector research has 
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relied on exit destinations rather than the reasons behind those exits. This 
allows for a more nuanced analysis than looking at a binary outcome of exits 
versus non-exits.  
When looking at the various types of exit a CEO can make through the lens 
of social capital theory, it is clear that some types of exit may enhance a 
CEO’s social capital whilst others may diminish it. In the private sector 
literature, exits types are usually defined by the reason for exit and include 
retirement, resignation, and dismissal (Campbell et al., 2017; Wangrow et al., 
2018). Whilst it may be possible to identify public sector dismissals in the 
USA, in the UK public sector staff are protected from dismissal by 
bureaucratic and laborious due processes (Boyne et al., 2010a). This makes 
dismissals, also referred to as involuntary exits, very hard to identify, partly 
because they are very rare (Grissom and Andersen, 2012; Grissom et al., 
2016). A CEO may be pushed out without being formally dismissed, that is, 
the CEO and board may come to a mutual agreement that the CEO will step 
down. This is usually presented in a positive light with the CEO wanting to 
explore other opportunities, take up a new challenge, or spend time with 
family. Whilst it can be inferred from this that the CEO was pushed out it is 
not known for certain hence using the reason for exit as an outcome variable 
can be challenging.  
This has been addressed in the public sector literature by using exit 
destinations rather than reasons for exit. Petrovsky et al. (2017) analysed 
pooled exit types but also separated them out into leavers to the public 
sector, private sector and retirement. Rutherford and Lozano's (2018) study 
on USA university presidents used four exit destinations: retirement; a 
sideways move to a new university; moving to the private, public or non-profit 
sector; or taking a different role in the same university. A review of the 
literature on teacher turnover concluded that the factors found to influence 
decisions to move to another teaching role were not necessarily the same as 
those influencing decision to leave the profession. Therefore, it is important 
to distinguish between mobility and attrition (Grissom et al., 2016). Most 
public sector research has ignored this and does not separate out different 
types of exit (Bertelli, 2007; Pitts et al., 2011) or focuses on moving between 
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the public and private sector (Su and Bozeman, 2009). A survey of NHS 
CEOs showed that they viewed moves to other CEO or Director of Finance 
roles in larger or more complex NHS organisations as a promotion 
(Hoggettbowers, 2009).  
2.7.6 Summary and research questions 
This section has discussed the literature on the antecedents of CEO turnover 
in the private and public sector. Broadly, these antecedents can be 
categorised as organisational level or CEO level factors. The primary 
organisational level factor considered in the literature is that of organisational 
performance. However, whilst it is widely studied there have been no 
attempts to explicitly link it to social capital nor to the impact it may have on a 
CEO’s exit destination. This gives rise to my first research question: how 
does organisational performance, as a proxy for reputational social capital, 
affect a CEO’s ability to influence their tenure and their destination on exiting 
the CEO role? 
Within the category of CEO level factors, the concept of insiderness is most 
relevant when using the lens of social capital theory but again, this explicit 
link has not been made in the extant literature. A CEO who worked in the 
firm prior to being appointed its CEO is assumed to have greater internal 
social capital than an outsider. This social capital may give them greater 
power to influence the board’s decisions and thus they may be able to 
prolong their tenure even when faced with push factors that would otherwise 
increase the likelihood of them exiting their post. This gives rise to my 
second research question: how does a CEO’s insider status, as a proxy for 
internal social capital, affect the likelihood of them exiting their post and their 
exit destination? 
2.8 CEO selection 
This section discusses the literature on CEO selection, the second of the 
three main topics in CEO succession research and the focus of my second 
empirical chapter. Although ideally any research into CEO selection would 
include all applicants for a post, in reality this information is often not 
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available and thus much of the CEO succession research literature focuses 
on the actual appointments that are made and any differences between 
those appointed (Dalton and Kesner, 1985; Schnatterly and Johnson, 2008; 
Elsaid et al., 2011; 2016). Considering the lens of social capital theory, the 
proxies identified earlier in this literature review are important when looking 
at CEO selection. Both a CEO’s insider status and their reputation can be 
viewed as key factors in determining whether they are appointed to a new 
CEO role.  
Much of the literature on CEO selection focuses on the choice between the 
internal and external labour markets (Davidson et al., 2002), that is, the 
choice between a candidate already working in the firm, an insider, or one 
external to the firm, an outsider. According to Bailey and Helfat (2003): 
‘The match between successor skills and the future needs of the 
corporation is of critical importance to the success of the firm’ (pg. 
350).  
Therefore, it is vital that boards are able to assess the suitability of potential 
candidates. There is wide agreement that boards may be faced with the 
problems of information asymmetry and adverse selection when appointing a 
new outsider CEO (Zajac, 1990; Shen and Cannella Jr, 2002; Karaevli, 2007; 
Zhang, 2008; Desai et al., 2015). Zhang (2008) finds that relative to inside 
successions, outside successions are characterised by a higher level of 
information asymmetry between the board and potential candidates but the 
risk of information asymmetry and adverse selection is less if the new CEO 
has prior CEO experience. Karaevli (2007) agrees that the lower the degree 
of insiderness, the more chance there is of information asymmetry and 
adverse selection. Insiderness is important because the very decision to hire 
someone from outside a firm indicates that the firm is seeking to make 
strategic changes by breaking with the established leadership (Helmich and 
Brown, 1972; Datta and Guthrie, 1994; Bailey and Helfat, 2003).  
Several authors use the concept of insiderness, albeit with different 
definitions, yet Karaevli and Zajac (2013) suggest that insiderness in and of 
itself is not a main effect, but that it is contingent on the degree of 
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organisational stability, as measured by the nature of the predecessor CEO’s 
departure, the tenure of that predecessor, and firm performance. Karaevli 
and Zajac argue that although outsider CEOs are motivated to make the 
necessary strategic changes, they do not all have the ability to do so. In this 
context, the nature of the predecessor CEO’s departure is important because 
an unexpected departure, through dismissal for example, leaves the board 
needing to make a swift replacement. The time pressures of this can lead to 
greater information asymmetry and a poorer fit between the successor CEO 
and the needs of the firm. This, coupled with the organisational turmoil and 
uncertainty brought about by the dismissal of the CEO, can create conditions 
that are not conducive to the successor CEO being successful. The tenure of 
the previous CEO is important because longevity is associated with 
stagnancy. An outsider successor CEO who replaces a longstanding CEO is 
more likely to be successful in making strategic changes because the firm is 
ripe for that change. The final contingency variable studied by Karaevli and 
Zajac is firm performance. A poorly performing firm is more likely to hire an 
outsider CEO in an attempt to turn around that poor performance, yet a 
poorly performing firm will create more challenges than a high-performing 
firm so the chances of success are lower. By looking at the conditions 
necessary for insiderness to matter, Karaevli and Zajac take existing theory 
and apply that logic to a new context, however, despite making the link 
between insiderness and strategic change they do not look at the 
subsequent performance of the firm – something that is usually of interest to 
scholars.  
There is a significant body of empirical research looking at the choice of a 
CEO successor, specifically, the link between antecedents of succession and 
CEO characteristics. However, the results are mixed and this is generally 
attributed to methodological differences, that is, the different 
operationalisations of the insider/outsider concepts. Dalton and Kesner 
(1983) and Lauterbach et al. (1999) test whether the size of an organisation 
has any bearing on the selection of an insider or outsider. They find that size 
is important with larger firms tending to have more inside successions than 
small firms. They conclude that this is because larger firms have a bigger 
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internal talent pool from which to choose potential successors. Other studies 
have found that organisational size is not a factor (Schwartz and Menon, 
1985). Dalton and Kesner (1985) test the prevailing view that firms with poor 
performance will appoint an outside successor to the role of CEO. However, 
contrary to the extant literature, they find that only mid-performing 
organisations tend to appoint outsiders. Subsequent studies disagree with 
these findings and instead conclude that poor performance is more likely to 
result in the appointment of an outside successor (Schwartz and Menon, 
1985; Boeker and Goodstein, 1993; Datta and Guthrie, 1994; Lauterbach et 
al., 1999). However, evidence has also been found to suggest that it is high 
performing firms that appoint outsiders (Chung et al., 1987). Other 
antecedents of CEO selection tested include advertising intensity (Datta and 
Guthrie, 1994), industry structure (Datta and Rajagopalan, 1998), profitability 
and risk (Cannella Jr et al., 1991); and board composition (Borokhovich et 
al., 1996; Davidson et al., 2002). Other CEO characteristics used include 
functional experience (Datta and Guthrie, 1994; Guthrie and Datta, 1997), 
CEO age (Guthrie and Datta, 1997), organisational tenure  (Guthrie and 
Datta, 1997), education level (Datta and Guthrie, 1994), industry origin 
(Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2003), and international experience (Magnusson et 
al., 2006). 
The findings from these studies are that profitability is negatively associated 
with CEOs’ education level and their propensity to have technical experience 
(Datta and Guthrie, 1994). Firm profitability is positively associated with the 
organisational tenure of selected CEOs. Firms with inferior profitability are 
more likely to select CEOs with throughput functional experience. Firm size 
is positively associated with organisational tenure of selected CEOs. Firm 
size is positively associated with age of selected CEOs (Guthrie and Datta, 
1997). Industry structure is important in selecting a CEO (Datta and 
Rajagopalan, 1998). Firms with more independent boards and with block-
shareholders are more likely to select industry unrelated successors 
(Davidson et al., 2002). There is a strong positive association between the 
proportion of outside directors on a board and the choice of outside CEO 
successor (Borokhovich et al., 1996). Intra-firm succession is associated with 
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an heir apparent (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2003). Institutional ownership 
interacts with firm performance to influence successor choice (Bommer and 
Ellstrand, 1996) and international experience is an important construct 
associated with CEO succession (Magnusson et al., 2006).  
In the discussion above, the baseline organisational performance of the 
recruiting firm has been referenced as a contingency factor. This is not to be 
confused with using organisational performance as a proxy for a CEO’s 
reputational social capital. If a CEO candidate currently works in a high-
performing firm, their reputational social capital will benefit from that since at 
least part of that firm’s success will be attributed to the managerial prowess 
of that individual (Anandaciva et al., 2018). Conversely, a CEO candidate 
overseeing poor performance in their current firm will have their reputation, 
and thus social capital, diminished by that association.  
2.8.1 Summary and research questions 
This section has discussed the selection of a new CEO with particular 
reference to the insider status of the CEO as a proxy for firm-specific social 
capital. It also addressed the use of a CEO candidate’s reputation as a 
marker of social capital using the performance of their previous firm as a 
proxy. Although my research is limited by only having access to data on 
successful candidates it is still possible to explore the extent to which social 
capital is valued by recruiting firms by comparing the numbers of 
appointments with specific characteristics against those without those 
characteristics. Thus, my third research question is: is social capital valued 
by recruiting organisations? This applies to the use of both proxies for social 
capital.  
The literature review in this section highlighted the importance of baseline 
organisational performance as a contingency factor when appointing a new 
CEO. The assumption is that firms experiencing poor performance will place 
a greater value on external candidates as they will be seeking to make 
strategic changes. However, this could be countered by an outsider’s lack of 
social capital, which is generally valued by recruiting firms. Thus, this gives 
rise to my fourth research question: does the baseline performance of the 
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organisation affect the value placed on social capital, as proxied by insider 
status, by the recruiting organisation? 
2.9 Post-succession organisational performance 
The third and final dimension of CEO succession research is the relationship 
between succession and post-succession organisational performance, the 
consequences of succession. Three competing theories of succession 
emerged during the early years of succession research. The common sense, 
or adaptive theory suggests that when a firm is performing poorly a new 
manager can help improve performance as he brings in fresh ideas and has 
different skills, that is, transferable human capital (Grusky, 1963). On the 
other hand, Grusky also proposed that the opposite was true, that 
succession was in fact disruptive and a new manager would create a vicious 
cycle of worsening performance as the stability of a firm is disrupted and 
morale drops. The third theory was proposed by Gamson and Scotch (1964) 
as a challenge to Grusky’s theories and states that even though a new 
manager is often brought in after poor firm performance, there is no 
expectation that post-succession organisational performance will actually 
improve, hence succession is a ritual scapegoating process designed merely 
to pacify shareholders. Whilst these theories have been referenced in 
several studies there is a view that they are not developed enough to truly 
count as theories because they lack rigour in answering the ‘why’ question 
(Van de Ven, 1989) to explain causality (Giambatista et al., 2005).  
Both the Lieberson and Connor (1972) and Salanick and Pfeffer (1977) 
studies concluded that top managers have no impact on organisational 
performance. That is, they find support for the scapegoating theory. 
However, these studies have been criticised by Day and Lord (1988) for 
failing to consider important factors such as performance time lags. Day and 
Lord therefore blame these two studies for the general perception that top 
managers have a minimal impact on performance. The scapegoating theory 
has also been dismissed by Boyne et al. (2011a) who argue that it has at 
least two flaws that render it obsolete: 
47 
 
‘…even if the new incumbent is no more talented, or has no more 
strategic discretion, than the predecessor, performance is likely to rise 
if the very stakeholders pressing for change are reassured by the 
succession and subsequently provide more cooperation... In this case, 
even a ritualistic succession is likely to have some positive effects, 
other things being equal. Second, the prediction that follows from this 
model (no effect of succession on performance) is indistinguishable 
from disruptive and adaptive effects that roughly cancel out.’ (pg. 340) 
Petrovsky et al. (2015) suggest that in any succession event there are both 
adaptive and disruptive effects, the net effect of which will depend on the 
scale of each. It is plausible then that any observed scapegoating is merely 
an example of where the adaptive and disruptive effects of succession have 
cancelled each other out. Because of this uncertainty there is no cohesive 
theoretical basis to explain CEO succession and its link to firm performance 
(Zajac, 1990). The mixed results on whether CEO succession affects firm 
performance have led to a diversification in the research streams to take 
account of contextual variables that may moderate the relationship (Karaevli, 
2007). This supports Shen and Cannella Jr's (2002) argument that it is the 
succession context that influences performance rather than the succession 
event itself. 
The empirical evidence to support or refute these succession theories is 
mixed. Some researchers have found evidence that post-succession 
organisational performance is better for outsiders (Lauterbach et al., 1999; 
Huson et al., 2004). Others have found evidence to the contrary, that 
performance is better for insiders (Zajac, 1990). There is plenty of evidence 
to support the view that senior managers in public organisations do affect 
organisational performance (Hill, 2005; Boyne et al., 2011a; 2011b). Boyne 
et al. (2011a) found that succession has a positive effect when baseline 
performance is poor, and a negative effect when baseline performance is 
high, that is, baseline performance moderates the relationship between 
succession and organisational performance. Hill (2005) found that whilst 
outsiders have an immediate negative effect on organisational performance, 
the long-term impact of succession is positive. Davidson et al. (1990) found 
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that the stock market reacts more favourably to announcements of insider 
CEO succession than outsider. However, a study looking at CEO 
successions in NHS trusts concluded that CEOs had no impact on 
organisational performance (Janke et al., 2018). Their working paper looked 
at the impact of CEOs in NHS trusts over a twelve year period using a range 
of performance measures including inputs such as the number of beds, 
number of nurses as a percentage of all staff, and bed growth. Throughput 
measures such as waiting times, length of stay, staff satisfaction, and 
admissions and performance data such as mortality rates, MRSA infection 
rates, operating surplus, and readmissions. CEO characteristics such as 
gender, clinical background, education level, tenure, and previous CEO 
experience were included. They found that turnover rates for NHS CEOs 
were subject to high separation rates, with a trust expecting to go through, on 
average, 3.5 CEOs over an 11-year period. Basing their methodology on that 
of Bertrand and Schoar (2003), they were unable to find any evidence that 
CEOs in NHS trusts were able to change performance, let alone improve it.   
There is some dissent about the appropriateness of using the 
insider/outsider concept. Desai et al. (2015) claims that the insider/outsider 
distinction is irrelevant and it is experience as a leader that should be 
included in any model. The upper echelons theory proposes that top 
executives’ experiences affect their choices which in turn affect 
organisational performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). As such, previous 
career experience is an important construct and has largely been 
conceptualised in the literature as functional experience, that is, the business 
discipline in which they have the most experience. This is often categorised 
as throughput experience and output experience where throughput refers to 
those disciplines associated with transforming raw materials into products 
and services and output experience is associated with development, 
marketing and sales functions (Guthrie and Datta, 1997). A further dimension 
of career experience is related to the industry in which it was gained (Wang 
et al., 2015).  
In recent years there has been a trend towards exploring different facets of 
experience. For example, some researchers have looked at whether prior 
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experience as a CEO affects post-succession performance. Whilst it might 
be expected that such prior experience would be positively associated with 
post-succession performance because of the job-specific human capital that 
the CEO brings with them, in fact the results show that whilst the stock 
market reacts favourably to successor CEOs with prior CEO experience 
(Elsaid et al., 2011), a successor CEO with prior CEO experience has poorer 
post-succession organisational performance than those without prior CEO 
experience (Zhang, 2008; Elsaid et al., 2011; Bragaw and Misangyi, 2015; 
Hamori and Koyuncu, 2015). Despite this, CEOs are increasingly being hired 
into similar roles to the ones they previously held so boards must believe that 
job-specific human capital is important and transferable (Hamori and 
Koyuncu, 2015). These findings are attributed to a negative transfer of 
human capital (Elsaid et al., 2011). This means that successor CEOs need to 
unlearn entrenched beliefs and habits before they can be effective in their 
new role. Bragaw and Misangyi (2015) even found that increased length of 
prior CEO experience was negatively correlated to the negative learning 
effect in the new role. This negative relationship could be moderated by the 
previous performance of the firm though, as a new CEO may face an uphill 
battle to turn around a failing firm regardless of their talents. In contrast, 
studies using sports teams have found a positive association between prior 
leadership experience and improved post-succession organisational 
outcomes (Desai et al., 2015).  Desai et al suggest that the mixed results in 
the literature about the impact of prior experience are due to ambiguity in 
how job-specific experience is defined.  
Another facet of experience that has been of interest is a successor CEO’s 
experience of board diversity. Zhu and Shen (2016) suggest that a CEO’s 
prior experience with board diversity will affect not only the performance of 
the firm following the succession, but also the propensity for further CEO 
turnover and director turnover. They find evidence to support the view that 
the more diverse the hiring firm’s board is compared to the successor CEO’s 
previous board, the greater the likelihood of post-succession CEO and 
director turnover, and the lower the post-succession organisational financial 
performance. In this study, board diversity is a composite of board members’ 
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age, ethnicity, education, gender, functional expertise, industry background, 
and whether they attended an Ivy League school, that is, it goes a step 
further than other studies that look at these things in isolation. Although the 
evidence supported the authors’ hypotheses, the model is rather simplistic as 
it only includes main effects and control variables. They demonstrated a 
direct link between board diversity and both director turnover and post-
succession organisational performance, and included director turnover as a 
control variable in the organisational performance model, yet failed to 
consider whether director turnover is actually a mediator of the relationship 
between board diversity and post-succession organisational performance. 
Top management team turnover has been identified as a mediator in other 
studies, as discussed further in the next section. There is also no 
consideration of potential moderators to these relationships.  
When considering the relationship between CEO insider status and post-
succession organisational performance these mixed results are largely 
blamed on inconsistencies in the conceptualisation of the insider construct 
(Datta and Guthrie, 1994; Karaevli, 2007). As already discussed above, there 
is no single definition of insider and outsider used across all studies so the 
varying results could, at least in part, be attributable to the different 
definitions.  
2.9.1 Summary and research questions 
This section has discussed the impact a new CEO has on post-succession 
organisational performance. The literature reports mixed results for whether 
a new CEO has a positive or negative impact on organisational performance 
which gives rise to my fifth research question: does CEO succession make a 
difference to organisational performance? 
Three main theories of succession are proposed: disruptive, adaptive, and 
scapegoating. Under the disruptive theory, it is assumed that replacing the 
CEO will cause a decline in performance due to the disruption caused by the 
succession event and the bedding-in period the new CEO requires before 
being effective. Counter to this theory is the adaptive argument which 
assumes a new CEO will lead to an improvement in performance as the 
organisation will adapt to any changes. The third theory argues that CEO 
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succession will have no impact on performance as it is merely a 
scapegoating exercise to make the board look like it is taking action. It is 
reasonable to consider whether the baseline performance of the firm will 
have an impact on subsequent performance changes resulting from a CEO 
succession, hence my sixth research question is: does the impact of a new 
CEO change depending on the baseline performance of the organisation? 
These two research questions have been formulated to address unanswered 
questions in the extant literature with regards to what impact a new CEO 
might have on performance. However, a further development of this is to 
consider the role that social capital plays in these theories. Specifically: how 
does social capital affect the impact a new CEO has on organisational 
performance? 
The next section summarises the gaps in the literature that have been 
identified throughout the course of this literature review.  
2.10 Gap in the literature  
This literature review has addressed the three main topics in CEO 
succession research: the antecedents of CEO succession, the selection of a 
new CEO, and the new CEO’s impact on post-succession organisational 
performance. This review has identified a number of gaps in the extant 
literature which are summarised below.  
Firstly, the main gap identified is the lack of attention paid to social capital as 
a variable which might help explain CEO turnover, selection and impact. 
Whilst other types of capital, such as human capital, have been widely 
studied (Shen and Cannella Jr, 2002; Elsaid et al., 2011; Hamori and 
Koyuncu, 2015; Bragaw and Misangyi, 2015), social capital has been largely 
ignored in the extant literature. Two proxies for social capital have been 
proposed: insider status and organisational performance. The former of 
these provides a proxy for the firm-specific bonding ties a CEO may have 
whilst the latter provides a proxy for the reputational social capital a CEO 
may have accumulated though overseeing good performance in either their 
current or previous role. Although insiderness has been used as an 
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explanatory variable in many studies looking at CEO succession (Shen and 
Cannella Jr, 2002; Zhang, 2008; Karaevli and Zajac, 2013; Nath and 
Mahajan, 2017), none have made the explicit link between it and social 
capital. A CEO’s reputational capital has only been referenced in studies 
using sports teams (Wangrow et al., 2018) but otherwise ignored in the 
literature looking at private and public sector organisations. Whilst in the 
literature the performance of a CEO’s previous firm has been identified as a 
potential proxy for managerial reputation, the lack of implementation of this 
remains an identified gap (Hamori and Koyuncu, 2015).  
Secondly, most of the extant literature uses private sector firms as a case 
study, and most of these are based in the USA. Throughout the history of 
CEO succession research a number of competing theories have been 
posited and yet no conclusive evidence has been found to support any of 
them over and above the others. Therefore, it is suggested that research 
should be extended to include more firms and industries from outside the 
USA and, in particular, the public sector. Whilst the public sector, in the UK 
at least, has made significant movements towards aligning itself with private 
sector business principles in recent years (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; 
Christensen and Lægreid, 1999), there remain in place fundamental 
differences that will test the theories from the private sector literature and 
give them greater credence. There is an obvious gap in the literature when 
considering the use of the English NHS as a case study. Whilst the 
organisational performance implications of a new CEO in the NHS have 
been subjected to some research (Janke et al., 2018), there remains no peer 
reviewed literature looking at CEO selection nor the antecedents of CEO 
departure in the English NHS. 
2.11 Conclusion 
This literature review has provided a broad discussion on the CEO 
succession literature in addition to providing an overview of social capital 
theory and the proxies used throughout my research. Social capital has been 
identified as a potential explanatory variable to help explain why CEOs leave 
their roles, why some candidates are more attractive to employers and why 
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some CEOs are more successful than others. Despite its obvious uses in this 
context it remains a largely unexplored area in CEO succession research, a 
gap which my research aims to fill to some extent. Social capital is distinct 
from human capital in that its value lies in the relationships held between 
individuals and the prestige accumulated from having a track record of high 
performance. Although there are some critics of social capital theory it is 
broadly accepted that proxies can be used to indicate whether an individual 
has social capital, and in some cases to quantify how much. For my research 
a CEO is designated as having internal social capital if they worked in the 
organisation immediately prior to being appointed its CEO. This is a 
simplistic dichotomous variable, they either have internal social capital or 
they do not. A second facet of social capital used throughout is the presence 
of reputational social capital where the performance of their current or 
previous organisation is used to determine whether they have high or low 
reputational social capital.  
This review also highlights the importance of using the public sector as a 
case study context for this research. Whilst I have used the English NHS, the 
arguments for doing so apply equally to other public sector organisations and 
the conclusions drawn from my research will be applicable more widely since 
much of the English public sector was transformed through the NPM reforms 
of the 1970s to 1990s. This widespread adoption of private sector business 
practices into the public sector has had a long lasting impact on the 
organisational forms in the public sector which now mirror those in the 
private sector with CEOs, boards and comparable corporate governance 
mechanisms. Yet despite these similarities, there remain fundamental 
differences between the private and public sector as the former is profit 
maximising whilst the latter is intended to serve the needs of the public rather 
than focusing on making money. It is therefore of particular interest to 
explore whether conclusions drawn from research using private sector 
organisations can be replicated when using public sector organisations.  
Three main strands of CEO succession research have dominated the 
literature in recent years and it is those three areas that I focus on in my 
research. Namely, the antecedents of succession, the selection of a new 
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CEO, and the impact that new CEO has on post-succession organisational 
performance. The lens of social capital theory has not been widely used to 
address why a CEO leaves their role and this gap in the literature is a glaring 
omission. Although this review found that, theoretically, dismissals are of 
most intertest and thus most often studied, within the public sector it is 
particularly difficult to identify dismissals hence instead exit destinations are 
used in place of reasons for exiting. Social capital theory can be applied here 
to determine whether an exit destination will enhance or diminish an 
individual’s social capital. This is primarily based on the perceived status of 
an exit destination and whether the move is considered a promotion or 
demotion. Although social capital theory is the primary lens used here, a 
complimentary labour market theory is also identified to provide a framework 
to help explain the decision making process that determines a CEO’s exit 
destination.  
The literature on CEO selection is split into studies which look at all 
candidates for a CEO role and those that only consider successful 
appointments. The former tends to use qualitative data from surveys 
whereas the latter, in line with my approach, uses quantitative data on actual 
appointments. Choosing a new CEO is the responsibility of the board and 
they will inevitably have more information about internal candidates than 
those who are external to the firm. This information asymmetry can lead to 
bias towards internal candidates purely through virtue of knowing more about 
them and their abilities and it is no surprise that much of the literature 
focuses on this choice between internal and external labour markets. 
Applying the lens of social capital theory, the presence of internal social 
capital might be expected to influence this choice towards an inside 
candidate whereas the presence of reputational social capital could influence 
in either direction. An internal candidate overseeing high organisational 
performance will have both internal social capital and reputational social 
capital whereas an external candidate overseeing high organisational 
performance in their current firm will only have reputational social capital.  
The third strand of research looks at the impact a new CEO has on 
organisational performance. It is widely accepted that this impact will be 
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affected by the baseline performance of the firm as it might be expected that 
it is more of a challenge to turn around a poor performing firm than to 
continue the good performance of a firm. Three theories of succession 
dominate the literature. The first proposes that CEO succession will have a 
detrimental impact on performance as it is a disruptive event. The second 
proposes the opposite, that succession will improve performance as the 
organisation adapts to its new CEO. The third suggests that CEO succession 
is a ritual scapegoating process where no impact is expected to be made on 
performance. Evidence for each of these theories is mixed and applying the 
lens of social capital theory offers up new opportunities to explore the 
circumstances in which any of them may be found to be true.  
The final section in this chapter summarised the gaps in the literature that my 
research intends to contribute towards filling. Whilst several gaps are 
identified, the overarching aim of my research is to apply the lens of social 
capital theory to CEO succession research and the following chapters 




Chapter 3: Data and variables 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the philosophical approach underpinning my 
research. It also describes the data sample and variables used in this study 
and explains how they were constructed. It describes the overall data sample 
available for analysis but each of the three empirical chapters uses a subset 
of this dataset. These subsets are described in further detail within each of 
the next three empirical chapters.  
The format of this chapter is as follows. The next section describes the 
philosophical approach used throughout my research. Section 3.3 describes 
the data sources used to construct the data sample used throughout this 
research. This is followed by a section describing the variables included in 
the dataset and then a summary of key descriptive statistics.  
3.2 Philosophical approach 
My research is firmly located within the positivist philosophy and, as such, 
uses a quantitative methodology. This aligns with the existing literature on 
CEO succession although that literature does call for a more qualitative 
based approach to be adopted (Berns and Klarner, 2017). Quantitative 
methodologies are generally classified under the positivist philosophy which 
has several implications when used in social sciences research. Easterby-
Smith et al. (1997) suggest six factors: methodological choices (all research 
must be quantitative), values (the choice of what and how to research should 
be value-free and based on objective criteria), causality (research should aim 
to identify causal explanations), operationalisation (frame concepts such that 
they can be measured quantitatively), independence (the researcher must 
remain independent of the topic), and reductionism (all concepts should be 
reduced to the simplest terms).  
Facets of management and organisational performance in the NHS have 
been studied extensively (Mannion et al., 2005) but relatively few have taken 
a quantitative approach to their research (Mannion et al., 2005a; 2005b; 
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Walshe and Smith, 2011; Veronesi and Keasey, 2010; 2011; 2012; Veronesi 
et al., 2013; 2014). For this research, these underlying tenets of the positivist 
philosophy marry with my own views since I strongly believe that evidence, in 
the form of hard facts, is necessary to establish scientific laws. To apply the 
positivist philosophy to this example of research requires that management 
be studied as an objective element rather than from a people perspective. 
That is, the behaviour of humans is not considered at all and management is 
reduced to the level of quantifiable facts such as the number of managers 
employed in each trust, and further facts about those managers such as their 
gender and levels of social capital. Their behaviours, thoughts, feelings and 
attitudes are rejected by the positivist philosophy (Crossan, 2003). It is 
accepted that whilst the positivist philosophy provides a platform for an 
evidence-based approach to research it is not without its weaknesses. For 
this particular research, human behaviours could have a significant impact 
on organisational outcomes. It is unrealistic to assume that outcomes are 
independent of human actions yet the positivist approach to this research 
dictates that they must be ignored. 
3.3 Data sources and sample selection 
My research is novel in its use of administrative data. This is data collected 
by organisations on their operations where the primary use is operational 
and research is considered a secondary use. The NHS publishes large 
amounts of longitudinal administrative performance data at trust level but 
access to individual level data is not generally available. Although the NHS 
does collect and hold staffing data via the Electronic Staff Record database it 
is not readily available for secondary uses such as research. As an 
alternative, a bespoke cut of data was obtained from Binley’s, a private 
sector NHS database collator. The Binley’s database contains NHS 
management staff data that is collected by Binley’s and crosschecked with 
trusts for accuracy. It is collected for marketing purposes, but Leeds 
University purchased access to a subset of data covering 2003 to 2012. A 
further two years of data was later made available by Warwick University, 
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giving total coverage from 2003 to 20141. This is a person-level dataset 
allowing individuals to be tracked over time for any management posts they 
have held in the NHS.  
The dataset comprises twelve files, one per year, in Excel format. Each year 
contains in the region of 30,000 records with 32 fields. Not all of these fields 
were needed for this study. Those of interest were year, organisation name, 
responsibility code, employee name, job title, unique person identifier, 
region, and NHS provider code. The combined file containing all twelve years 
of data comprised 371,084 records across a range of NHS organisation 
types. Of these, 194,305 related to trusts and the others were deleted. A 
master file of CEO successions in trusts was created by removing any record 
which was not for a CEO post. The Binley’s dataset does contain a CEO 
specific job code, but this was not always used correctly. A manual check 
was done to ensure that only CEO posts were left in the dataset, including 
posts for acting and interim CEOs. Records for Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland were dropped. The Binley’s dataset includes records for all 
types of NHS trust, but this study only uses those for acute trusts, and 
combined acute and community trusts since performance data and control 
variable data is not generally available for the other types of trust due to their 
specific functions.  
To ensure accuracy, the Binley’s dataset was checked to make sure that no 
trusts had more than twelve CEO records, one per financial year. A CEO 
succession was identified by comparing each record with the preceding 
year’s record and noting where a different person was in that post. Similarly, 
a CEO departure was noted by comparing each CEO record with the 
following year in that trust. These records were then manually cross checked 
against annual reports provided by each trust using the Freedom of 
Information Act where they were not already available on trust websites. It 
was not possible to obtain annual reports for all trusts in all years. This 
process uncovered a large number of inconsistencies between the Binley’s 
 
1 Trust annual reports were later used to extend the data sample to 2017/18 
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database and the staff reported by the trusts each year. The Binley’s 
database available for this research was compiled using data from January 
to March each year whereas the annual reports cover a financial year, April 
to March. The NHS organisational performance measures used in this study 
cover financial years so that is the time frame of interest. The Binley’s 
database sometimes reported the CEO as one person in a particular year, 
but the annual report reported another person. On investigation, it appeared 
that the Binley’s database was often picking up an interim or acting CEO who 
was replaced in April with a substantive CEO. The CEO dataset was 
manually corrected to reflect the annual reports where necessary. The 
annual reports were then used to identify the CEOs in post between 2014 
and 2017, which extended the data sample.  
When combining these with the Binley’s data, the final CEO panel dataset 
contained 2,144 trust-year records including 473 CEO departures and 474 
CEO successions. The entrants includes CEOs who were appointed on an 
interim basis. Figure 3-1 shows the number of CEO successions in each 
year.  
 
Figure 3-1 CEO successions by year 
 
The next section describes each of the variables in the dataset and 

























3.4 Variable construction and operationalisation 
This section describes the variables used in this research. It is split into 
dependent variables, explanatory variables, and control variables. Each 
variable has been selected based on the extant literature and the research 
questions specified in the previous chapter. The operationalisation of key 
variables has been influenced by the lens of social capital theory used 
throughout my research and, where applicable, is clearly highlighted below.  
3.4.1 Dependent and explanatory variables 
Some of the dependent variables described in this sub-section are also used 
as explanatory variables when addressing other research questions. Where 
applicable, this is noted.  
3.4.1.1 CEO tenure 
CEO tenure is used as the dependent variable in the empirical chapter 
looking at the antecedents of CEO succession. Here, the research question 
being addressed is: how does social capital affect a CEO’s ability to 
influence their tenure? A CEO’s observed tenure is the number of years in 
post during the study observation period whereas their total tenure includes 
any years in post prior to the start of the study observation period. So, for a 
CEO taking up their post between 1st April 2003 and 31st March 2018 their 
observed tenure will be the same as their total tenure. For any CEO who 
started prior to 1st April 2003 their total tenure will be greater than their 
observed tenure. For the 473 CEOs who exited their posts during the study 
period, Table 3-1 shows the observed tenure, which ranged from 1 to 14 
years, although 80% of CEOs left within 5 years, and the total tenure, which 
ranged from 1 to 19 years. A further 110 CEOs remained in post at the end 
of the study period of which seven were in post for the entire duration of the 
study period and thus have right censored observed tenures of 15 years and 
total tenures ranging from 15 to 26 years. 
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Table 3-1 CEO tenure 
CEO tenure  
(years) 
Observed tenure Total tenure 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
frequency 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
frequency 
1 138 29.18 29.18 122 25.79 25.79 
2 81 17.12 46.30 67 14.16 39.96 
3 73 15.43 61.73 69 14.59 54.55 
4 64 13.53 75.26 60 12.68 67.23 
5 32 6.77 82.03 31 6.55 73.78 
6 26 5.50 87.53 28 5.92 79.70 
7 18 3.81 91.33 23 4.86 84.57 
8 14 2.96 94.29 13 2.75 87.32 
9 9 1.90 96.19 10 2.11 89.43 
10 9 1.90 98.10 10 2.11 91.54 
11 2 0.42 98.52 11 2.33 93.87 
12 - - - 11 2.33 96.19 
13 3 0.63 99.15 6 1.27 97.46 
14 4 0.85 100.00 3 0.63 98.10 
15    3 0.63 98.73 
16    1 0.21 98.94 
17    2 0.42 99.37 
18    2 0.42 99.79 
19    1 0.21 100.00 
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3.4.1.2 Exit destination 
A CEO’s exit destination is also used as a dependent variable in the 
empirical chapter looking at the antecedents of CEO succession. The 
research question being addressed here is: how does social capital affect a 
CEO’s ability to influence their destination on exiting the CEO role? Exit 
destinations were manually collected from annual reports, LinkedIn, and 
media reports of the circumstances surrounding a CEO’s departure. Table 
3-2 shows the exit destinations used in this study. Of the 473 exits, 28.5% 
were moves to other CEO posts in the NHS. These were readily identified 
using the CEO dataset collected for this study and such a move is 
considered to enhance a CEO’s social capital as their reputation will either 
be enhanced by a perceived promotion, by moving to a larger or more 
prestigious trust, or by their ability to be appointed to a new CEO role, even if 
considered a sideways career move. A similar proportion, 27.7%, moved to 
non-CEO roles in the public sector, which includes non-health roles. This 
destination is generally considered to be a demotion and therefore damages 
a person’s reputation. A small proportion of CEOs, 7%, moved to a role in 
the private sector and even though not at CEO level, this is considered a 
reputation enhancing move since the private sector offers greater fiscal 
rewards. A quarter of the CEOs exited to unemployment or self-employment. 
It was often difficult to differentiate between these hence they were grouped 
together. This destination is considered reputation damaging since it was 
often accompanied by media reports of the CEO having been pushed out of 
their role. The remaining 11.6% of CEOs exited to retirement, which is 
considered to be a reputation neutral destination since it is a natural part of 
the career pathway. There were several reports of early retirement, which 
were likely due to a CEO being pushed out of their role, but it was not 
possible to ascertain this for all exits to this destination.  
Looking at the spread of exits within each year (see Table 3-2) we see that 
exits to other NHS CEO roles as a proportion of all exits in each year fell 
over the sample period, from an average of 32% in the first half of the period 
to 23% in the latter half. Moves to non-CEO roles in the public sector 
increased over the same time period from around 26% in the first half to 31% 
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in the latter half. Whilst there is some variation in the proportion of other exit 
destinations being used in each year, the overall trend is relatively stable.  













2003 13 7 3 8 1 32 
2004 6 4 1 11 4 26 
2005 7 10 1 9 3 30 
2006 21 5 2 8 5 41 
2007 10 10 3 8 1 32 
2008 9 8 0 6 3 26 
2009 6 8 2 6 4 26 
2010 9 10 3 7 5 34 
2011 13 9 3 8 2 35 
2012 12 7 5 11 5 40 
2013 8 6 2 9 2 27 
2014 7 9 4 9 4 33 
2015 7 14 2 6 8 37 
2016 4 13 1 6 5 29 
2017 3 11 1 7 3 25 
Total 135 131 33 119 55 473 
 
3.4.1.3 Insider status 
A CEO’s insider status is used as a dependent variable in the empirical 
chapter looking at CEO selection. Here, the research question being 
addressed is: is social capital valued by recruiting firms? A dummy variable 
was created to indicate whether a CEO was an insider, that is, whether they 
already worked in the trust immediately prior to becoming its CEO. This was 
coded as 1 if the CEO worked in the trust immediately prior to being 
appointed its CEO and 0 otherwise.  
This dummy variable is also used as an explanatory variable when 
addressing other research questions in chapters 4 and 6. Notably: how does 
a CEO’s insider status affect the likelihood of them exiting their post and their 
exit destination, does the baseline performance of the organisation affect the 
value placed on social capital by the recruiting organisation, and how does 
social capital affect the impact a new CEO has on organisational 
performance? Here, being an insider is equated with having internal social 
capital. Of the 473 exits observed in the sample, 96 (20.3%) were insiders. 
Of the 474 CEOs taking up their new roles, 116 (24.5%) were insiders. When 
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looking at trends over time we see that the proportion of CEOs in post who 
are insiders rises from 10% in 2003/04 to 27% in 2017/18.  
3.4.1.4 Organisational performance 
Organisational performance is used as a dependent variable in the third 
empirical chapter looking at the impact a new CEO has on post-succession 
organisational performance. Specifically, for the research questions: does 
CEO succession make a difference to organisational performance, does the 
impact of a new CEO change depending on the baseline performance of the 
firm, and how does social capital affect the impact a new CEO has on 
organisational performance? Organisational performance is also used as an 
explanatory variable when considering the impact of baseline performance 
as a contingency factor. It is also used as an explanatory variable when used 
as a proxy for a CEO’s reputational social capital.  
When used as an explanatory variable, organisational performance is 
represented by dummy variables indicating whether performance was good 
or poor. The threshold for this is the top and bottom 30% of trusts in each 
financial year for each performance metric. This percentile approach was 
chosen as a compromise to accommodate the performance metrics 
described below, half of which are standardised and thus conform to a 
normal distribution.   
Within the public sector there are numerous candidates for performance 
metrics, but these often differ between organisations and in the eyes of 
stakeholders. Even within a single organisation type, such as NHS trusts, 
there are still many potential performance metrics, each signalling something 
different. The choice of these can depend on what facet of performance is 
considered to be most important at a particular point in time. Therefore, a 
range of performance metrics spanning several facets of performance were 
included in the analyses and are described below.  
3.4.1.4.1 Reference Cost Index  
The RCI is used in the NHS to indicate the average cost of providing a 
defined service within a particular financial year. They originate from a 1997 
White Paper The New NHS which stated that granular cost information would 
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be collected and used to generate unit costs. This data has been collected 
and published each year since 1998. The RCI shows the average cost of a 
trust’s total activity compared against the same activity carried out at the 
national average cost. A trust with costs equal to the national average costs 
will score 100, trusts with higher than average costs will score above 100 
and those with lower than average costs will score below 100. To account for 
different geographical cost pressures, such as wages and property costs, a 
market forces factor (MFF) is used to adjust the RCI. This adjustment is 
made by dividing the RCI by the MFF, so areas with higher wage and 
property costs will have their RCI reduced. From Table 3-3 we can see that 
RCI data is missing for some records, leaving 2,123 records available for 
analysis with a range of 69.09 to 138.05 and a mean of 98.8.  
3.4.1.4.2 Operating surplus 
Much of the extant literature on CEO successions research uses financial 
measures of performance since private sector organisations are generally 
used as case studies. Therefore, it is important to include a financial 
measure in my research even though the public sector is non-profit seeking. 
A trust’s operating surplus was used to provide a financial measure of 
performance. Operating surplus is used here as NHS trusts are non-profit 
making organisations, but it is akin to the profit in a profit-making 
organisation. Due to the long sample period of 15 years, these figures were 
adjusted for inflation to give values at 2018 rates. A value of zero means that 
no operating surplus was generated in that year whilst values below zero 
mean there was a deficit and values greater than zero indicate a surplus. 
From Table 3-3 we see that this data is missing for many records, leaving 
just 1,811 records available for analysis. The missing data is generally due to 
annual reports not being available for all trusts in all years. This metric 
ranges from -£194,951 to £126,188 with a mean of £1,181.55 and a median 
value of £3,595. Further analysis of this variable shows that just over 30% of 




Table 3-3 Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
CEO succession 2,144 0.221 0 0.415 0 1 
CEO exit 2,144 0.221 0 0.415 0 1 
Observed tenure  2,144 3.578 3 2.858 1 15 
Total tenure  2,144 4.354 3 3.691 1 26 
Male 2,144 0.662 1 0.473 0 1 
Clinician 2,144 0.221 0 0.415 0 1 
Insider 2,144 0.200 0 0.400 0 1 
Previous CEO experience 2,144 0.537 1 00.499 0 1 
CEO age (years) 1,882 50.639 51 6.173 31 69 
Acute trust 2,144 0.746 1 .435 0 1 
Teaching trust 2,144 0.200 0 0.400 0 1 
Foundation trust 2,144 0.366 0 0.482 0 1 
Number of overnight beds 2,140 791.558 726 362.235 224 2,662 
A&E waiting time target  2,136 0.931 0.952 0.061 0.598 0.995 
Operating surplus 1,811 1,181.546 3,595 18,554.33 -195,000 126,000 
Reference cost index 2,123 98.843 98.650 6.785 69.090 138.050 
Inpatient waiting times (days) 2,135 60.978 54 22.962 1 344 
Mortality rates 2,054 1.003 1.005 0.104 0.539 1.443 
MRSA infection rates 2,138 0.478 0.399 0.422 0 5.395 
Herfindahl Index - admissions 2,144 0.776 0.070 0.313 0.040 0.160 
Herfindahl Index - board size 2,144 0.737 0.060 0.029 0.040 0.150 
Board independence 2,142 0.506 0.530 0.074 0.060 0.700 
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3.4.1.4.3 A&E target achievement 
Acute trusts in England have a waiting time target for A&E of 4 hours and it is 
expected that at least 95% of patients attending A&E should be admitted, 
transferred or discharged within four hours. This target was introduced in 
2004 but data is available from quarter 3 of 2002/03. This metric was 
operationalised as the average performance across all four quarters in a 
financial year. From Table 3-3 we see that data was available for 2,136 
records with a range of 59.8% to 99.5% target attainment and a mean of 
93.1% with the median value at 95.2%.  
3.4.1.4.4 Inpatient waiting times 
In addition to these performance measures, a throughput measure (Janke et 
al., 2018) was also used, namely, the mean inpatient waiting time (in days) 
for each trust in each financial year. This is the number of days a patient 
waits from being referred for an operation or procedure to it being carried 
out. From Table 3-3 we see that this metric was available for 2,135 records 
and ranged from 1 to 344 days with a mean of 61 days and a median value 
of 54 days. 
3.4.1.4.5 MRSA infection rates 
Clinical performance was measured using hospital infection rates for MRSA. 
These were standardised using the mean of the population for each trust. A 
value of one indicates that the trust had the expected number of MRSA 
infections in that year. A value of less than one indicates there were fewer 
than expected infections and a value of more than one indicates there were 
more than the expected number of infections. A value of zero was applied 
where no infections were observed in that year. From Table 3-3 we see that 
missing data reduced the number of records to 2,138, which ranged from 0 
to 5.395 with a mean of 0.478 and a median value of 0.399.  
3.4.1.4.6 Mortality rates 
Hospitals are often judged by their mortality rates but again, given the long 
sample period there was no single mortality metric available across the entire 
15 years. Instead, two separate measures were used, each covering a 
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portion of the sample period. The hospital standardised mortality ratio 
(HSMR) was available from the beginning of the observation period to 
2011/12. The standardised hospital mortality indicator (SHMI) was available 
from 2011/12. The HSMR takes the value of 100 if the number of deaths 
were as expected, less than 100 if there were fewer than expected deaths, 
and greater than 100 if there were more deaths than expected. The SHMI 
takes the value of 1 if the number of deaths were as expected, less than 1 if 
there were fewer than expected deaths, and greater than 1 if there were 
more deaths than expected. A combined metric was created which converted 
the HSMR to the same scale as the SHMI and used the SHMI from 2011/12 
onwards with years prior to that being populated using the HSMR. From 
Table 3-3 we see that this combined metric for mortality rates provides 2,054 
records ranging from 0.539 to 1.443 with a mean of 1.003 and a median 
value of 1.005.  
3.4.1.5 Succession one and two years previously 
For the third empirical chapter looking at the impact a new CEO has on 
performance, two dummy explanatory variables were created to indicate 
whether the current CEO had been in post for at least one full financial year 
and two full financial years. There are 474 new CEO appointments included 
in the data sample, but of these, not all were in post for at least one full 
financial year. It is suggested that a new CEO needs 12 to 18 months to bed 
in and have an impact of organisational performance (Hoggettbowers, 2009) 
hence looking at the impact over time is useful.  
3.4.2 Control variables 
The control variables used in this research were chosen based on their 
previous use within the extant literature and are described below.  
3.4.2.1 Organisation size 
The size of each trust was measured using a continuous variable for the 
number of overnight beds as this is often used as a proxy for trust size in the 
health-sector literature (Perotin et al., 2013; Veronesi et al., 2013; 2015; 
Kirkpatrick et al., 2017). From Table 3-3 we see that there was missing data 
for four records, leaving 2,140 records available for analysis. This metric 
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ranged from 224 to 2,662 beds with a mean of 792 beds and a median of 
726.  
3.4.2.2 CEO gender  
The gender of a CEO is a personal characteristic sometimes used in the 
CEO successions literature as a control variable (Petrovsky et al., 2017; 
Janke et al., 2018). The gender of each CEO was coded as 0 for female and 
1 for male. Gender was available for all CEOs in the data sample meaning 
that all 2,144 records were available for analysis. Almost 70% of CEOs 
exiting a trust were male and 63.5% of new CEOs were male. When looking 
at trends over time we see a clear downward trend in the dominance of men 
in CEO roles over the sample period falling from 78% in 2003/04 to 55% in 
2017/18. 
3.4.2.3 Teaching status 
The teaching status of a trust may influence its desirability as an employer 
due to the perceived reputational benefits of working in a teaching trust, 
which tend to be large and thus have bigger budgets than non-teaching 
trusts. As per the extant literature (Salge, 2011; Veronesi et al., 2014; 2015; 
Kirkpatrick et al., 2017; Janke et al., 2018) a control dummy was created to 
account for this. The teaching trust variable was coded as 1 for teaching 
trusts and 0 for non-teaching trusts. This value could theoretically vary over 
time if a trust was granted teaching status, but this did not happen to any 
trusts in the observation period, hence this variable is non-time dependent. 
Nearly 16% of exits were from teaching trusts. 
3.4.2.4 Foundation trust status 
Foundation trust (FT) status indicates that a trust has met strict financial 
performance governance standards and is therefore granted freedom from 
central government control. FT status is often used as a control variable in 
the health-sector literature (Salge, 2011; Janke et al., 2018). A trust with 
foundation status was coded as 1, with non-foundation trusts coded as 0. 
Foundation trust status can vary over time and any trust gaining foundation 
status during the sample period has different values before and after that 
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event. Therefore, this variable is time dependent. 33% of exits were from 
foundation trusts. 
3.4.2.5 Trust type 
Two types of NHS trust are included in the data sample: acute, and 
combined acute and community. An acute trust provides secondary health 
services whereas a combined acute and community trust provides 
community services in addition to the acute services. Other types of trust 
were excluded due to the organisational performance measures used in my 
research not being relevant for them. The number of trusts included in each 
financial year exhibits a general downward trend, due to trust mergers, an 
increasingly common occurrence as financially embattled trusts seek to 
benefit from the increased economies of scale generated by larger 
organisations. The number of acute trusts falls from a peak of 113 in 2004/05 
and 2006/07 to a low of 97 in 2016/17 and 2017/18. During the sample 
period five new trusts were created from mergers or acquisitions and 20 
trusts ceased to exist.   
3.4.2.6 Previous CEO experience 
The extant literature has highlighted the significance of previous experience 
at CEO level when considering CEO successions. A dummy variable was 
created to indicate whether a CEO had previous experience as a CEO, either 
in another NHS trust or elsewhere. This variable was coded as 1 if the CEO 
had previous experience and 0 otherwise.  
3.4.2.7 Geography 
As per the extant health-sector literature (Veronesi et al., 2015), it is common 
practice to include a control variable to differentiate between geographical 
areas. This study uses the four regional footprints: North, Midlands and East, 
London, and South that were historically used in the NHS prior to the recent 
move to seven regional footprints. It also uses the historic Strategic Health 
Authority (SHA) footprints for more granularity. Until the 2013 reorganisation 
of the NHS there were ten SHAs which were responsible for developing and 
improving health services in their local area, but these were replaced by 
Clinical Commissioning Groups.  
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3.4.2.8 Clinical background 
Public health sector management research has had a recent focus on the 
role of clinicians on boards (Veronesi et al., 2013; 2014; 2015). A dummy 
variable for whether a CEO is a clinician of any type was created. This 
includes doctors, nurses and other health care professionals. Whilst 23.5% 
of CEOs who exited their roles were clinicians, this increased to 29% of new 
entrants, which indicates that clinicians are becoming more prevalent in CEO 
posts. When looking at trends over time we see that the mean proportion of 
CEOs in post who were clinicians ranged from 11% 2003/04 to 33% in 
2017/13, showing a clear increasing trend to appoint CEOs with clinical 
backgrounds.  
3.4.2.9 Labour market concentration 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a commonly used measure of 
market concentration and is used here as a proxy for the competitiveness of 






where 𝑠𝑖 is the market share of firm i.  
Two different operationalisations were constructed for this metric. The first 
used the number of hospital admissions to create the HHISHA variable whilst 
the second used the number of non-executive board members in each trust 
to create the HHISHABOARD variable. Both of these were calculated at SHA 
level for each financial year. It is generally accepted that an HHI of less than 
0.01 indicates a highly competitive market, a value between 0.01 and 0.15 
indicates the market is unconcentrated, a value between 0.15 and 0.25 
indicates a moderately concentrated market, and a value greater than 0.25 
indicates the highly concentrated market. Table 3-3 provides the descriptive 
statistics for each of these metrics and we can see that the metric calculated 
using admissions ranges from 445 to 1,566 whereas the metric calculated 
using board size ranges from 378 to 1,544. Both are similar with means of 
777 and 738 respectively. The maximum values for each imply that within 
each SHA the labour market is competitive. 
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3.4.2.10 CEO age 
The age of the CEO has been widely used as a control variable when looking 
at the antecedents of exit (Petrovsky et al., 2017), particularly where 
retirement is an option as this is clearly highly correlated with age. From 
Table 3-3 we see that there is lots of missing data for the age variable, with 
only 1,882 records available for analysis. CEO age was manually collected 
from a range of sources including trust annual reports, LinkedIn and media 
reports. It was rare that the actual date of birth was disclosed so in most 
cases the date of birth was inferred from the source material, which means 
there is a margin of error around this variable. The age of CEOs ranged from 
31 to 69 years with a mean of 50.6 years and a median value of 51 years.  
3.4.2.11 Board independence 
The proportion of non-executive board members is expected to influence 
decisions on whom to appoint as a new CEO. Therefore, it is an important 
control variable when looking at CEO selection. Board independence was 
calculated as the number of non-executive board members divided by the 
total number of board members. Data for this was manually collected from 
trust annual reports and supplemented using the Binley’s database where 
annual reports were not available. From Table 3-3 we see that the proportion 
of non-executive board members ranged from 6% to 70% with a mean of 
51% and a median value of 53%.  
3.5 Summary  
This chapter has described how the data sample used in this thesis was 
constructed. It has also described the variables used in the analysis and 
provided descriptive statistics. Under the positivist philosophy used 
throughout my research only observable and quantifiable variables are 
acceptable for use in the analysis. This has shaped the choice of variables to 
those outlined in this chapter. CEO successions research has largely 
adopted a quantitative approach in the extant literature, which has provided a 
basis from which to select the variables used in my research. Three main 
strands of CEO succession research have been identified for exploration in 
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this thesis and the next chapter addresses the first of these, the antecedents 
of CEO succession. 
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 Chapter 4 – Antecedents of CEO turnover 
4.1 Introduction 
In September 2019 Siobhan McArdle, CEO of South Tees Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust, sent an email to her staff announcing her resignation. Her 
email, quoted online (Lintern, 2019) stated that: ‘the personal cost of being a  
CEO in the NHS is just too high and life is just too short.’ Such a statement 
suggests that the pressures facing an NHS CEO are substantial. So, is it that 
this particular CEO couldn’t handle the pressure any longer or were other 
factors involved? It is likely that the decision making process leading up to 
this apparent resignation encompassed many factors with a virtual set of 
scales balancing them off against each other: what elements of the job did 
she like, which did she not like, how was her relationship with the board, 
what were the challenges facing the trust, what other opportunities were 
there for her outside the trust? Above all these considerations comes the 
pivotal question of how well suited was she to the role?  
South Tees is by no means the only NHS trust to have had a change of 
CEO. Turnover of CEOs in the NHS is a frequent occurrence with median 
tenure being just 3 years (Anandaciva et al., 2018). Although this has 
increased since 2014, up from 2.5 years (Anandaciva et al., 2018) it is still 
lower than in other parts of the English public sector. For example, local 
authorities are reported to have a median tenure for CEOs of 4 years 
(Petrovsky et al., 2017). However, CEO tenure in the private sector appears 
to be longer with a median length of 5 years (Karlsson et al., 2019). 
Interestingly, whilst CEO tenure in the NHS appears to be rising (Anandaciva 
et al., 2018), the opposite is happening in the UK private sector, with median 
tenure falling in recent years (Cornish, 2017). 
CEO turnover can be disruptive (Boyne et al., 2011a), so identifying which 
factors might influence that event is an important step in helping trusts, and 
other organisations, retain top managers. Therefore, this empirical chapter 
looks at the antecedents of CEO turnover to try and determine whether 
factors contributing to an individual’s social capital can help predict the 
likelihood of turnover and their exit destination. Through the lens of social 
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capital theory, I look at the insider status of a CEO and the performance of 
their trust. An insider CEO is assumed to have internal social capital 
accumulated through virtue of already working with the people whom they 
now lead. A CEO currently overseeing high baseline organisational 
performance is assumed to have reputational social capital as a result of that 
good performance being attributed to their leadership prowess (McCabe et 
al., 2008; Anandaciva et al., 2018).  
The structure of this rest of this chapter is as follows: firstly, I set out the 
theoretical motivation for my research into the antecedents of CEO 
succession. This adopts a simple framework for a labour market theory of 
CEO succession which looks at various types of inputs into the decision-
making process that precedes a CEO’s departure. In line with 
recommendations from the extant literature I differentiate between exit 
destinations in an attempt to present a more nuanced analysis. As this is the 
first study to look at NHS CEO departures, I have had to define exit 
destinations for the first time in this context, which differ to those presented in 
existing public sector research. Through the lens of social capital theory, 
these exit destinations can be grouped into those that enhance social capital, 
those that diminish it, and those that are neutral. The second section sets out 
my hypotheses and the arguments underpinning them before the results of 
my analyses are presented and discussed.  
There are two analytical strands to this chapter addressing the research 
questions: how does a CEO’s insider status, as a proxy for social capital, 
affect the likelihood of them exiting their post and their exit destination; and 
how does organisational performance, as a proxy for social capital, affect a 
CEOs ability to influence their tenure and their destination on exiting the 
CEO role? The first hypothesis, described in more detail in the next section, 
posits that insiders, those CEOs who worked in a trust immediately prior to 
becoming its CEO, have a lower risk of exit compared to outsiders for all 
non-retirement exits. A Cox Model and competing risks models are used to 
test this hypothesis. The second hypothesis, which is in two parts, suggests 
that the relationship between organisational performance and risk of exit is 
non-linear with both extremes of performance being associated with higher 
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or lower risks of leaving depending on whether the exit destination is 
considered to enhance or diminish their social capital. A Cox Model and 
competing risks models are also used to test this hypothesis. The final 
section interprets the findings from my analysis and draws conclusions 
before setting out what contribution this research has made to the literature. 
But first, the next section sets out the theoretical motivations for my research 
and the associated hypotheses.  
4.2 Theoretical motivation and hypothesis development  
This empirical chapter is underpinned by two complementary theoretical 
arguments. The first is a simple labour market theory proposed by Grissom 
and Andersen (2012) and the second, a theory of social capital as described 
by Adler and Kwon (2002). Petrovsky et al. (2017) highlighted the importance 
of adopting a different theoretical stance for public sector CEO succession 
research than that used in studies of the private sector or other settings 
where the CEO has little protection from removal. This lends itself to the 
adoption of the labour market framework developed by Grissom and 
Andersen (2012) which suggests there are logical inputs to the decision 
making process that determines whether a CEO exits or stays. A key 
difference here is that I use exit destinations rather than reason for exit. This 
is due to the difficulty in identifying the true reasons for exits in the public 
sector. For example, dismissals are rarely reported as such and a CEO is 
more likely to be removed following a compromise agreement where they 
step down or are moved to another part of the NHS (Anandaciva et al., 
2018). In the very rare event that an NHS CEO is dismissed and reported as 
such it is usually attributed to gross misconduct rather than the result of poor 
performance. Examples include the dismissal of Southport and Ormskirk 
NHS Trust CEO Jonathan Parry in 2015, and Newcastle and Tyne NHS 
Foundation Trust CEO Sir Leonard Fenwick in 2017, both reported as 
dismissals for misconduct.    
Figure 4-1 shows the conceptual labour market framework used in this 
chapter in which I identify input factors at an individual level and 
organisational level. Previous research has used a third category of inputs at 
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the environmental level. For the public sector this usually involves political 
factors (Boyne et al., 2010a; Petrovsky et al., 2017) but these are not 
relevant for the NHS as any political change will affect each trust in the same 
way since, unlike for local authorities, there is no local political control. 
Grissom and Andersen (2012) note that this framework recognises that the 
decision-making process for both the CEO and board is a black box, and that 
we can only observe the inputs to the process and the outputs. These inputs 
can be viewed through the lens of social capital theory to identify those of 
most theoretical interest, namely, insider status and organisational 
performance, both of which can be considered proxies for the presence or 
amount of social capital an individual may have.  
A CEO’s insider status can be used as a proxy for their internal social capital 
on the assumption that they will have been able to build relationships with 
colleagues and stakeholders during their pre-CEO tenure (Adler and Kwon, 
2002). Within the context of NHS trusts there are several possible definitions 
of insider status but the one used here is whether the CEO worked in the 
trust they then became CEO of immediately prior to becoming its CEO. If 
they worked in the trust prior to becoming its CEO we might expect them to 
have already developed relationships which could help them settle into the 
role more readily and to have accumulated trust-specific knowledge that 
gives them an advantage over an outsider (Petrovsky et al., 2017). They will 
already be familiar with how the trust operates and the internal politics that 
need to be managed (Petrovsky et al., 2017), which may give them more 
power to influence any decisions about replacing them (Johnson et al., 2012; 
Phan and Lee, 1995). Conversely, outsiders to the trust, although in most 
cases having experience in the NHS (Anandaciva et al., 2018), may struggle 
to build relationships and navigate the internal landscape (Petrovsky et al., 
2017). For any CEOs that do come from the private sector, we would expect 
them to have greater opportunities to leave given their connections in that 
sector (Bertelli and Lewis, 2013; Petrovsky et al., 2017). Extrapolating this to 
outsiders as per the definition used here, we might expect outsiders to a trust 
to have greater opportunities to leave as they too will have contacts in other 
parts of the NHS or other sectors.  
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Figure 4-1 Labour market model 
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The appointment of an insider CEO is associated with a commitment to 
maintaining the status quo within an organisation as it signals that the board 
is not seeking a change in the strategic direction of the organisation (Helmich 
and Brown, 1972; Datta and Guthrie, 1994; Bailey and Helfat, 2003). An 
insider will already be committed to that strategy and can thus be assumed 
to be a good fit for that organisation (Petrovsky et al., 2017). They will have 
the security of taking on a CEO role in a known organisation and, given the 
challenging environment in the NHS, may be reluctant to leave that role 
(Anandaciva et al., 2018). Based on these arguments, I would expect 
insiders to have a longer tenure than outsiders. Therefore, the first 
hypothesis is: 
H1: CEOs who have accumulated internal social capital through 
insiderness will have a lower risk of exit than outsiders, for all non-
retirement exit types 
The impact of a trusts’ performance on a CEO’s likelihood of leaving is 
affected by contradictory forces and could be non-linear (Grissom and 
Andersen, 2012; Grissom et al., 2016). A CEO overseeing poor performance 
might be expected to have fewer options to leave since the poor 
performance of the trust will reflect poorly on their leadership abilities (Fee 
and Hadlock, 2003; McCabe et al., 2008; Anandaciva et al., 2018) and make 
them unattractive to other employers by tarnishing their reputation and thus 
diminishing their reputational social capital. Therefore, we might expect 
CEOs of poor performing trusts to have a lower risk of exit. However, in 
conditions of poor performance the board may want to remove the CEO in 
the hopes of replacing them with someone better able to improve 
performance (Anandaciva et al., 2018). Thus, we might expect CEOs of poor 
performing trusts to have a higher risk of exit (McCabe et al., 2008; Grissom 
and Andersen, 2012; Petrovsky et al., 2017). These opposing forces could 
cancel each other out, leading to no observed impact of performance, but 
when looking at separate exit destinations I expect their diminished 
reputational social capital, resulting from the poor performance, to influence 
the direction of the associations such that: 
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H2a: CEOs with low reputational social capital have a lower risk of exit 
to destinations that enhance their reputational social capital, but a 
higher risk of exit to destinations that diminish their reputational social 
capital 
Since organisational performance can be considered as a source of 
reputational social capital, sustained good performance will reflect well on a 
CEO as the success is attributed to their superior leadership (McCabe et al., 
2008; Anandaciva et al., 2018). This makes them attractive to other 
employers and thus increases the opportunities they have for career 
advancement such that we might expect CEOs overseeing good 
performance to have a higher risk of leaving. However, NHS leadership 
positions can be difficult to fill (Hoggettbowers, 2009) due to the perceived 
challenges of those roles, with candidates facing significant exposure to the 
risk of damaging their reputation if they do not perform well (Anandaciva et 
al., 2018). Therefore, a CEO overseeing good performance may be 
incentivised to remain in post, to maintain their good reputation and avoid the 
pitfalls of moving to a trust that may damage it (Johnson et al., 2011). Thus, 
we might expect CEOs overseeing good performance to have a lower risk of 
leaving (McCabe et al., 2008; Grissom and Andersen, 2012; Petrovsky et al., 
2017). Again, these two opposing forces could cancel each other out but 
when looking at separate exit destinations I expect their enhanced 
reputational social capital, resulting from the good performance of their trust, 
to influence the direction of the association such that: 
H2b: CEOs with high reputational social capital have a higher risk of 
exit to destinations that enhance their reputational social capital but a 
lower risk of exit to destinations that diminish their reputational social 
capital 
This section has set out the theoretical motivations for my research and the 
hypotheses that will be tested in this chapter. The next section describes the 
methodology used in this chapter, that of survival modelling.  
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4.3 Data and methodology  
This section describes the methodology used in the analyses in this chapter, 
specifically, the Cox survival model and competing risks models. This is 
followed by a description of the sample and variables used to test the 
hypotheses set out in the previous section.  
4.3.1 Methodology  
For this chapter, the event of interest is a CEO leaving their post. This can be 
viewed as the time in post until that event, which is analogous to a survival 
time. Therefore, survival analysis modelling is used in this chapter. This 
method is particularly suitable when data is right-censored, that is, some 
CEOs may not have left their jobs by the end of the sample period. This is an 
important consideration because removing censored observations from a 
study can skew the remaining data. For example, there are several CEOs 
who remain in the same job for the entire sample period, giving them a right-
censored time to event of at least 15 years. This censoring is permitted by 
the inclusion of information about timing, which is unique to survival models 
when compared to other types of regression. Not only do these methods look 
at the event of interest, but also the time until that event occurs. This means 
that relationships between independent variables and survival time can be 
easily explored. A further benefit of these methods is the ability to include 
independent variables that vary over time, such as performance data.  
As described by Mills (2011), survival time 𝑇 is a positive random variable 
which has specific values denoted by 𝑡. The cumulative density function is 
represented by 𝐹(𝑡) where: 
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Pr⁡(𝑇 ≤ 𝑡) is the probability that a survival time 𝑇 is less than or equal to 𝑡. 






⇒ 𝑓(𝑡) = lim
∆𝑡→0
𝐹((𝑡 + ∆𝑡) − 𝐹(𝑡))
∆𝑡
 
The probability density function provides the unconditional probability that a 
CEO leaves between time 𝑡 and ∆𝑡 and is therefore expressed as: 
𝑓(𝑡) = lim
∆𝑡→0
𝑃𝑟(𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 ≤ 𝑡 + ∆𝑡)
∆𝑡
 
The survivor function ?̂?(𝑡) gives the probability that a survival time 𝑇 is 
greater than or equal to time 𝑡. ?̂?(𝑡) is the proportion of CEOs still in post at 
time t and is expressed as: 
?̂?(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑡) = Pr⁡(𝑇 ≥ 𝑡) 
The way in which an event and non-event are related to each other is 





This hazard rate provides the rate at which CEOs leave by time t given that 
they were in post until t, that is, a CEO leaving is conditional on that CEO 
having survived until time t. This conditional leaving rate is expressed as: 
ℎ(𝑡) = lim
∆𝑡→0
𝑃𝑟(𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 ≤ 𝑡 + ∆𝑡|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡)
∆𝑡
 
The Cox model (Cox, 1972) is a semi-parametric method that doesn’t specify 
the form of the baseline hazard in advance. The model with fixed covariates 
is defined as: 
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝{𝛽1𝑥1+. . . +𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘} 
where: 
• 𝑡⁡represents the survival time 
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• ℎ(𝑡) is the hazard function at time t for a subject with covariate values 
𝑥1 to 𝑥𝑘 
• ℎ0(𝑡) is the baseline hazard function, that is, the hazard function 
when all covariates are equal to zero (since 𝑒𝑥𝑝(0) ⁡=⁡1) 
• 𝑒𝑥𝑝 is the exponential function 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥) ⁡= ⁡ 𝑒𝑥 
• 𝑥𝑖 is the i
th covariate in the model; and 
• 𝛽𝑖 is the regression coefficient for the i
th covariate 𝑥𝑖, that is, it 
measures the impact of the covariate. 
The values of exp(𝛽𝑖) provide the hazard ratios for each covariate. A hazard 
ratio greater than one indicates that as the value of that covariate increases, 
the hazard of the event of interest increases and thus the survival time 
decreases. Conversely, a hazard ratio of less than one indicates that as the 
value of that covariate increases, the hazard of the event of decreases 
increases and thus the survival time increases. A hazard ratio equal to one 
indicates that the covariate had no effect on the event of interest and thus on 
survival times.  
The Cox model is a proportional hazards model, that is, it assumes that the 
hazard function for two different levels of a covariate are proportional for all 





ℎ0(𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝{𝛽1𝑥𝑖1+. . . +𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑘}
ℎ0(𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝{𝛽1𝑥𝑗1+. . . +𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑗𝑘}
= 𝑒𝑥𝑝{𝛽1(𝑥𝑖1 − 𝑥𝑗1)+. . . +𝛽𝑘(𝑥𝑖𝑘 − 𝑥𝑗𝑘) 
Which, because the ℎ0(𝑡) cancel out, is independent of time t. For a model 
with time-varying covariates the Cox model takes the form: 
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝{𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2(𝑡). . . +𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘} 
The only difference is the inclusion of the 𝛽2𝑥2(𝑡)⁡term for time-varying 
variables.  
An extension to this is the competing risks model as proposed by Fine and 
Gray (1999). Here, a competing risk is present when a CEO is at risk of 
exiting to more than one destination and the occurrence of any one those 
events will prevent any other exit from happening for that CEO. That is, they 
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can only exit to a single destination out of several possible options. Whereas 
in the Cox model we are interested in the survival function for the event of 
interest, 𝑃(𝑇 > 𝑡⁡and⁡event⁡type⁡1), for competing risks models we are 
interested instead in the failure function, 𝑃(𝑇 ≤ 𝑡⁡and⁡event⁡type⁡1), that is, 
the cumulative incidence function. Fine and Gray (1999) specify a model for 





𝑃(𝑡 < 𝑇 ≤ 𝑡 + 𝛿⁡and⁡event⁡type⁡1)|𝑇 > 𝑡⁡𝑜𝑟⁡(𝑇 ≤ 𝑡⁡and⁡not⁡event⁡type⁡1
𝛿
} 
From this the cumulative incidence function (CIF) can be calculated as: 
 𝐶𝐼𝐹1(𝑡) = 1 − exp⁡{−?̅?1(𝑡)} 
where ?̅?1(𝑡) = ⁡∫ ℎ̅1(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑡
0
 is the cumulative sub-hazard.  
4.3.2 Sample selection 
The panel data sample used for analysis in this chapter includes all NHS 
acute trusts and combined acute and community NHS trusts in England 
between 2003/04 and 2017/18, and any CEOs of those trusts who were in 
post between 1st April 2003 and 31st March 2017. In total there were 2,144 
trust-year records available for analysis comprised of 155 trusts and 430 
distinct CEOs. In accordance with the literature, interim CEOs were removed 
from the sample (Bushman et al., 2010) as were any exits due to a trust 
being terminated (Petrovsky et al., 2017). This reduced the sample to 2,002 
records in which there were 364 CEO exit events, as shown in Table 4-1. 
The descriptive statistics presented throughout the rest of this chapter refer 
to this reduced sample.  
Table 4-1 Sample construction 
Procedure Observations 
Original sample 2,144 
Less: CEOs appointed on an interim basis (106) 
Less: CEO exits due to a trust being 
terminated 
(36) 
Final sample in trust-years 2,002 
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4.3.3 Dependent variables 
This chapter uses several dependent variables. For the pooled cox model I 
use the observed tenure, for the competing risks models I use exit 
destinations, and for the t-tests I use total tenure. A full description of all 
variables used in this analysis is provided in Chapter 3. The observed tenure 
is shown in Figure 4-2 as a survival function where the x-axis is the tenure 
and the y-axis shows the proportion of CEOs still in post for each year of 
tenure. As provided in Table 4-2, the mean observed tenure is 3.74 years 
with a range of 1 to 15 years. For the total tenure, the mean is 4.56 years 
with a range of 1 to 26 years, indicating that at least one CEO took up their 
post 11 years before the study observation period started. Seven CEOs were 
in post for the entire duration of the study and remained in post on the last 
day of the observation period. This means they were right-censored. In total, 
the final sample included 111 right-censored observations 
 
Figure 4-2 CEO survival curve 
 
For the competing risks models a multinomial exit destination variable was 
used, as described in Table 4-3. Nearly a quarter (23.9%) of exits were to 
self-employment or unemployment. This category is assumed to represent a 
poor outcome which would diminish their reputational social capital and was 
usually the destination for CEOs stepping down for personal reasons or to 
face new challenges, often code for being pushed out by the board. These 
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CEOs tended to establish themselves as self-employed consultants or had a 
significant break in employment before returning to a paid role. For simplicity, 
for the remainder of this chapter this destination is referred to as self-
employment. Nearly a fifth (19.8%) of the exits were to non-CEO posts 
elsewhere in the public sector. In practice this can include both demotions 
and promotions, but the latter seem to be quite rare as judged during the 
data collection process. Some moves, such as the recent secondment of the 
CEO of Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust to the Chief Operating 
Officer role in NHS England are clearly a promotion, but others are more 
ambiguous. When an NHS CEO is pushed out of their role, one of the face-
saving strategies used is to second them to a role elsewhere in the NHS or 
DHSC for a period before they disappear quietly out of NHS employment 
(Dunhill, 2018). 
Table 4-2 Summary statistics 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
CEO exit 2,002 0.182 0.386 0 1 
Observed tenure 2,002 3.735 2.887 1 15 
Total tenure 2,002 4.557 3.726 1 26 
Male  2,002 0.657 0.475 0 1 
Clinician 2,002 0.215 0.411 0 1 
Insider 2,002 0.185 0.388 0 1 
CEO age (years) 1,766 50.528 6.069 31 69 
Acute trust 2,002 0.735 0.442 0 1 
Teaching trust 2,002 0.206 0.404 0 1 
Foundation trust 2,002 0.371 0.483 0 1 
Overnight beds 2,001 796.312 363.739 232 2,662 
A&E target 1,995 0.932 0.060 0.598 0.995 
Operating surplus 1,706 1,763.971 17,878.240 -195,000 126,000 
RCI 1,993 98.800 6.763 69.090 138.050 
Inpatient waits (days) 1,999 61.013 23.116 1 344 
HSMR 1,195 100.168 10.995 67.364 144.299 
SHMI 890 1.002 0.095 0.539 1.247 
MRSA 2,002 0.477 0.424 0 5.395 
HHISHA- admissions 2,002 0.078 0.032 0.040 0.160 
Previous CEO experience 2,002 0.541 0.499 0 1 
 
On balance, this category is assumed to be a demotion which diminishes 
reputational  social capital since most of the media reports alluded to CEOs 
being pushed out. Exits to retirement account for 15.1% of all departures and 
include those taking early retirement. This is often influenced by a CEO 
being pushed out and to save face they take early retirement rather than 
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leaving to self-employment. Although the media reports sometimes alluded 
to this being the case, it was not clear enough to make a distinction between 
those and genuine early retirements, therefore this category is taken at face 
value as being genuine retirements. Retirement is considered a neutral 
destination which neither enhances nor diminishes an individual’s 
reputational social capital. Moves to the private sector account for just 7.4% 
of all exits and this is generally considered to be a promotion as the private 
sector can offer far greater fiscal rewards to CEOs making that move. 
Moving to the private sector is likely to enhance an individual’s reputational 
social capital.  
Table 4-3 Exit destinations 
Exit destination Count Percentage 
CEO in another trust 123 33.79 
Self-employed/no known post 87 23.90 
Non-CEO in public sector 72 19.78 
Retirement 55 15.11 
Private sector 27 7.42 
Total 364 100 
 
4.3.4 Explanatory variables  
The explanatory variables are those included in the analysis to test the 
hypotheses stated earlier in this chapter. For this chapter these variables are 
dummies for insider status, low performance relative to other trusts and high 
performance relative to other trusts. For the entire sample, 18.5% of records 
were coded as insiders but when looking at the exits this fell to 12.1% 
meaning that 44 of the 364 exits were for insider CEOs. There was one CEO 
who returned to a trust as CEO after several years working in another trust. 
This was not coded as an insider, despite the CEO having a historic track-
record with that trust, due to the length of time spent away from the trust.  
The main analysis reported in this chapter uses the average performance 
against the A&E four-hour waiting time target. The performance in each 
quarter was averaged across each financial year to give a single 
performance metric for each year. Missing records reduced the sample size 
to 1,995 with a mean performance of 93% achievement but a range from 
60% to 99%. Dummy variables for relatively good and poor performance 
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were created using the top and bottom 30% of performance figures within 
each financial year. Supplementary analysis used alternative performance 
metrics as described in Chapter 3. Two financial measures were used, 
operating surplus and the RCI. The operating surplus was adjusted for 
inflation using 2018 prices and for the sample used here it has a mean value 
of £1,764 but values ranged from -£195,000 to £126,000, indicating 
significant variations in performance (Table 4-2). This data was not available 
for all trusts in all years hence the total number of observations available for 
analysis reduces to 1,706. For operating surplus, the higher the value, the 
better the performance. However, for RCI, lower values denote better 
performance as this is cost information and lower costs are preferable. 
Missing values for RCI reduced the sample size to 1,993 records in which 
the mean RCI was 98.8. This is below average, where the average cost is 
100. The best RCI was 69.09 and the worst was 138.05, as shown in Table 
4-2.  
Other performance metrics used include MRSA infection rates, where lower 
values denote better performance. The mean infection rate was 0.48 with a 
minimum of 0 and a maximum value of 5.4 (Table 4-2). For mortality rates, 
dummy variables for good and poor performance were created for both the 
HSMR and SHMI variables using the top and bottom 30% of performance 
figures within each financial year. A single dummy variable for good mortality 
performance was created using the good dummy variable for HSMR up to 
and including 2011/12 and the good dummy variable for SHMI thereafter. A 
single dummy variable for poor mortality performance was created in the 
same way using the HSMR and SHMI poor dummy variables. Inpatient 
waiting times, in days, was also used for the supplementary analysis. There 
were three missing values for inpatient waiting times which reduced the 
sample size to 1,999. The mean waiting time was 61 days, but this ranged 
from 1 to 344 days.  
4.3.5 Control variables 
Control variables were added to the model to account for factors that are 
known to be important and have previously been identified in the literature as 
such. The size of each trust was measured using a continuous variable for 
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the number of overnight beds. The smallest trust had 232 beds compared to 
2,662 for the largest trust. The mean number of beds was 796, as shown in 
Table 4-2. The gender of each CEO was coded as 0 for female and 1 for 
male. 65.7% of the records were for men and this was reflected in the 
proportion of exits that were men, 67%. The teaching trust variable was 
coded as 1 for teaching trusts and 0 for non-teaching trusts. 20.58% of the 
records were for trusts with teaching status but this reduced to 15.93% for 
exit records. A trust with foundation status was coded as 1 with non-
foundation trusts coded as 0. 37.06% of the records were for trusts with 
foundation status although this reduced to 34.34% for exit records. A total of 
73 trusts gained FT status during the observation period. This is due to the 
observation period starting before foundation trusts were created.  
This study uses the four regional footprints: North, Midlands and East, 
London, and South that were historically used in the NHS prior to the recent 
move to seven regional footprints. The North region accounts for 31% of all 
records, the Midlands and East accounts for 27.5%, London 15.6% and the 
South 25.9%. When looking at only those records attached to exits these 
figures change slightly such that the Midlands and East accounts for the 
most exits (33%), the North accounts for 24.5%, the South accounts for 
24.2% and London 18.4%. 
The sample comprised two types of NHS trust: acute, coded as 1; and 
combined acute and community, coded as 0. Most records were for acute 
trusts (73.5%) with that figure rising to 78% when looking at just the exit 
records. The main analysis in this chapter includes a dummy variable for 
whether a CEO is a clinician of any type. 21.6% of all records are for 
clinicians, reducing slightly to 20.6% when looking at exit records only. Within 
that group there is considerable variation in the type of clinician, with nurses 
accounting for the large majority, followed by doctors and then other clinical 
roles such as pharmacist and physiotherapist.  
It is obvious that the age of a CEO might be an important factor when looking 
at exit events, particularly for exits into retirement, and the literature supports 
this assumption (Petrovsky et al., 2017). It was not possible to collect the age 
of every CEO in the sample, which reduced the number of exit events 
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available for analysis from 364 to 316. Due to this reduction in sample size, 
the age variable is excluded from the main analyses and only addressed in 
the section on robustness checks. The average age of CEOs exiting their 
posts is 51.5 years but when looking at each exit destination separately the 
average age ranges from 49.19 for exits to other CEO posts in the NHS to 
57.26 for exits to retirement. The youngest CEO to leave their post was 34 
and the oldest was 69.  
This section has described how the sample used in this chapter was 
constructed and the variables used in the models. The next section provides 
the results of the analyses and a discussion on how those results support the 
hypotheses.  
4.4 Empirical results 
A correlation matrix is presented in Table 4-4 with any correlations significant 
at the 95% confidence level flagged with an asterisk. Figure 4-3, which 
shows the smoothed hazard function for pooled CEO exits, clearly 
demonstrates that the risk of exit peaks at around 6 years of tenure before 
declining steadily.   
Identifying a single performance metric in the public sector is difficult. Doing 
so in the NHS is even more so since there are many facets of performance 
with different stakeholders valuing some more than others. Therefore, to 
make this research as widely applicable as possible, several performance 
metrics have been used to test the hypotheses. However, only the results 
using A&E waiting time target are reported in this chapter although the 
results for other performance metrics are discussed and are provided in 
Appendix A. 
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Table 4-4 Correlation matrix 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
  (1) Insider 1.000 
  (2) A&E target -0.069* 1.000 
  (3) Op. surplus 0.034 0.229* 1.000 
  (4) RCI -0.017 -0.086* -0.047 1.000 
  (5) Inpatient waits -0.111* -0.028 0.003 0.000 1.000 
  (6) SHMI 0.101* -0.066 -0.028 -0.010 -0.015 1.000 
  (7) HSMR 0.110* -0.026 -0.072* -0.127* 0.064* 0.706* 1.000 
  (8) MRSA 0.050* -0.222* -0.054* 0.093* -0.039 -0.122* -0.171* 1.000 
  (9) Clinician 0.067* 0.058* 0.003 -0.030 -0.028 -0.056 -0.059* 0.105* 1.000 
  (10) Previous CEO -0.434* -0.080* -0.029 0.105* 0.008 -0.106* -0.126* 0.018 -0.075* 1.000 
  (11) Acute trust -0.090* 0.002 -0.044 -0.152* 0.047* 0.022 -0.046 0.028 0.141* -0.002 1.000 
  (12) CEO age -0.014 -0.051* 0.031 0.082* -0.248* -0.090* -0.180* 0.050* 0.013 0.165* -0.038 
  (13) Teaching trust -0.055* -0.072* 0.125* 0.255* -0.021 -0.324* -0.299* 0.117* -0.014 0.204* 0.018 
  (14) FT status 0.226* 0.014 0.094* -0.035 -0.347* 0.037 -0.031 -0.022 0.096* -0.100* -0.007 
  (15) Male -0.079* -0.045* 0.033 0.055* 0.044 -0.005 -0.083* -0.064* -0.418* 0.061* -0.002 
  (16) Beds -0.091* -0.113* 0.044 0.224* 0.028 -0.083* -0.108* 0.018 -0.059* 0.208* 0.023 
 
Variables (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(12) CEO age 1.000     
(13) Teaching trust 0.094* 1.000    
(14) FT status 0.139* 0.024 1.000   
(15) Male 0.112* 0.154* -0.104* 1.000  
(16) Beds 0.207* 0.453* -0.060* 0.174* 1.000 
* shows significance at the 0.05 level 
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Figure 4-3 CEO hazard rate 
 
A simple t-test was used to see if insider CEOs had a different tenure length 
compared to outsiders. Table 4-5 provides the results which indicate that 
insider CEOs had an average tenure of 5.19 years whilst outsider CEOs had 
an average tenure of 4.49 years. Therefore, we can conclude that tenure is 
significantly longer for insider CEOs, which supports hypothesis H1. The 
results from the multivariate analysis are provided in Table 4-6.  
Table 4-5 t-test to compare tenure for insiders and outsiders 
  Insider Outsider t-value Probability 








Table 4-6 shows the multivariate results using A&E waiting time target 
achievement as the performance metric. Model A is for all exits pooled and 
models B to F show the competing risks models for each exit destination. 
The pooled analysis provides evidence that insiders have a different risk of 
exit compared to outsiders, with model A showing that insider CEOs have a 
36% lower hazard of exit, significant at the 95% confidence level. The results 
for the competing risks models were mixed, with model B showing that 
insiders have a 73% lower hazard of exit to other NHS CEO roles. This result 
was significant at the 99% confidence level. 
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Table 4-6 Survival models using A&E metric  
Model A B C D E F 







Insider (dummy) 0.639** 0.269*** 1.316 0.473 0.544 2.924** 
 (0.116) (0.109) (0.497) (0.348) (0.218) (1.258) 
Low performance relative to other trusts 1.343** 0.678 1.096 0.718 2.997*** 0.995 
 (0.178) (0.181) (0.308) (0.391) (0.825) (0.328) 
High performance relative to other 
trusts 0.875 0.895 0.759 1.134 1.427 0.745 
 (0.121) (0.202) (0.241) (0.581) (0.474) (0.270) 
Clinician (dummy) 1.060 0.664 0.809 1.209 1.542 1.094 
 (0.158) (0.181) (0.278) (0.510) (0.438) (0.386) 
Previous CEO experience (dummy) 1.002 0.896 0.981 0.792 0.839 2.168** 
 (0.124) (0.184) (0.260) (0.374) (0.206) (0.852) 
Acute trust (dummy) 1.336** 1.316 1.094 1.415 1.121 0.745 
 (0.185) (0.321) (0.325) (0.826) (0.328) (0.229) 
Teaching hospital (dummy) 0.754 1.129 1.042 2.558* 0.493* 0.354** 
 (0.132) (0.365) (0.322) (1.247) (0.203) (0.164) 
Foundation Trusts status (dummy) 1.002 1.053 0.909 1.343 1.145 2.838*** 
 (0.124) (0.232) (0.264) (0.551) (0.284) (0.874) 
Male (dummy) 1.206 1.072 1.436 1.647 0.986 0.800 
 (0.160) (0.247) (0.444) (0.753) (0.265) (0.253) 
Overnight beds 1.000** 0.999*** 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Region: Midlands and East 1.315* 0.747 1.451 5.510** 1.353 0.810 
 (0.201) (0.183) (0.539) (4.324) (0.423) (0.319) 
Region: London 1.247 0.661 2.858*** 4.086* 0.801 1.214 
 (0.235) (0.210) (1.118) (3.272) (0.325) (0.628) 
Region: South  0.952 0.508** 1.537 4.147* 0.963 1.905* 
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Model A B C D E F 







 (0.157) (0.141) (0.601) (3.406) (0.336) (0.714) 
CEO spells 445 445 445 445 445 445 
Number of exits 336 111 69 24 79 53 
Observations 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,849 
Log pseudo-likelihood -1,752.850 -619.591 -395.112 -135.670 -445.453 -287.962 
Hazard ratios reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The risk of an insider CEO exiting to retirement, model F, was 192% higher 
than for outsiders. A result that was significant at the 95% confidence level. 
Whilst the risk of exit to the private sector, model D, or self-employment, 
model E, were also lower for insiders, those results were not statistically 
significant. Similarly, the higher risk of insiders exiting to non-CEO roles in 
the public sector, model C, was also found to be non-significant. These 
results were replicated across all other performance metrics: RCI, operating 
surplus, inpatient waiting times, MRSA and mortality rates as shown in 
Appendix A. Hypothesis H1 stated that insiders would have a lower risk of 
exit than outsiders but that this relationship was not expected to hold for exits 
to retirement. The findings provide support for this hypothesis since insiders 
have a lower risk of exit in the pooled model and for exits to NHS CEO roles, 
but a higher risk of exit to retirement. 
The second hypothesis suggested that organisational performance would be 
associated with tenure. A simple t-test was carried out to test whether 
average tenure for pooled exits was different for CEOs overseeing high and 
low relative performance across the full range of performance metrics. Table 
4-7 shows that for all metrics, the average tenure was significantly longer for 
CEOs overseeing high relative performance than those overseeing low 
relative performance. Whilst all the differences were significant, the most 
notable difference was observed when using operating surplus as the 
performance metric. Here, good performers stayed in post for an average of 
5.36 years whereas poor performers left after an average of 3.88 years. 
Further analysis was carried out using multivariate survival models, the 
results of which are provided in Table 4-6.  
Hypothesis H2a suggested that CEOs with low reputational social capital 
would have a lower risk of exit to destinations that enhanced their 
reputational social capital, but a higher risk of exit to destinations that 
diminished their reputational social capital. The pooled model, A, shows a 
significantly increased risk of exit for CEOs overseeing low performance.  
However, there was no evidence found to support the hypothesis that CEOs 
of poor-performing trusts have a lower risk of exit to destinations that 
enhance their social capital. Although exits to other NHS CEO roles and the 
private sector did show a lower risk, this was not statistically significant. The 
- 96 - 
results did show support for the hypothesis that CEOs of poor-performing 
trusts have a higher risk of exit to destinations that diminish their social 
capital since exits to self-employment were 200% higher, significant at the 
99% confidence level. Hypothesis H2b suggested that CEOs with high 
reputational social capital would have a higher risk of exit to destinations that 
enhanced their reputational social capital but a lower risk of exit to 
destinations that diminished their reputational social capital. No support was 
found for this hypothesis. 























































The results using alternative performance metrics were mixed. The only 
pooled model to show a significant association with poor performance was 
the one using mortality rates. This showed a 28% higher risk of exit for CEOs 
overseeing poor performance, that is, high mortality rates relative to other 
trusts, although this association was noisy and only significant at the 90% 
confidence level. For high performance, only the pooled model using 
operating surplus as the performance metric showed a significant result with 
a 28% lower hazard of exit. The results for exits to destinations that would 
enhance a CEO’s social capital were contradictory, with only the model using 
inpatient waiting times as the performance metric generating statistically 
significant results. This showed that CEOs overseeing long waiting times had 
a 63% higher risk of exit to other NHS CEO roles yet a 73% lower risk of exit 
to the private sector, both destinations felt to enhance social capital. When 
using RCI as the performance metric, there were also contradictory results 
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for exits to destinations that diminish reputational social capital. Exits to non-
CEO roles in the public sector had a 71% higher risk, whilst exits to self-
employment had a 46% lower risk.  
Significant associations were found for some of the control variables. 
Regardless of the performance metric used, all competing risks models for 
exits into retirement showed a higher risk of exit for CEOs with previous 
experience as an NHS CEO. Although, since previous CEO experience is 
highly correlated with age (see Table 4-4) and retirement is related to age, 
this association is not surprising. The type of trust was significant in all 
pooled models except when using operating surplus as the performance 
metric. A CEO from an acute trust, rather than a combined acute and 
community trust, was approximately 35% more likely to exit. The teaching 
status of a trust was also found to be significant, with the A&E model from 
Table 4-6 showing that CEOs from teaching trusts had a 156% higher risk of 
exit to the private sector and a 51% lower risk of exit to self-employment, 
although both associations were noisy and only significant at the 90% 
confidence level. A stronger association was found for exits to retirement 
which had a 65% lower risk for CEOs from teaching trusts. This latter 
association was also found in the retirement models using all other 
performance metrics.  
The pooled models using RCI, inpatient waiting times, and MRSA all showed 
a significantly lower risk of exit for CEOs from teaching trusts, albeit only 
significant at the 90% confidence level. The competing risks models for exits 
to the private sector showed a significantly higher risk of exit when using RCI 
and MRSA as the performance metrics. Models for exits to self-employment 
showed a significantly lower risk of exit for CEOs from teaching trusts when 
using inpatient waiting times and MRSA as the performance metrics. 
Foundation trust status was significant in all retirement models and showed 
that CEOs from foundation trusts were much more likely to exit to retirement 
than those from non-foundation trusts. Organisational size was found to be 
an important factor in whether a CEO exited their post. Table 4-6 shows that 
for each additional overnight bed, the risk of a CEO leaving to any 
destination reduces very slightly. This association is repeated and 
strengthened for exits to other NHS CEO roles but reversed for exits to 
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retirement where each additional overnight bed increases the risk of exit. 
Similar results are seen in the models using the alternative performance 
metrics for exits to other NHS CEO roles and retirement.  
A regional control variable was included to allow for differences due to 
geography. In the pooled model, A, CEOs in the Midlands and East region 
had a 32% higher hazard of exiting when compared to the North region. This 
association was repeated and strengthened across all performance metrics. 
When using waiting times and mortality as the performance metrics an 
additional association was found with London having an approximately 40% 
higher hazard of exiting to any destination compared to the North region. The 
competing risks models showed more exaggerated effects with the Midlands 
and East, and London both having a much higher hazard of exiting to the 
private sector than the North, as shown in model D. London CEOs also had 
a much higher hazard of exiting to non-CEO roles in the public sector than 
CEOs from the North, as shown in model C. This result is not surprising 
since a greater proportion of public sector roles are based in London than 
any other region. CEOs from the South region had a 50% lower hazard of 
exiting to other NHS CEO roles than CEOs from the North, model B, but a 
95% higher hazard of exiting to retirement, model F.  
The results presented in this section have related to the main models used in 
the analysis. However, decisions were made about how to operationalise 
some of the variables and which variables to include. The next section 
discusses the robustness checks that were carried out to explore the 
sensitivity of the models.  
4.4.1 Robustness checks 
For some of the variables a decision was made about how to operationalise 
them in the models used in the main analysis. Robustness checks were 
conducted to see whether different operationalisations or including additional 
variables had an impact on the results reported in the previous section.  
4.4.1.1 Sample selection 
The sample used in the main analysis included any CEOs who were in post 
on 1st April 2003 even if they had started prior to that date. As a robustness 
check, a subset of this data was created in which only those CEOs who 
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started on or after 1st April 2003 were included. The analysis using A&E 
waiting time target achievement as the performance metric was re-run to see 
if excluding the CEOs already in post prior to the observation period affected 
the results and conclusions. The conclusions from the pooled model were 
unaffected but for the competing risks models there were some differences 
for hypothesis H2b. In the main analysis there was no support for hypothesis 
H2b in the competing risks models but with the reduced subset both exits to 
other CEO roles in the NHS and non-CEO roles in the public sector became 
weakly significant for CEOs overseeing high performance, showing a 
reduced risk of exit to those destinations of 42% and 46% respectively. 
Hypothesis H2b predicted that CEOs from high-performing trusts would have 
a higher risk of exit to destinations that enhanced their reputational social 
capital and a lower risk of exit to destinations that diminished it. Although 
mixed, there was weak evidence to support a lower risk of exit to a 
destination that diminished reputational social capital. The conclusions for all 
other hypotheses remained unchanged although some of the control 
variables did become significant or lose their significance. For exits to 
retirement, the subset of data resulted in the same conclusions, but the size 
and strength of the effects were magnified.  
4.4.1.2 Organisational performance 
The main analysis used organisational performance from the year prior to 
CEO exit, that is, there was a one-year lag for performance which was then 
categorised into high and low performance relative to all other trusts in each 
year using the top and bottom 30% as thresholds. An alternative 
operationalisation of performance was tested for the A&E waiting time target 
achievement metric which instead used the lagged raw values for the 
average target achievement. This alternative operationalisation had no 
impact on the pooled model or exits to retirement, but for exits to other NHS 
CEO roles the performance became significant with a 111% higher hazard of 
exit for every additional percentage of target achievement. Exits to the 
private sector increased as performance improved, although this association 
was only significant at the 90% confidence level. Exits to self-employment 
also increased very slightly as performance improved. This provides mixed 
support for hypothesis H2b since it shows that performing well against the 
- 100 - 
high-profile A&E waiting time target leads to a higher risk of exiting to a 
destination that enhances reputational social capital but also a higher risk of 
exiting to a destination that diminishes reputational social capital.  
4.4.1.3 Clinician type 
The main analysis used a binary variable to indicate whether the CEO was a 
clinician. Replacing the clinician dummy variable with clinician type (doctor, 
nurse, other) had no impact on the pooled model using A&E waiting time 
target achievement as the performance metric, that is, clinician type was not 
significantly associated with the risk of exit. However, the pooled model using 
operating surplus as the performance metric showed that doctors had an 
85% greater hazard of exit, significant at the 99% confidence level. The 
pooled models using RCI, inpatient waiting times and MRSA infection rates 
as the performance metrics all showed an approximately 50% higher hazard 
of exit for doctors, but this was only significant at the 90% confident level. For 
the competing risks models, a highly significant but very small decreased 
hazard was shown for exits to the private sector for CEOs with ‘other’ clinical 
qualifications across all performance metrics.  
4.4.1.4 CEO labour market competitiveness 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a commonly used measure of market 
concentration. Used here at strategic health authority level, it provides a 
proxy for the competitiveness of the labour market for NHS CEOs by 
assigning a value to represent the concentration of NHS acute, and 
combined acute and community trusts in each SHA. Adding this variable to 
the models had no impact on the conclusions drawn from the results and the 
variable itself was not statistically significant in any model.  
4.4.1.5 CEO age 
Including age in the models showed that although it was a significant 
predictor of CEO exits, it didn’t change the interpretation of the models that 
excluded age. The pooled model using A&E waiting time target achievement 
as the performance metric showed that for every additional year of CEO age, 
the hazard of exit increased by 3%. This association was significant at the 
95% confidence level. For exits to other NHS CEO roles, every additional 
year of age was associated with a 4% lower hazard of exit, significant at the 
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99% confidence level. For exits to non-CEO roles in the public sector, every 
additional year of age was associated with a 6% higher hazard of exit, 
significant at the 95% confidence level. Exits to the private sector were not 
influenced by CEO age but exits to self-employment had a 4% higher hazard 
for every additional year of age, significant at the 90% confidence level. The 
strongest association was for exits to retirement which saw a 25% higher 
hazard for every additional year of age, significant at the 99% confidence 
level.   
Table 4-8 shows the results of t-tests comparing the mean average age for 
CEOs exiting to various destinations using the best and worst performers for 
each performance metric. For the pooled model it can be seen that, at the 
95% confidence level, only performance as judged by operating surplus and 
average inpatient waiting times have significant differences in the age of the 
CEO on exit. For both of these, CEOs overseeing good performance leave at 
an average age of nearly 54 compared to under 51 for CEOs overseeing 
poor performance. At the 90% confidence level there is a significant 
difference in age of CEO at exit when using MRSA and mortality rates as the 
performance metric. However, whilst mortality rates show that CEOs 
overseeing good performance tend to exit at an older age than those 
overseeing poor performance, this relationship is reversed for MRSA. For 
exits to other NHS CEO posts the relationships hold for operating surplus 
and waiting times, although the latter is only at the 90% confidence level. 
CEOs overseeing good performance as judged by operating surplus and 
mortality rates exit to non-CEO posts in the public sector at a much older age 
than those overseeing poor performance, with an approximately 6-year 
difference. There is no significant different in the average age of CEOs 
exiting to private sector, self-employment or retirement.  
The next section summarises these findings and discusses what this means 
for the hypotheses stated earlier in this chapter. It also discusses the original 
contribution that this research has made to the literature.  
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Table 4-8 Average age of exit  
Exit 
destination 





Pooled A&E target Mean (S.D.) 52.60 (0.70) 51.82 (0.66) 0.802 0.424 
RCI Mean (S.D.) 51.07 (0.71) 52.35 (0.71) -1.271 0.206 
Operating surplus Mean (S.D.) 53.67 (0.89) 50.78 (0.66) 2.663 0.009 
Waiting times Mean (S.D.) 53.63 (0.60) 50.51 (0.72) 3.356 0.001 
MRSA Mean (S.D.) 51.08 (0.64) 52.78 (0.71) -1.786 0.076 
Mortality Mean (S.D.) 52.55 (0.71) 50.73 (0.65) 1.865 0.064 
       
NHS CEO posts A&E target Mean (S.D.) 50.71 (1.11) 48.39 (1.17) 1.413 0.164 
RCI Mean (S.D.) 50.13 (1.11) 48.13 (1.12) 1.209 0.231 
Operating surplus Mean (S.D.) 51.29 (0.98) 47.31 (1.18) 2.387 0.022 
Waiting times Mean (S.D.) 51.31 (1.06) 48.81 (1.05) 1.672 0.099 
MRSA Mean (S.D.) 49.22 (0.95) 49.72 (1.26) -0.325 0.746 
Mortality Mean (S.D.) 50.04 (1.15) 48.00 (1.09) 1.266 0.211 
       
Non-CEO public 
sector posts 
A&E target Mean (S.D.) 54.00 (2.11) 52.05 (1.50) 0.820 0.418 
RCI Mean (S.D.) 50.57 (1.97) 53.38 (1.28) -1.246 0.221 
Operating surplus Mean (S.D.) 56.15 (1.67) 50.35 (0.99) 3.198 0.003 
Waiting times Mean (S.D.) 52.95 (1.41) 49.60 (1.58) 1.577 0.123 
MRSA Mean (S.D.) 51.56 (2.04) 52.05 (1.18) -0.218 0.829 
Mortality Mean (S.D.) 54.90 (1.43) 49.35 (1.47) 2.700 0.011 
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4.5 Summary and conclusions  
This empirical chapter has addressed the research questions: how does a 
CEO’s internal social capital affect the likelihood of them exiting their post 
and their exit destination, and how does reputational social capital affect a 
CEOs ability to influence their tenure and their destination on exiting the 
CEO role? For the purpose of this study social capital was proxied by both a 
CEO’s insider status and the organisational performance of their trust. An 
insider CEO, one who was employed by the trust immediately prior to 
becoming its CEO, was assumed to have greater internal social capital than 
an outsider by virtue of the relationships and reputation they would have 
developed during their pre-CEO tenure. Whilst most outsiders are likely to 
have NHS trust sector experience, the trust-specific capital that is generated 
by personal relationships and knowing the internal politics of a particular trust 
was expected to be an important input factor in the decision-making process 
for whether a CEO exited their role. Specifically, H1 suggested that CEOs 
with internal social capital would have a lower risk of exiting compared to 
outsiders for all non-retirement exit destinations. There was partial support 
for this hypothesis as insider status was not a significant factor for all exit 
destinations. The pooled models and exits to other NHS CEO roles did 
demonstrate a lower hazard of exit for insiders whilst the hazard of exit to 
retirement was indeed higher, much higher in fact, for insiders compared to 
outsiders.  
The theory originally presented in this chapter was that the relationship 
between reputational social capital and risk of exit was non-linear. Whereas 
hypothesis H2a made suggestions about this relationship for CEOs with poor 
reputational social capital, H2b suggested the direction of the associations for 
the other extreme, that of high reputational social capital. Using 
organisational performance as a proxy for reputational social capital 
assumes that the success or not of an organisation will be attributed to the 
skills of its leader. Hypothesis H2a suggested that CEOs overseeing poor 
performance would have a lower risk of exit to destinations that enhanced 
their social capital, that is, their reputation, but a higher risk of exit to 
destinations that diminished their social capital. This was predicated on the 
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argument that a CEO with a poorer reputation would struggle to find an 
alternative job offer that didn’t damage their social capital even further by 
being seen as a demotion. Whilst the outcome of a CEO exiting can be due 
to both the CEO and board’s decision-making processes, it was argued that 
the CEO’s decision making would outweigh that of the board due to the 
difficulty in removing public sector employees from their posts.  
The results presented some interesting findings for CEOs overseeing poor 
performance, with only limited support for H2a. The pooled model showed 
that CEOs overseeing poor performance were significantly more likely to exit. 
The competing risks models partially supported the hypothesis with a higher 
hazard of exit to self-employment, a destination considered to have a 
diminishing effect on reputational social capital. In contrast, CEOs 
overseeing good performance relative to other trusts had a lower hazard of 
exit only when looking at pooled exits using operating surplus as the 
performance metric. This mixed evidence tends to suggest that the balance 
of power in the decision-making process lies with the board, and that some 
performance metrics are not considered that valuable in assessing the 
effectiveness of the CEO. Some of the results are counter-intuitive. If a CEO 
overseeing poor performance is pushed out by the board, we might expect 
them to exit to self-employment or unemployment, particularly if their 
performance was very poor – as evidenced by the results. Alternatively, if a 
face-saving agreement is reached, we might expect the CEO to exit to a non-
CEO role in the public sector as this seems to be a traditional route out of the 
NHS for poor performing CEOs. For older CEOs an exit to retirement would 
also be a good face-saving strategy.  
Hypothesis H2b proposed that CEOs overseeing high performance relative to 
other trusts would have a higher risk of exit to destinations that enhanced 
their reputational social capital but a lower risk of exit to destinations that 
diminished their reputational social capital. The main analysis provided no 
support for this except when using operating surplus as the performance 
metric. However, the main analysis used dummy variables to differentiate 
between high and low relative performance in each year. When using the 
raw data for the average A&E waiting time target achievement instead of the 
dummy variables, there was strong support for H2b with the hazard of exiting 
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to other NHS CEO roles, a social capital enhancing destination, increasing 
as performance improved, and the hazard of exiting to non-CEO roles in the 
public sector, a social capital diminishing destination, reducing as 
performance improved.  
The novelty of this analysis lies in its use of the lens of social capital theory. 
As reported in the literature review in Chapter 2, social capital has been 
largely ignored as a theoretical framework in CEO succession research to 
date. The literature review also highlighted the limited amount of research 
into antecedents of CEO turnover in the public sector and the absence of any 
using the NHS as a case study. What research there is tends to focus on 
CEOs’ intention to leave (Bertelli, 2007; Pitts et al., 2011) rather than actual 
exits or limits itself to considering exits as a homogenous group rather than 
distinguishing between types of exit (McCabe et al., 2008; Boyne et al., 
2008).  
The empirical study described in this chapter adds to the evidence base in 
several ways. Firstly, it uses social capital theory as a framework for studying 
CEO exits. By using CEO insider status and organisational performance as 
proxies for internal and reputational social capital respectively I am able to 
attribute some of the risk of a CEO exiting to the presence or amount of 
social capital they have accumulated. Secondly, it uses the English NHS as 
a case study. To date there is no other peer reviewed research looking at the 
antecedents of CEO succession in the NHS. Whilst comparable research 
does exist for other organisations in the English public sector (Boyne et al., 
2008; 2010a; 2010b; Petrovsky et al., 2017), this is limited to local 
authorities. Thirdly, this study goes beyond the exit destination definitions 
used so far in existing research and thus provides greater granularity. The 
closest comparable research uses just three exit destinations, public sector, 
private sector, and retirement (Petrovsky et al., 2017), whereas this research 
uses five destinations and is thus better able to draw conclusions about the 
impact of decision influencing input factors.  
This chapter has explored what factors affect a CEO’s likelihood of leaving 
their post, with a focus on factors that can be used to assess their social 
capital, specifically their insider status and organisational performance. 
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Some of these results seem logical in the context of the NHS. It has already 
been suggested that CEOs of poor performing trusts can be pushed out of 
their posts with face-saving measures such as being seconded to other NHS 
roles, and the results support this. Social capital may provide CEOs with 
additional power to help them influence the timing of their departure and their 
destination on exit.  
The choice of performance metric has been shown to make a difference to a 
CEO’s risk of exit, which suggests that some performance measures are 
seen as being more important than others, by the board at least. If the board 
is pushing out poor performing CEOs it suggests that in doing so they hope 
to replace them with a CEO who can turn that performance around. Is CEO 
social capital valued by recruiting firms? This is the question posed in the 
next empirical chapter.   
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Chapter 5 – CEO selection 
5.1 Introduction 
CEO succession research is broadly split into three domains. The previous 
chapter explored the first of these, the antecedents of a CEO exiting their 
post, whilst this chapter focuses on the second, the selection of a new CEO 
to fill that void. In keeping with the theme of social capital theory this chapter 
addresses the research questions: is social capital valued by recruiting firms, 
and does the baseline performance of the organisation affect the value 
placed on social capital by the recruiting organisation?  
The choice of a new CEO is a critical decision since it offers the organisation 
an opportunity to adapt to its changing environment by ensuring that the new 
CEO has characteristics that are aligned to the context of the organisation 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009). It is believed that a new CEO will have a substantial 
impact on the organisation (Lauterbach et al., 1999) so boards are under 
pressure to make the right appointment. Therefore, it is important to try and 
understand the factors that influence the choice of new CEO, not only for 
boards making that decision but also for potential candidate CEOs 
(Magnusson and Boggs, 2006). Managers who are interested in an external 
move will most likely make decisions in their current role that are intended to 
increase their desirability to other organisations (Fee and Hadlock, 2003). A 
CEO’s strategic effectiveness is influenced by their relationships within and 
outside the organisation. This means that changing the CEO brings with it a 
change in the social structure in which the organisation has been operating 
as a result of its CEO’s networks (Cao et al., 2006). Therefore, a candidate’s 
social capital is a key consideration for boards when deciding whom to 
appoint, particularly since social capital, in the form of an individual’s 
reputation can be perceived as an informational signal to external 
stakeholders about the recruiting organisation (Certo, 2003). 
The structure of the rest of this chapter is as follows: first, I discuss the 
theoretical arguments applicable to CEO selection, using the lens of social 
capital theory, and set out the hypotheses to be tested. I then describe the 
data sample and variables used throughout this chapter before setting out 
the methodology, that of logit regression. This is followed by the empirical 
- 108 - 
results, which include robustness checks for several organisational 
performance metrics: the average performance against the A&E four hour 
waiting time target, operating surplus, reference cost index, average waiting 
times for inpatient admissions, MRSA infection rates, and mortality rates.  
The analysis in this chapter continues with the theme of social capital as a 
key factor in CEO succession decisions and three hypotheses are used to 
explore this. The first suggests that insiders are preferable to outsiders since 
they will have greater internal social capital, hence a positive association is 
expected to be observed between insider status and CEO selection. The 
second hypothesis is in two parts and suggests that the relationship in the 
first hypothesis is over-simplified and that the baseline performance of the 
recruiting trust should be taken into account as a contingency factor. The 
third hypothesis explores the relationship between the second proxy for 
social capital, that of reputation as determined by the performance of the 
candidate’s previous trust, and selection whilst taking account of the baseline 
performance of the recruiting trust. The final section in this chapter discusses 
the empirical results and draws conclusions before setting out what the 
original contribution of this research offers to the literature. But first, the next 
section sets out the theoretical motivations for my research and the 
associated hypotheses. 
5.2 Theoretical motivation and hypotheses development  
As described in previous chapters, both insider status and organisational 
performance are used as proxies for a CEO’s social capital within the context 
of the NHS. Appointing an insider signals a desire to maintain the status quo 
since it is assumed that an insider will be familiar with, and supportive of, the 
incumbent CEO’s strategies and happy to continue implementing them 
(Lauterbach et al., 1999; Finkelstein et al., 2009). Research into the selection 
of insider or outsider CEOs implicitly assumes that outsiders will be able to 
effect strategic change (Datta and Guthrie, 1994; Lauterbach et al., 1999; 
Bailey and Helfat, 2003), which is beneficial to the hiring organisation 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Karaevli and Zajac, 2013). Although outsider 
selection was once a relatively rare event (Finkelstein et al., 2009), over 
recent years an increasing number of outsider CEO appointments have been 
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made (Georgakakis and Ruigrok, 2017) by the world’s largest 2,500 
companies, rising from 18% in 2009 to 30% in 2012 (Favaro et al., 2013). 
Some types of organisation, such as hospitals, may have fewer people 
wanting to be CEO, which would mean a greater number of outsiders being 
appointed (Finkelstein et al., 2009). This is backed up by David Nicholson, 
former CEO of the NHS, who once stated that ‘we find it very difficult to 
recruit people who want to be chief executives’ (Santry, 2007). Thereby 
implying that not only is it difficult to find internal candidates, but there may 
also be a shortage of suitable external candidates. Recent reports have 
highlighted the unattractive nature of NHS CEO roles, with individuals 
receiving personal blame when things go wrong (Anandaciva et al., 2018). 
The different types of social capital could be expected to have a different 
impact on CEO selection with internal candidates being appointed where 
internal social capital is valued and external candidates being appointed 
where reputational social capital is valued. The suitability of a candidate as 
assessed by their social capital would suggest that insider CEOs would be 
preferable since they will already have knowledge of the organisation and 
established social networks (Schnatterly and Johnson, 2008). This gives rise 
to the first hypothesis: 
H1: When organisations appoint CEOs they will favour candidates with 
internal social capital  
Although testing H1 would preferably be done using a dataset containing all 
applicants for the CEO role, there is precedent in the literature for looking 
only at successful appointments (Dalton and Kesner, 1985; Schnatterly and 
Johnson, 2008; Elsaid, Wang and Davidson, 2011; Elsaid et al., 2016). 
Whilst this first hypothesis explores the direct link between social capital and 
CEO selection, it is thought that there are various contingency factors which 
influence CEO appointment decisions. The choice of an insider or outsider 
CEO is believed to be contingent on the performance of the recruiting 
organisation prior to the CEO succession, where a poor performing 
organisation is more likely to choose an outsider (Dalton and Kesner, 1985; 
Finkelstein et al., 2009). The rationale for this argument is that the board of a 
poor performing organisation will want to effect strategic change and, as 
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discussed above, an outsider CEO is expected to be more open to making 
such large-scale changes as they are not bound by old loyalties or strategies 
and are thus more willing to make sweeping changes (Lauterbach et al., 
1999; Bailey and Helfat, 2003). Conversely, an organisation with good 
baseline performance may be inclined to appoint an insider CEO so that the 
successful strategies leading to that good performance are maintained 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009). However, evidence to support this is inconclusive, 
with some research showing neither poor nor high performing organisations 
selected outsiders but instead it was mid-range performers (Dalton and 
Kesner, 1985). Others found mixed evidence (Lauterbach et al., 1999) whilst 
more recent studies found support for the theoretical arguments presented 
above, that high performing firms are more likely to appoint an insider (Zhang 
and Rajagopalan, 2003) and that poor performing firms are more likely to 
appoint an outsider (Schnatterly and Johnson, 2008). This leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
H2a: An organisation that is performing well will be more likely to 
appoint a CEO with internal social capital (an insider) 
H2b: An organisation that is performing poorly will be more likely to 
appoint a CEO with no internal social capital (an outsider) 
The appointment of an insider implies not only that the board wants to 
maintain current strategies but also that they value internal social capital and 
recognise the importance of that social capital in maintaining those strategies 
(Fitzsimmons and Callan, 2016). However, the appointment of an outsider 
may be necessary at times, not only due to poor organisational performance 
but also because there might be no suitable candidates within the recruiting 
organisation. This leads to other considerations in how to choose between 
outside candidates. Continuing with the theme of social capital and the use 
of organisational performance as a proxy, we might expect CEOs from high 
performing trusts to be appointed more often than those from poor 
performing trusts as their reputational social capital will be enhanced by that 
good performance (Fee and Hadlock, 2003; McCabe et al., 2008; 
Anandaciva et al., 2018). As discussed in the previous chapter, leadership 
has become increasingly personalised with CEOs being blamed for poor 
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performance but conversely, basking in the glory of high performance (Fee 
and Hadlock, 2003; Anandaciva et al., 2018). Based on this, we might expect 
poor performing trusts to appoint CEOs with greater reputational social 
capital to maximise the likelihood that they will be able to turn its 
performance around. However, a poor performing trust might struggle to 
attract talented managers as they may fear their reputational social capital 
being damaged by overseeing continued poor performance in the recruiting 
trust (Johnson et al., 2011; Anandaciva et al., 2018). This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
H3: An organisation that is performing poorly will be more likely to 
appoint a CEO with reputational social capital 
This section has set out the theoretical motivations for my research and the 
hypotheses that will be tested in this chapter. The next section describes the 
methodology used in this chapter, that of logit regression.  
5.3 Data and methodology 
This section describes the methodology used in this chapter, that of logit 
regression.  This is followed by a description of the data sample and 
variables used to test the hypotheses set out in the previous section.  
5.3.1 Methodology 
The analysis in this chapter is concerned with binary outcomes. Therefore, 
logit regression is appropriate. As described in the Stata Manual (StataCorp, 
2019), a random effects binary outcomes model assumes that the individual 
effects are normally distributed such that 𝜐𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜐
2). This yields: 
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The panel level likelihood 𝑙𝑖 is given by 
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Which is equivalent to 








∗  denotes the quadrature weights and 𝑎𝑚
∗ denotes the quadrature 
abscissas. The log likelihood L is the sum of the logs of the panel level 
likelihoods 𝑙𝑖. The log-likelihood is approximated by the adaptive Guass-
Hermite quadrature, which approximates the panel level likelihood with 
 𝑙𝑖 = √2?̂?𝑖 ∑ 𝑤𝑚
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where ?̂?𝑖 and 𝜇?̂? are the adaptive parameters for panel 𝑖. This means that 
with the definition of 𝑔(𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝜐𝑖), the total log likelihood is approximated by: 







































where 𝑤𝑖 is the user specified wright for panel 𝑖 or, if no weight is specified 
then 𝑤𝑖=1. The method of Naylor and Smith (1982) is used to calculate the 
posterior mean and variance using the parameters 𝜇?̂? and ?̂?. Starting with 
- 113 - 
?̂?𝑖,0 = 1 and ?̂?𝑖,0 = 0, the posterior means and variances are updated in the 
𝑘𝑡ℎ⁡iteration. Therefore, at the 𝑘𝑡ℎ⁡ iteration of the optimisation for 𝑙𝑖 we use: 
𝑙𝑖,𝑘 ≈ ∑ √2?̂?𝑖,𝑘−1𝑤𝑚
∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝{(𝑎𝑚
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which is repeated until ?̂?𝑖,𝑘 and ?̂?𝑖,𝑘 have converged for this iteration of the 
maximisation algorithm. Only when the change in log likelihood from the 
previous iteration is less than a relative difference of 1e-6 are the quadrature 
parameters fixed.  
I am using panel data, so I cluster by organisation to control for trusts which 
had multiple successions. Specifying vce(robust) causes the Huber-White 
VCE estimator (Arellano, 2003) to be calculated for the coefficients 
generated in this regression.  
5.3.2 Sample selection 
The panel data sample used for analysis in this chapter includes all NHS 
acute trusts and combined acute and community NHS trusts in England 
between 2003/04 and 2017/18, and any CEOs of those trusts who were 
appointed between 1st April 2003 and 31st March 2017. In total there were 
2,144 trust-year records available for analysis comprised of 155 trusts and 
474 CEO appointments.   
5.3.3 Dependent variables 
This chapter uses several dependent variables depending on the hypothesis 
being tested. Hypothesis H1 is tested by comparing proportions and so uses 
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the insider dummy as the dependent variable. Several dummy dependent 
variables were created for the purpose of testing the other hypotheses. H2a 
and H2b use a dummy binary dependent variable to indicate where the new 
CEO came from with a 1 indicating they were an insider and a 0 indicating 
they were an outsider to the recruiting trust. This dummy variable ensures 
that only those records where a CEO was appointed are used in the 
regression modelling. Hypothesis H3 uses another dummy binary variable 
which differentiates between relatively high and low performance of the 
successor CEO’s previous trust, where 1 indicates the performance of the 
previous trust was relatively high and 0 indicates the performance of the 
previous trust was relatively low. This latter variable is assumed to indicate 
whether a CEO has high or low reputational social capital.  
5.3.4 Explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables are those included in the analysis to test the 
hypotheses stated earlier in this chapter. As described in Table 5-1, the 
insider flag is a dummy variable which differentiates between the origin of the 
new CEO, where a 1 indicates they were an insider and a 0 indicates they 
were an outsider to the trust. Of the 474 CEO appointments observed in the 
sample, 116 were insiders. The other explanatory variables are those for the 
organisational performance of the recruiting trusts in the period immediately 
prior to a new CEO being appointed, that is, in the financial year prior to the 
year of appointment. Because this analysis uses a sub-sample of the panel 
dataset, those records relating to a new CEO appointment, the relative top 
and bottom performers are no longer exactly the top and bottom 30%. Of the 
474 appointments, there are 425 with data for A&E target achievement, 
which ranges from 70% to 99% with a mean of 92.9%. There are 423 
records with RCI data, which ranges from 78.96 to 138.05 with a mean of 
99.17. Operating surplus data was available for 390 records, which ranged 
from -£195,000 to £68,514 with a mean of -£2,821. Average inpatient waiting 
times were available for 426 records, which ranged from 1 to 156 days with a 
mean of 62 days. MRSA infection rates were also available for 426 records, 
which ranged from 0 to 1.55 with a mean of 0.42. Finally, mortality rates were 
available for 406 records, which ranged from 0.54 to 1.44 with a mean of 
1.01.  
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5.3.5 Control variables 
Control variables were included in the regression models to account for any 
factors that are known or suspected to be important having previously been 
identified as such in the literature. It is theorised that the size of the recruiting 
organisation will affect the decision to appoint an insider or outsider because 
it acts as a proxy for the size of the labour market within the organization 
(Datta and Guthrie, 1994). A small firm may have very few potential 
candidates whereas a larger firm might be expected to have more options 
and therefore tend to appoint more insiders (Datta and Guthrie, 1994; Zhang 
and Rajagopalan, 2003). The size of each trust was measured using the 
number of overnight beds available in each year. This ranged from 224 to 
2,302 with a mean of 767 as shown in Table 5-1. It is also important to 
control for the concentration of the labour market (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 
2003) as the number of candidates may be influenced by the number of 
trusts in the same geographical area.  
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index was computed at SHA level for each 
financial year, even though that is no longer a recognised geographical unit 
in the NHS. As shown in Table 5-1, this variable ranged from 0.04 to 0.15 
with a mean of 0.074. This metric was calculated using the number of 
executive board members in each trust in each year. When summed across 
each SHA this can be used as a proxy for the size of the CEO labour market 
in each SHA since it is likely that only candidates who already work at board 
level would be considered for a CEO role (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2003). 
Due to the difference in scale of this variable when compared to others 
included in the model, it was transformed by multiplying it by 100 to avoid the 
problem of infeasibly large odds ratios and confidence intervals. As in the 
previous chapter, additional controls for foundation trust status and teaching 
status were included as these have been shown to be important when 
looking at NHS trusts (Salge, 2011; Veronesi et al., 2014; 2015; Kirkpatrick 
et al., 2017; Janke et al., 2018). The next section provides the results of the 
analyses and a discussion on how those results support the hypotheses.  
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Table 5-1 Descriptive statistics for CEO appointments 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Insider 474 0.245 0.430 0 1 
Overnight beds 472 766.86 348.879 224 2302 
Labour market 
concentration  
474 0.074 0.029 0.040 0.150 
Foundation trust 474 0.321 0.467 0 1 
Teaching trust 474 0.171 0.377 0 1 
Baseline performance 
A&E 
425 0.929 0.057 0.700 0.993 
Baseline performance 
RCI 
423 99.170 6.933 78.960 138.050 
Baseline performance 
operating surplus 
390 -2820.923 21680.13 -195000 68514 
Baseline performance 
inpatient waiting times 
426 62.435 22.898 1 156 
Baseline performance 
MRSA 
426 0.415 0.285 0 1.554 
Baseline performance 
mortality 
406 1.007 0.107 0.539 1.443 
Relatively good A&E 
performance 
425 0.259 0.439 0 1 
Relatively poor A&E 
performance 
425 0.395 0.490 0 1 
Relatively good RCI 
performance 
423 0.305 0.461 0 1 
Relatively poor RCI 
performance 
423 0.324 0.469 0 1 
Relatively good operating 
surplus performance 
390 0.213 0.410 0 1 
Relatively poor operating 
surplus performance 
390 0.397 0.490 0 1 
Relatively good inpatient 
waits performance 
426 0.303 0.460 0 1 
Relatively poor inpatient 
waits performance 
426 0.352 0.478 0 1 
Relatively good MRSA 
performance 
426 0.322 0.468 0 1 
Relatively poor MRSA 
performance 
426 0.317 0.466 0 1 
Relatively good mortality 
performance 
426 0.296 0.457 0 1 
Relatively poor mortality 
performance 
426 0.378 0.485 0 1 
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Table 5-2 Correlation matrix 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  (1) Insider 1.000        
  (2) Overnight beds -0.072* 1.000       
  (3) Labour market concentration 0.137* 0.219* 1.000      
  (4) Foundation trust 0.192* -0.064* 0.065* 1.000     
  (5) Teaching trust -0.040 0.455* -0.076* 0.025 1.000    
  (6) Baseline performance A&E -0.041 -0.130* -0.036 0.069* -0.072* 1.000   
  (7) Baseline performance RCI -0.027 0.226* -0.029 -0.048* 0.259* -0.098* 1.000  
  (8) Baseline performance operating 
surplus 
0.044 0.055* 0.017 0.091* 0.107* 0.256* -0.066* 1.000 
  (9) Baseline performance waiting times -0.080* 0.011 -0.065* -0.337* -0.022 -0.051* -0.019 0.005 
  (10) Baseline performance MRSA 0.039 0.070* -0.137* -0.114* 0.165* -0.028 0.080* -0.043 
  (11) Baseline performance Mortality 0.078* -0.105* 0.116* -0.004 -0.304* -0.032 -0.091* -0.038 
 
 
Variables (9) (10) (11) 
(9) Baseline performance waiting 
times 
1.000   
(10) Baseline performance MRSA -0.004 1.000  
(11) Baseline performance Mortality 0.051* -0.157* 1.000 
* shows significance at the 0.05 level  
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5.4 Empirical results 
This section presents the results of the analyses and states whether support 
has been found for each of the hypotheses set out previously. A correlation 
matrix is presented in Table 5-2 with any correlations significant at the 95% 
confidence level flagged with an asterisk. Descriptive statistics are provided 
in Table 5-1. As discussed in the previous chapter, there are many 
performance metrics that are used to assess the performance of NHS trusts. 
These vary over time depending on what is of most importance to 
stakeholders at any point in time. In this chapter, I present the results using 
all six performance metrics: average A&E target achievement, RCI, operating 
surplus, inpatient waiting times, MRSA infection rates, and mortality rates, as 
this provides an interesting comparison with insights into which, if any, are 
valued during the CEO selection process.  
Table 5-3 shows the results for a one-sided test of proportions used to 
assess hypothesis H1, that organisations appointing CEOs will favour those 
with internal social capital. This tests the null hypothesis that the proportion 
of CEO appointments that are insiders is equal to the proportion that are 
outsiders against the alternative hypothesis that the proportion of insiders is 
greater than the proportion of outsiders. The data shows that the proportion 
of CEO appointments that are insiders is much lower than those that are 
outsiders with just 24.5% of all appointments being for insiders.  
Table 5-3 Proportions test results for H1 








     
A regression model was used to assess what factors might influence the 
choice between insider and outsider CEO. As shown in Table 5-4, the size of 
the trust was not a significant factor yet the market concentration for CEOs 
was, with an odds ratio slightly greater than one. Foundation trust status was 
also significant with an odds ratio much greater than one. This indicates that 
foundation trusts are much more likely to appoint insiders than outsiders.  
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Table 5-4 Logit model results for H1 
Variables Odd ratios 
Overnight beds 1.000 
(0.000) 




Foundation trust 1.677** 
(0.408) 




Wald statistic 14.71*** 
Observations 472 
Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The second hypothesis looked at the relationship between a trust’s baseline 
performance immediately prior to the CEO succession event and the 
likelihood of appointing an insider or outsider as CEO. Table 5-5 shows the 
1-tailed t-test results for hypotheses H2a and H2b, that higher baseline 
performance will be associated with the appointment of an insider and lower 
baseline performance will be associated with the appointment of an outsider 
respectively. These tests use the continuous form of the performance 
metrics, but no support was found for either hypothesis for any of the metrics 
except for operating surplus where weak support, at the 90% confidence 
level, was found for hypothesis H2a. A logit regression model was used to 
test these hypotheses using dummy variables to indicate whether a trust’s 
baseline performance was relatively high or low compared to other trusts in 
each year (regardless of whether that trust had a CEO succession event). 
The results for this are shown in Table 5-6, which reports the odds ratios for 
each variable entered into the regression model along with the Huber-White 
standard errors.  
Only two of the regression models showed significant results for the dummy 
variables for relatively high or low baseline performance. The model using 
the average attainment of the 4-hour A&E target as the performance metric 
had odds ratios above one for both relatively high and relatively low baseline 
performance, meaning that a non-linear relationship between baseline   
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performance and the appointment of an insider CEO was demonstrated 
since both relatively high and relatively low baseline performance were 
positively associated with the selection of an insider CEO. The model using 
operating surplus as the performance metric also demonstrated a non-linear 
relationship between baseline performance and the appointment of an 
insider CEO, with both relatively high and relatively low performance being 
negatively associated with insider selection, or conversely, positively 
associated with outsider CEO selection, due to having odds ratios of less 
than one. This provided mixed evidence in support of hypotheses H2a and 
H2b.  
Table 5-5 t-test results for H2 
Performance 
metric 
 Inside Outside t-
value 
Probability 
     H2a: Pr(T < t) H2b: Pr(T > t) 






















-1.467 0.072 0.929 




















0.6754 0.750 0.250 
 
To test the non-linear relationship further, a regression model was run using 
only mid-range relative performance for the A&E and operating surplus 
metrics. For the A&E model, the odds ratio for mid-range performance was 
less than one and significant at the 95% confidence level. For the operating 
surplus model, mid-range performance had an odds ratio greater than one, 
which was significant at the 99% confidence level. Testing mid-range 
performance for the other performance metric yielded no significant results. 
Rerunning the models using the raw continuous performance data with a 
quadratic term included showed non-linear results for all the metrics. 
However, these were not significant. 
- 121 - 
Table 5-6 Logit regression results for H2a and H2b 




times MRSA Mortality 
Relatively high baseline performance 2.236*** 1.148 0.468** 1.485 0.745 1.318 
 (0.674) (0.331) (0.168) (0.425) (0.216) (0.389) 
Relatively low baseline performance 1.824** 0.823 0.523** 0.963 0.938 1.061 
 (0.494) (0.224) (0.141) (0.261) (0.276) (0.255) 
Number of overnight beds 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO labour market concentration 1.079** 1.091** 1.090** 1.089** 1.096** 1.093** 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) 
Foundation trusts status 1.565* 1.576* 1.490 1.488 1.662** 1.635* 
 (0.406) (0.391) (0.459) (0.377) (0.420) (0.416) 
Teaching trust status 1.302 1.389 1.488 1.354 1.304 1.195 
 (0.419) (0.460) (0.481) (0.437) (0.429) (0.410) 
Constant 0.083*** 0.120*** 0.172*** 0.118*** 0.142*** 0.109*** 
 (0.039) (0.048) (0.079) (0.051) (0.056) (0.048) 
Wald statistic 19.23*** 13.48** 15.88** 16.43** 13.54** 12.70** 
Observations 424 422 389 425 425 425 
Odds ratios reported. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A number of the control variables were significant in several of the models. 
The size of the local CEO labour market was proxied by a Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index calculation based on the number of executive board 
members in each trust in each year. For all performance metrics, this was 
significant with an odds ratio just over one, indicating that as the 
concentration of potential CEO candidates increases the likelihood of 
appointing an insider increases. Foundation trust status was found to be 
significant in the models using A&E target attainment, RCI, MRSA infection 
rates, and mortality rates, with each of these having an odds ratio above one 
indicating that foundation trust status is positively associated with the 
selection of insider CEOs.   
Hypothesis H3 suggested that the selection of CEOs with greater reputational 
social capital, as proxied by the performance of their previous trust, would be 
contingent on the baseline performance of the recruiting trust such that trusts 
with poor baseline performance would be more likely to appoint them. Not all 
CEOs came from other acute or combined acute and community trusts, so 
the sample size was further reduced for this analysis. Table 5-7 shows the 
results from the regression models used to test this hypothesis for each of 
the performance metrics, where the dependent variable was the appointment 
of a CEO with high or low reputational social capital. The baseline 
performance of the recruiting trust was found to be significant in all the 
models, although in the A&E model only low baseline performance was 
significant. In each of the other models, relative high performance had odds 
ratios greater than one, indicating that relatively high performance is 
positively associated with the likelihood of appointing a CEO with high social 
capital, as proxied by the performance of their previous trust. Relatively low 
performance was significant in the models using A&E target attainment, 
operating surplus and inpatient waiting times as the performance metrics. 
For each of these, the odds ratios were less than one, indicating that trusts 
with poor performance were less likely to appoint CEOs with high social 
capital. This analysis provided no support for hypothesis H3 since poor 
baseline performance of the recruiting trust was shown to be associated with 
a reduced likelihood of appointing a CEO with higher social capital. The 
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control variables presented mixed results for significance, with the size of the 
trust, as proxied by the  number of overnight beds, being weakly significant, 
at the 90% confidence level, in the RCI and mortality models whilst 
foundation trust status was significant at the 95% confidence level in the A&E 
and waiting times models. The supply of CEO candidates was only 
significant in the model using MRSA infection rates as the performance 
variable, with an odds ratio slightly above one.  
This section has presented the results of the hypothesis tests and drawn 
basic conclusions about whether they show support for the hypotheses. The 
next section reports the outcome of robustness checks on the analysis as it 
is possible that decisions made during the analysis, such as how to 
operationalise variables, or which control variables to include, may have 
affected the results.   
5.4.1 Robustness checks 
Robustness checks were conducted to see whether including additional 
control variables had an impact on the results reported in the previous 
section. The additional variables of interest are board independence and 
previous CEO tenure, each of which is discussed below.  
5.4.1.1 Board independence 
The decision on who to hire as CEO is made by the board, therefore, it is 
expected that the composition of the board might affect the decision that is 
eventually made. Previous research has explored the impact of board 
composition on hiring decisions and suggested that board independence is 
an important factor (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Here, board independence is 
taken to be the proportion of board members that are non-executives in each 
year for each trust. Adding in this continuous variable had no impact on the 
findings and was itself not significant in the models used to test hypotheses 
H2a and H2b. For hypothesis H3, the model using RCI had an odds ratio less 
than one, which was significant.  
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Table 5-7 Logit regression results for H3 




times MRSA Mortality 
Relatively high baseline performance 1.251 2.982** 4.975** 2.475* 2.520** 2.206*** 
 (0.522) (1.473) (3.101) (1.266) (0.966) (0.644) 
Relatively low baseline performance 0.348** 0.722 0.384* 0.413** 0.949 0.705 
 (0.160) (0.375) (0.219) (0.176) (0.402) (0.231) 
Number of overnight beds 1.000 0.999* 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.001* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO labour market concentration 0.985 0.978 0.906 1.010 1.173** 0.995 
 (0.052) (0.062) (0.072) (0.064) (0.083) (0.041) 
Foundation trusts status 2.798** 1.041 0.714 2.158** 1.190 1.013 
 (1.348) (0.389) (0.336) (0.843) (0.401) (0.263) 
Teaching trust status 0.573 0.861 1.435 1.027 1.377 0.800 
 (0.2724) (0.398) (1.011) (0.591) (0.598) (0.303) 
Constant 2.281 1.789 2.147 0.648 0.344* 0.359** 
 (1.227) (1.442) (1.537) (0.399) (0.214) (0.177) 
Wald statistic 12.89** 17.76*** 16.24** 13.49** 17.01*** 20.24*** 
Observations 176 156 148 168 169 376 
Odds ratios reported. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.4.1.2 Previous CEO tenure 
Previous research has also suggested that the outgoing CEO might have 
some impact on the selection of the new CEO (Cao et al., 2006; Finkelstein 
et al., 2009; Elsaid et al., 2016). In particular, the tenure of the outgoing CEO 
might be expected to influence hiring decisions because the board is likely to 
be a reflection of that CEO in terms of their characteristics and ways of 
thinking, if they were in post for long enough to replace board members with 
their own choices (Shen and Cannella Jr, 2002). Adding in the tenure of the 
previous CEO had no impact on the findings and was itself not significant in 
the models for hypotheses H2a and H2b. It was, however, significant in the 
models used to test hypothesis H3 using A&E target achievement, inpatient 
waiting times, and mortality rates as the performance metrics. Odds ratios 
were significant and less than one for the A&E and inpatient waiting times 
models, but greater than one for the mortality model, although only weakly 
significant.  
5.5 Summary and conclusions 
This empirical chapter has focused on the research questions: is social 
capital valued by recruiting organisations, and does the baseline 
performance of the organisation affect the value placed on internal social 
capital? The rationale behind these research questions was to follow on from 
the research in the previous chapter, which addressed the factors that might 
cause a CEO to leave their job. Once a CEO post becomes vacant, the 
board needs to appoint a new CEO and this chapter has addressed that 
need, once again looking through the lens of social capital theory. Social 
capital has been proxied by the insider status of the new CEO, with an 
insider assumed to have greater internal social capital than an outsider, and 
the performance of a candidate’s previous trust, where good performance is 
assumed to enhance their reputational social capital.  
The theoretical arguments presented in this chapter suggested that insiders 
would be preferred over outsiders since insiders would have greater internal 
social capital through virtue of already working in the recruiting trust. A 
simplistic hypothesis H1 therefore stated that insider status would be 
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positively associated with CEO selection. It was clear from the data that this 
was not the case, with less than a quarter of all trust CEO appointments 
being insiders. This contrasts sharply with data from the private sector where 
70% of CEO appointments are insiders (Favaro et al., 2013). A regression 
model was used to look at what factors might influence the choice between 
insider and outsider. Theoretically, we might expect larger firms to appoint 
more insiders since their internal labour market could be assumed to be 
bigger than a small firm (Lauterbach et al., 1999) yet on the other hand, firm 
size might overstate the size of the CEO candidate pool since realistically 
only members of the board are likely to be considered as potential 
candidates (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2003). The size of the trust was found 
to be non-significant which supports the theory that organisational size is not 
a good proxy for the CEO labour market. An alternative proxy for the size of 
the local CEO labour market was provided by a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
calculation based on the number of executive board members in each trust 
within each SHA. This was found to be significant with the odds of appointing 
an insider increasing as the pool of candidates in the local area reduced, 
suggesting that the choice between insider and outsider is likely to be 
influenced by the origin of the candidates that apply for the post, that is, the 
supply of potential candidates. A limitation of my research is that I only have 
records for successful candidates and do not know who applied 
unsuccessfully. Foundation trust status was also shown to be significant with 
foundation trusts more likely to appoint insiders than outsiders. Table 5-2 
shows a small yet significant correlation between foundation trust status and 
CEO market concentration, so this result is not surprising as foundation 
trusts tend to be in areas with lower market concentration.  
The second hypothesis built on the first by arguing that any decision to 
appoint an insider or outsider would be made in the context of the baseline 
performance of the recruiting trust. An organisation that is performing poorly 
might be expected to want to bring in fresh ideas rather than promoting from 
within whereas a successful organisation is likely to want to continue that 
success and therefore avoid an influx of new ideas and strategies that might 
disrupt that good performance. In which case an insider would be preferred 
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(Finkelstein et al., 2009). There was limited support found for this hypothesis 
with only two of the performance metrics yielding significant results, although 
both demonstrated a non-linear relationship between baseline performance 
and the likelihood of appointing an insider rather than the linear relationship 
suggested by the hypotheses.  
In the model using A&E target achievement as the performance metric, both 
relatively high and relatively low baseline performance of the recruiting trust 
was found to be positively associated with the likelihood of appointing an 
insider. That is, both extremes of performance had odds ratios greater than 
one. So, whilst hypothesis H2a was supported because the model showed 
that relatively high baseline performance was positively associated with 
insider selection, hypothesis H2b was not supported. In the model using 
operating surplus as the performance metric, both extremes of performance 
had odds ratios below one indicating that both relatively high and relatively 
low performance are associated with a decreased likelihood of appointing an 
insider, or conversely, an increased likelihood of appointing an outsider. 
Therefore, hypothesis H2b was supported but H2a was not supported. These 
non-linear relationships were confirmed by running models using only mid-
range performance. Mid-range performance in the A&E model had a 
significant odds ratio below one whereas in the operating surplus model it 
had a significant odds ratio of greater than one. These non-linear 
relationships echo the findings from Dalton and Kesner (1985). 
The opposing relationships found in the A&E and operating surplus models 
highlight the potentially different value that stakeholders place on the 
different performance metrics. The A&E 4-hour waiting time target is high 
profile and often appears in the media when reporting on trust performance. 
It is well known to the public and therefore an easy indicator for whether a 
trust is performing well or not. Good performance against this indicator is 
desirable as it will influence public perception of the trust. Therefore, the 
positive association between high performance and the selection of an 
insider is not surprising. Operating surplus is much more of an internal 
measure of performance, likely of interest only to those working in the NHS 
rather than the public and as such, the association between low performance 
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and the appointment of an outsider seems reasonable. The A&E metric 
inherently captures an array of performance considerations as achieving that 
target relies on there being appropriate levels of funding, staffing, and 
capability whereas the operating surplus metric is a measure of financial 
performance alone.  
Social capital was also proxied by the performance of the newly appointed 
CEO’s previous trust, with high performance, relative to other trusts in that 
year, assumed to enhance an individual’s reputational social capital. 
Hypothesis H3 posited that any relationship between reputational social 
capital would be contingent on the baseline performance of the recruiting 
trust in the period immediately prior to the CEO appointment such that trusts 
with poor baseline performance would be more likely to appoint CEOs with 
high reputational social capital. All the models did show significant 
associations between the extremes of relative baseline performance and the 
likelihood of appointing a new CEO with relatively high reputational social 
capital compared to relatively low reputational social capital. The models 
using RCI, operating surplus, inpatient waiting times, MRSA infection rates, 
and mortality rates all had a significant odds ratio of much greater than one 
for relatively high baseline performance. This indicates that trusts with good 
baseline performance are much more likely to appoint a CEO with high 
reputational social capital than one with low reputational social capital.  
The only significant results for relatively low baseline performance were for 
the models using A&E target attainment, operating surplus and inpatient 
waiting times, each of which had odds ratios below 1, indicating that poor 
performing trusts were much more likely to appoint CEOs with low 
reputational social capital than those with high reputational social capital. 
These results are not counterintuitive. It seems logical that CEOs with high 
reputational social capital will be attracted to other high performing trusts. 
They will not want to risk tarnishing their reputations by moving to a poor 
performing trust and potentially failing in turning that performance around. 
Similarly, a CEO candidate with low reputational social capital may not be 
able to attract offers of employment from high performing trusts and thus 
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may only be able to secure a role in a trust that cannot attract a higher 
calibre candidate.  
This chapter has explored the second of the three main strands of research 
into CEO succession, that of selection. The CEO selection literature is 
hampered by the data used in most studies as it only offers a partial picture 
of what is happening. Most studies, including this one, use data on actual 
appointments so it is only possible to compare successful candidates against 
other successful candidates. It is almost certain that a more nuanced picture 
would arise if data on all applicants were available as that would uncover any 
true preferences between certain candidate characteristics. However, even 
given this limitation it is still worth exploring the outcomes for CEO 
appointments and this chapter had added to the existing research literature 
in several ways. Firstly, it has used the NHS as a case study in direct 
contrast to the extant literature which predominantly focuses on private 
sector organisations. An immediately obvious difference between the two 
sectors was illustrated by the proportion of insider CEO appointments, 70% 
in the private sector compared to less than a quarter in the NHS. The NHS 
differs to the private sector in many other ways, not least with its non-profit 
making status and the level of public interest. By testing hypotheses in this 
new context, it helps broaden the applicability of theories thus far only tested 
in the private sector and thus adds to the richness of evidence available. 
Secondly, my research uses the lens of social capital theory, hitherto a 
largely unexplored aspect of CEO succession. By looking through this lens it 
is possible to identify threads that have previously been ignored, such as the 
value of social networks and how different performance metrics interact with 
these.  
As mentioned at the start of this chapter, there are three main areas of CEO 
succession research: the antecedents of a CEO leaving their post, the 
selection of a new CEO, and the impact a new CEO has on the performance 
of the recruiting organisation. The next chapter addresses the third of these 
domains whilst continuing to use the lens of social capital theory as a golden 
thread tying all three empirical chapters together.  
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Chapter 6 – Post CEO succession organisational 
performance 
6.1 Introduction 
This empirical chapter explores the third of the three main strands of CEO 
succession research, that of post-succession organisational performance. 
Specifically, it looks at the extent to which a new CEO is able to affect 
organisational performance in the context of NHS acute trusts as viewed 
through the lens of social capital theory. With the median tenure of an NHS 
CEO being a mere 3 years (Anandaciva et al., 2018), many trusts will be 
welcoming new CEOs each year so it remains a key strategic issue that 
boards need to keep in mind when considering whether a CEO succession 
event will benefit their trust. High turnover leads to organisational instability 
as leaders are not in post long enough to effect strategic change. An 
outgoing CEO will have their mind elsewhere and a new CEO will need time 
to get to grips with the new role and organisation. This can cause periods in 
which no strategic decisions are made (Anandaciva et al., 2018), which can 
be crippling for an organisation.  
The impact that a new CEO has on organisational performance is by no 
means clear cut. Previous research is inconclusive (Shen and Cannella Jr, 
2002; Huson et al., 2004; Boyne et al., 2011a; Quiqley et al., 2019) or 
produces counterintuitive results (Elsaid et al., 2011; Hamori and Koyuncu, 
2015), which leaves the field wide open for further research to try and clarify 
the research questions posed in this chapter: does CEO succession make a 
difference to organisational performance, does the impact of a new CEO 
change depending on the baseline performance of the firm, and how does 
social capital affect the impact a new CEO has on organisational 
performance? 
The extant literature is dominated by three main theories of succession, of 
adaptive or disruptive effects and ritual scapegoating (Rowe et al., 2005; 
Boyne et al., 2011a) dating back to the 1960s, although more recently there 
have been calls to focus on contingencies in an effort to explain when each 
of these theories might apply (Georgakakis and Ruigrok, 2017). In isolation, 
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the three main theories have garnered little conclusive support (Finkelstein et 
al., 2009) so this chapter seeks to add to the debate by using the lens of 
social capital theory.  
The previous empirical chapters looking at the antecedents of CEO 
succession and the selection of a new CEO highlighted the limited literature 
using the public sector for research and, in particular, the absolute dearth of 
literature using the NHS as a case study. However, there is one paper that 
does use the English NHS to explore the impact that CEOs have on post-
succession organisational performance. Janke et al.'s (2018) working paper 
looks at the impact that NHS CEOs had on trust performance over a twelve 
year period, but found no evidence in support of any performance changes, 
let alone gains, as a result of changing the CEO. A couple of potential 
explanations were suggested for this result. Firstly, the nature of a CEO role 
in the NHS means that political goals are competing with performance goals. 
A CEO may be preoccupied with ensuring they do not end up on a 
politician’s desk as a bad news story rather than concentrating on the long-
term performance of their trust. An alternative explanation suggested that the 
relatively short tenure of most CEOs allows them insufficient time to 
effectively bring together and command the disparate arms of their trust, thus 
meaning that performance changes are unlikely. My research builds on this 
paper by explicitly using social capital theory to help explain any differences 
in performance following a CEO succession event.  
The structure of the rest of this chapter is as follows. I first discuss the 
theoretical motivations for my research, which focuses on the three main 
theories of CEO succession as viewed through the lens of social capital 
theory. This leads to four hypotheses which suggest associations between 
organisational performance following a CEO succession and insider and 
outsider status along with the baseline performance of the recruiting trust. 
The next section describes how the data sample used in this analysis was 
constructed and provides an overview of the variables used in the models. 
The methodology used in this chapter, that of dynamic panel data 
regression, is explained before the next section presents the empirical 
results and discusses whether they support the hypotheses. A section on 
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robustness checks explores how sensitive the models are to changes in 
variable operationalisations or the inclusion of additional control variables 
before the final section summarises the findings, draws conclusions and 
highlights the original contribution of this research. Therefore, the next 
section discusses the theoretical motivations for this research and the 
hypotheses drawn from that.  
6.2 Theoretical motivation and hypotheses development  
As stated above, there are three main theories relating to CEO succession 
(Rowe et al., 2005) but, despite many years of empirical research aimed at 
testing these theories there remains a lack of consensus on which, if any, 
best reflects the impact new CEOs have on organisational performance 
(Shen and Cannella Jr, 2002; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Boyne et al., 2011a; 
Quiqley et al., 2019). These three theories can broadly be thought of as 
adaptive, disruptive, and scapegoating. The adaptive theory of CEO 
succession suggests that new CEOs will have a positive impact on 
organisational performance. This improvement in performance is generated 
by the organisation adapting to the new CEO and is consistent with the 
heroic view of leadership as it predicts that the actions of a single leader can 
have a significant impact on the organisation (Grusky, 1963; Boyne et al., 
2011a).  
The disruptive model, also known as the vicious cycle theory, predicts that a 
new CEO will lead to a worsening of organisational performance because the 
conditions surrounding a CEO succession event are often marred in conflict. 
These conditions may act as a distraction to staff, which will in turn impact on 
their own performance and thus that of the organisation. The vicious cycle 
aspect comes in as continued poor performance makes it even harder for the 
new CEO to recover the position, leading to yet more deterioration in 
performance and possibly further CEO successions (Grusky, 1963; Boyne et 
al., 2011a).  
The third theory, of ritual scapegoating, suggests that removing a CEO will 
signal to stakeholders that a change in strategy is desired yet there is no real 
expectation that a new CEO will be able to make much difference to 
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performance. Instead, this is an attempt to shift blame for poor performance 
(Boyne et al., 2011a). This latter theory, which predicts no change in 
performance, can be viewed as a combination of the other two theories in 
that there may be both adaptive and disruptive effects but they cancel each 
other out to give the impression of no impact (Gamson and Scotch, 1964; 
Boyne et al., 2011a).  
From this we can conclude that a new CEO is expected to have an impact on 
organisational performance but that the direction of this impact is uncertain 
since existing research is inconclusive, with results showing both 
improvements to, and a worsening of performance following a CEO 
succession. This leads to the hypothesis that: 
H1: CEO succession makes a difference to organisational 
performance 
This basic hypothesis is expanded on by the suggestion that a contingency 
view is more appropriate (Boyne et al., 2011a; Georgakakis and Ruigrok, 
2017), that is, the impact of CEO succession will depend on other factors 
such as the conditions in which the trust is operating at the point a new CEO 
takes over (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Boyne et al., 2011a; Karaevli and Zajac, 
2013). Under conditions of high baseline performance the disruptive theory 
of succession is expected to dominate (Boyne et al., 2011a) since the 
previous CEO is assumed to have had a positive effect on factors that might 
affect performance, such as staff morale and stakeholder relations (Zhang 
and Rajagopalan, 2004). A new CEO may find it difficult to maintain that high 
performing environment as they will be stepping into their predecessor’s 
shoes and may lack the internal social capital that allowed the previous CEO 
to oversee that high performance.  
Conversely, poor performance may be attributable to the previous CEO 
(Anandaciva et al., 2018) and a new CEO may therefore find it easier to 
improve performance. Here, the adaptive theory of succession is expected to 
dominate under conditions of poor baseline performance since the 
succession event will have a positive effect on performance (Miller, 1993). 
This could be because staff are invigorated by new leadership, stakeholders 
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are reassured, and people are motivated to turn the poor performance 
around (Boyne et al., 2011a). There is also an argument suggesting that any 
new CEO must be better than the previous CEO, and thus more likely to be 
able to improve performance, else why would the board bother to replace 
them (Huson et al., 2004). Therefore, this leads to the hypothesis that: 
H2:  The impact of CEO succession will vary depending on the 
baseline performance of the organisation such that succession in 
organisations with poor baseline performance will see performance 
improve and succession in organisations with good baseline 
performance will see performance decline.  
These arguments can be extended even further by considering what makes 
one CEO more successful than another. If the outgoing CEO has fostered 
the conditions for high performance, it could be argued that this has been 
facilitated by their internal social capital. That is, their relationships with 
colleagues and stakeholders (Adler and Kwon, 2002). An insider could 
arguably have built internal social capital in the form of existing relationships 
with colleagues and stakeholders. Social capital theory posits that social 
relationships can affect how CEOs perform (Johnson et al., 2012) since the 
benefits of social capital include increased influence, power, control and 
solidarity (Adler and Kwon, 2002), factors which are all necessary if a CEO is 
to lead effectively. This leads to the hypothesis that: 
H3:  The effect of succession on organisational performance will be 
moderated by insider status. 
Appointing an insider CEO is a signal to stakeholders that the board is happy 
with the strategic direction of the organisation whereas appointing an 
outsider usually signals a change of strategic direction (Datta and Guthrie, 
1994b; Bailey and Helfat, 2003; Karaevli and Zajac, 2013). I therefore might 
expect a trust with low baseline performance to appoint an outsider and a 
trust with high baseline performance to appoint an insider. Some evidence in 
support of this was found in the previous chapter. If a high performing CEO 
leaves, a new outsider CEO is expected to struggle to maintain that high 
performance let alone improve upon it as they will not have the internal social 
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capital available to leverage since it is estimated to take 12-18 months to bed 
in a new CEO, even if they have prior experience (Hoggettbowers, 2009). 
Therefore, the disruptive effects of succession are expected to dominate 
(Boyne et al., 2011a). An insider CEO would have internal social capital 
available to them (Schnatterly and Johnson, 2008) to leverage and thus 
might be expected to be able to maintain or even improve organisational 
performance.  
Conversely, the low performance of a trust can also be attributed to its leader 
(Anandaciva et al., 2018) as they may be responsible for factors that can 
cause poor performance, such as poor staff morale and poor stakeholder 
relations (Boyne et al., 2011a). Again, social capital theory is applied here to 
suggest that a lack of internal social capital can contribute to low 
performance (Adler and Kwon, 2002). A new outsider CEO will signal that 
the board wants a change in strategic direction (Datta and Guthrie, 1994b; 
Bailey and Helfat, 2003; Karaevli and Zajac, 2013), which we would expect 
to lead to an improvement in low performance, although not necessarily in 
the immediate term since it can take time for new CEOs to bed in 
(Hoggettbowers, 2009). However, a new CEO is a chance to reset those 
relationships hence I would expect performance to improve. An insider CEO 
will already be working in the trust prior to becoming its CEO and may well 
be tarred with the same brush in relation to their social capital by virtue of 
their association with the previous CEO and former regime (Johnson et al., 
2012). Therefore, I would expect that: 
H4: The relationship between insider succession and organisational 
performance will vary across levels of baseline performance such that 
under conditions of low baseline performance an outsider successor is 
expected to improve performance and under conditions of high 
baseline performance an insider successor is expected to improve 
performance. 
The reputation of a CEO, as proxied by the performance of their previous 
trust, is used as an indication of reputational social capital (Johnson et al., 
2012). If a manager has a track record of overseeing high performance in 
other trusts, it follows that there would be an expectation by the board of the 
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recruiting trust that their managerial ability would be transferred to the new 
trust (Bailey and Helfat, 2003; Elsaid et al., 2011; Hamori and Koyuncu, 
2015; Fitzsimmons and Callan, 2016). This leads to the hypothesis that: 
H5: CEOs with greater reputational social capital will lead to more of 
an improvement in performance in the new trust than those with lower 
reputational social capital 
This section has set out the theoretical motivations for my research and the 
hypotheses that will be tested in this chapter. The next section describes the 
methodology used in this chapter, that of dynamic panel data regression 
modelling.  
6.3 Methodology and variables 
6.3.1 Methodology 
The methodology used in this chapter, dynamic panel data regression, is 
inspired by the approach taken by Boyne et al. (2011a) in their analysis of 
post-succession organisational performance in the public sector, specifically 
English Local Authorities. However, whereas their methodology employed 
the Anderson-Hsiao estimator (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982), I have opted for 
the Arellano-Bover estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995) as described below.  
An organisation’s performance in any given year is assumed to be a function 
of its performance in previous years. If we use a lagged performance 
variable as an explanatory variable in a dynamic panel data estimation, there 
is a risk that correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term 
will lead to biased estimators. The method of instrumentation is a proposed 
solution to this problem as it prevents any bias resulting from correlation 
between the regressor 𝑥 and the error term . The basic principle of 
instrumentation, as defined by Behr (2003), is to: 
‘Find a variable Z, that is highly correlated with X, but does not 
correlate with ε. Use as the new regressor only that part of the 
observable variable X which correlates with Z and is orthogonal to ε.’ 
(Pg. 2) 
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The linear model we want to estimate contains explanatory variables 𝑥𝑡 and 
the lagged endogenous variable 𝑦𝑡−1. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡  
 where 𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)  and |𝜌| < 1 
𝑖 = 1,…,N index for individuals 
𝑡 = 1,…,T index for years 
𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  row vector of explanatory variables, dimension k 
𝜌 unknown parameter of the lagged endogenous variable 
𝛽 unknown parameter vector of the k explanatory variables 
𝛼𝑖 individual specific fixed effects 
The following assumptions are also made: 
- The error term is orthogonal to the exogenous variables: 𝐸(𝑥𝑖𝑡
′
𝑖𝑡) = 0 
- The exogenous variables might be correlated with the individual effect 
⁡𝐸(𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛼𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0 
- The error term (i.i.d.) is uncorrelated with the lagged endogenous 
variable: 𝐸(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑖𝑡) = 0 
The explanatory variables are assumed to be predetermined, which gives 
rise to the assumption of: 
𝐸(𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑠) = 0⁡for 𝑠 ≥ 𝑡 but 𝐸(𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑠) ≠ 0 for 𝑠 < 𝑡 
The Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) is one of several 
possible dynamic panel data estimators that can be used as it offers a better 
estimation than the cruder Anderson-Hsiao estimator (Anderson and Hsiao, 
1982). The Arellano-Bond estimator provides a generalised method of 
moments (GMM) series of equations, with one per time period, and is based 
on the work of Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988).  
In the Anderson-Hsiao approach, the twice-lagged level appears in the 
instrument matrix as: 







where row one corresponds to t = 2, since the first observation is lost due to 
applying the first difference transformation. Adding in a further lag yt-3 as a 
second instrument would cause the loss of another observation per panel. To 
avoid this loss of degrees of freedom, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) suggest 
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Including zeros in the place of missing vales prevents the loss of degrees of 
freedom such that all observations at time t > = 2 can be included in the 
model. This estimator is usually referred to as the difference GMM. A 
potential weakness in this method was identified by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) who suggested that the lagged levels can be poor instruments if the 
variables are close to a random walk. They modified the estimator to include 
lagged levels as well as lagged differences; this amended estimator is 
usually referred to as the system GMM. The system GMM is used in this 
chapter.  
6.3.2 Sample selection 
The panel data sample available for analysis in this chapter includes all NHS 
acute trusts, and combined acute and community NHS trusts in England 
between 2003/04 and 2007/18. However, the first year of data for 2003/04 is 
lost due to the methodology needing to use the lag of performance as an 
instrument. Therefore, in total there were 1,991 trust-year records available 
for analysis using the A&E metric.  
6.3.3 Dependent variables 
The dependent variable used in this chapter is organisational performance. 
NHS CEOs are judged on several key deliverables including achievement of 
government targets for standards of quality service provision and managing 
finances, whilst a more intangible deliverable is the quality of relationships 
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with stakeholders (Hoggettbowers, 2009). This diversity of potential 
performance metrics makes it difficult to select markers of organisational 
performance that are meaningful to all stakeholder at all times and may help 
explain the findings from Janke et al. (2018).  
The main analyses used the average attainment of the A&E 4-hour waiting 
time target but supplementary analyses used alternative performance 
metrics: operating surplus, RCI, inpatient waiting times, MRSA infection rates 
and mortality rates. These are described in Chapter 3 but the summary 
statistics for the main A&E analysis are provided in Table 6-1 below.  
Table 6-1 Descriptive statistics for sample 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
A&E performance 1991 .934 .061 .598 .995 
Operating surplus 
performance 
1711 1013.849 18924.21 -195000 126000 
RCI performance 1978 98.87 6.762 69.09 138.05 
Waiting time 
performance 
1990 58.279 19.999 1 344 
MRSA performance 1993 .485 .434 0 5.395 
Mortality performance 1920 1.002 .103 .539 1.443 
CEO succession 
(dummy) 
1999 .172 .378 0 1 
Insider status (dummy) 1999 .207 .405 0 1 
6.3.4 Explanatory variables 
A dummy variable was created to indicate whether a new CEO had started 
their role in the previous financial year. This was coded as 1 where a new 
CEO had started in the previous year and 0 otherwise. When looking at the 
succession rate over time it is clear that there is no obvious trend with the 
rate ranging from 13% to 23% in any particular year.  
Although the full sample contains 437 succession events occurring between 
2004/5 and 20017/18, 93 of those were in post for less than a full financial 
year and thus are not included in the model looking at successions occurring 
in the previous year, of which there are 344. These 93 successions were 
excluded because at least one full year of tenure was felt necessary in order 
to be able to attribute any performance changes to the new CEO. The 
sample also includes performance data for 339 succession events that 
occurred two years ago. This was based on the rationale that it can take new 
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CEOs 12-18 months to bed in and thus have an impact on performance 
(Hoggettbowers, 2009). The start dates for all CEOs were known, which 
means some succession events included in the model may have occurred 
prior to the study observation period.  
A dummy variables was created for the new CEO’s insider status. The 
insider dummy was coded as 1 if the new CEO worked in the trust 
immediately prior to becoming its CEO and zero otherwise. Of the 344 
succession events that occurred in the previous year, 62 (18%) were insider 
CEOs. The baseline performance of each trust was set as the performance 
in the financial year immediately prior to the new CEO taking up their post.  
6.4 Empirical results 
This section provides the results from the models used to test the 
hypotheses set out earlier in this chapter and assesses whether they provide 
any evidence to support the hypotheses. Hypothesis H1 suggested that CEO 
succession would make a difference to post-succession organisational 
performance but did not specify the direction of this relationship. Table 6-3 
provides the results of the regression model used to test H1 where model A 
includes all CEO successions occurring in the previous year. In model A the 
presence of a CEO succession event in the previous year is statistically 
significant at the 99% confidence level, thus proving support for hypothesis 
H1. The coefficient is positive meaning that performance improves following a 
CEO succession. The model was rerun using succession occurring two 
years previously but this showed that succession was not a significant main 
effect. When running models using alternative performance metrics (see 
Table B-1 in Appendix B), I found that CEO succession in the previous year 
had a statistically significant effect on performance only when using 
operating surplus as the performance metric.  
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Table 6-2 provides the correlation  matrix for the sample used in the A&E 
analyses. Throughout this section the model results reported in tables are for 
models using the average A&E target achievement as the performance 
metric, unless otherwise stated.  
Hypothesis H1 suggested that CEO succession would make a difference to 
post-succession organisational performance but did not specify the direction 
of this relationship. Table 6-3 provides the results of the regression model 
used to test H1 where model A includes all CEO successions occurring in the 
previous year. In model A the presence of a CEO succession event in the 
previous year is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, thus 
proving support for hypothesis H1. The coefficient is positive meaning that 
performance improves following a CEO succession. The model was rerun 
using succession occurring two years previously but this showed that 
succession was not a significant main effect. When running models using 
alternative performance metrics (see Table B-1 in Appendix B), I found that 
CEO succession in the previous year had a statistically significant effect on 
performance only when using operating surplus as the performance metric.  
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Table 6-2 Correlation matrix  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  (1) CEO succession 1.000 
  (2) A&E performance -0.023 1.000 
  (3) Operating surplus performance -0.047 0.284* 1.000 
  (4) RCI performance 0.022 -0.111* -0.077* 1.000 
  (5) Waiting time performance 0.009 0.088* -0.008 -0.012 1.000 
  (6) MRSA performance 0.013 -0.234* -0.046 0.088* -0.013 1.000 
  (7) Mortality performance 0.018 -0.043 -0.037 -0.081* 0.052* -0.114* 1.000 
  (8) Insider -0.030 -0.076* 0.026 -0.020 -0.076* 0.054* 0.093* 1.000 
 
* shows significance at the 0.05 level  
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Table 6-3 Regression models using A&E target for H1 to H4 
Model A B C D 
Hypothesis H1 H2 H3 H4 
Explanatory variables CEO succession last year 
Lagged (baseline) performance 0.888*** 0.875*** 0.827*** 0.757*** 
 (0.059) (0.068) (0.062) (0.139) 
CEO succession in previous year 0.005*** 0.116** -0.012 0.042 
 (0.002) (0.058) (0.008) (0.106) 
CEO succession x baseline 
performance 
 
-0.118*  -0.050 
  (0.061)  (0.114) 
Insider   -0.015** -0.160 
   (0.006) (0.332) 
CEO succession x insider   0.095** 0.256 
   (0.041) (0.466) 
Insider x baseline performance    0.163 
    (0.357) 




    (0.518) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  0.162*** 0.172*** 0.134** -0.001 
 (0.053) (0.061) (0.057) (0.113) 
Observations 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 
F-test 231.99*** 165.11*** 150.51*** 87.90*** 
Groups/instruments 154/43 154/57 154/44 154/58 
AR(2) 0.430 0.406 0.451 0.327 
Hansen statistic 0.052 0.005 0.071 0.001 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The second hypothesis predicted that post-succession organisational 
performance would be contingent on the baseline performance of the new 
trust such that CEO succession in high performing trusts would lead to a 
decline in performance and CEO succession in poor performing trusts would 
lead to an improvement in performance. Model B in Table 6-3 shows the 
results for the model testing hypothesis H2 for CEO successions occurring in 
the previous year. From this we can see that succession is significant at the 
95% confidence level and baseline performance is significant at the 99% 
confidence level. The interaction between CEO succession and baseline 
performance is significant at the 90% confidence level although it only just 
misses out on making the 95% cut-off.  
A post-hoc probe of this interaction was conducted to explore the interaction 
between CEO succession and baseline performance. Specifically, I estimate 
margins, contrasts, and marginal effects on the level of A&E performance. 
Figure 6-1 shows the predictive margins of succession. We see from this chart 
that under conditions of low baseline performance a trust experiencing a 
change in their CEO will have better performance than a trust with no 
succession. That is, the line for successions is above the line for no 
succession. This relationship appears to be statistically significant as the lines 
are not parallel. We can also see from this chart, and the data underlying it, 
that at low levels of baseline performance, a CEO succession will improve 
performance up until baseline performance is 95% after which point post-
succession performance declines.   
This visual assessment was tested by graphing the marginal effects for 
succession as shown in Figure 6-2. This shows that the differences between 
succession and no succession are largest at the lowest extreme of baseline 
performance and get smaller until around 95% before expanding again. The 
contrasts of predicted margins tells us that these differences are significant, at 
the 95% confidence level, for all levels of baseline performance below 95%. 
Interactions are symmetric so we can also look at it from the perspective of 
how the effect of baseline performance varies depending on whether a 
succession event occurred. Figure 6-3 shows this for two levels of baseline 
performance where the low and high values are calculated to be one standard 
deviation either side of the mean. This chart shows that when baseline 
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performance is low, a succession event will lead to an improvement in 
performance. When baseline performance is high, a succession event will lead 
to a decline in performance. Thus, hypothesis H2 is supported.  
 
Figure 6-1 Predictive margins of succession 
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Figure 6-2 Marginal effects of succession  
 
 
Figure 6-3 Predictive margins for baseline performance 
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Rerunning the model for successions occurring two years previously provided 
no significant results, indicating that the significant impact of a succession 
event the previous year does not continue into the second year of a new 
CEO’s tenure. When running models using alternative performance metrics 
(see Table B-2 in Appendix B), the interaction between succession and 
baseline performance was significant in the operating surplus and inpatient 
waiting times models, both at the 95% confidence level. However, both 
models showed that under conditions of poor baseline performance a CEO 
succession led to a further decline in performance whereas under conditions 
of good performance a succession led to a further improvement in 
performance. These further findings do not support hypothesis H2.  
Hypothesis H3 suggested that the relationship between CEO succession and 
performance would be moderated by insider status. Model C in Table 6-3 
tested this for CEO successions one year ago and found a significant, at the 
95% confidence level, interaction between succession and insider status. A 
post-hoc probe of this interaction was carried out to explore how insider status 
moderates succession. Figure 6-4 shows the predictive margins and we see 
from this that the effect of succession varies across the levels of insider status, 
that is, there is an interaction. The differences were tested for significance by 
calculating the average marginal effects of insider status and plotted as shown 
in Figure 6-5. At both levels of insider the confidence intervals do not include 
zero hence we can conclude that the difference between insiders and 
outsiders is significant. No significant associations were found when rerunning 
the model for successions occurring two years previously. When running 
models for the alternative performance metrics (see Table B-3 in Appendix B) 
both the operating surplus and MRSA models had significant interactions 
between succession and insider status, thus providing support for hypothesis 
H3.  
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Figure 6-4 Predictive margins for insider status 
 
 
Figure 6-5 Average marginal effects of insider status 
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An extension to this hypothesis was provided to build in contingencies, with 
hypothesis H4 suggesting that the relationship between insider succession and 
organisational performance will vary across levels of baseline performance 
such that under conditions of low baseline performance an outsider successor 
is expected to improve performance and under conditions of high performance 
an insider successor is expected to improve performance. Model D in Table 6-
3 provides the results for the model testing H4 for CEO successions in the 
previous year and shows that the interaction between succession, insider 
status and baseline performance is not significant. Rerunning the model for 
succession occurring two years previously also showed no significant 
associations. When running models with alternative performance metrics (see 
Table B-4 in Appendix B) I found that the model using operating surplus had a 
significant interaction between succession, insider status and baseline 
performance. A post-hoc probe of this interaction showed that at low levels of 
baseline performance an insider succession would improve performance but 
at high levels of baseline performance an insider succession would worsen 
performance. For outsider successions the reverse was true, with low baseline 
performance leading to an improvement in performance and high levels of 
baseline performance leading to a decline in performance. 
The fifth hypothesis, H5, suggested that CEOs from high performing trusts 
would lead to more of an improvement in performance in the new trust than 
those from low performing trusts. Table 6-4 provides the results of t-tests used 
to determine whether the change in performance, calculated by comparing the 
first year of post-succession performance to the performance in the year 
immediately prior to the succession, was better for CEOs from high performing 
trusts. Results are provided for all performance metrics, but we see that with 
the exception of MRSA infection rates, the improvements in performance 
following a succession are better for CEOs from low performing trusts. It is 
important to remember here that whilst for the A&E and operating surplus 
metrics a higher number denotes better performance, for the other metrics a 
lower number denotes better performance. The only significant result is found 
when using MRSA infection rates as the performance metric although here, 
CEOs from high and low performing trusts are both associated with a drop in 
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performance, but the drop is less for those from high performing trusts. 
Therefore, no support is found for hypothesis H5.  
Table 6-4 t-test results for H5 
Performance 
metric 
 High Low t-value Probability 













































6.4.1 Robustness checks 
Robustness checks were conducted to see how robust the models reported in 
the previous section are when changes are made to the specification or 
operationalisation of variables.  
6.4.1.1 Timescale for analysis 
The main analysis reported in this chapter looks at CEO succession events 
occurring one and two years ago. Given that the expected bedding-in period 
for a new CEO is 12-18 months (Hoggettbowers, 2009) a robustness check 
was carried out to see if the conclusions drawn from the main analysis held for 
the third year of tenure for new CEOs. For all original models using A&E target 
achievement as the performance metric there was no effect found in year two 
of a new CEO’s tenure and when looking at year three this lack of significant 
impact continued.  
6.5 Summary and conclusions  
This empirical chapter has addressed the research questions: does CEO 
succession make a difference to organisational performance, does the impact 
of a new CEO change depending on the baseline performance of the firm, and 
how does social capital affect the impact a new CEO has on organisational 
performance? Posed in the context of assessing post CEO succession 
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organisational performance in NHS acute, and combined acute and 
community trusts. As in the two previous empirical chapters, the analysis 
undertaken in this chapter has been viewed through the lens of social capital 
theory, where a CEO’s social capital has been proxied by their insider status 
and the organisational performance of their previous trust. 
The three main theories of CEO succession have yet to be proven in the 
extant literature and the mixed findings led to my first hypothesis, that 
succession would make a difference to performance, yet the direction of that 
difference was not known. Two opposing views are that CEO succession 
either has a positive impact, adaptive, or negative impact, disruptive, on 
performance whereas the third theory, scapegoating, suggests that 
succession makes no difference to performance. My analysis found some 
support for hypothesis H1 since a CEO succession event in the previous year 
was strongly associated with a small improvement in the A&E target 
performance. I also found support for H1 when using operating surplus as the 
performance metric with a significant improvement in performance following a 
succession. However, this support was not repeated for any of the other 
performance metrics which lends itself to concluding that overall, H1 was only 
partially supported. From this it is not possible to tell whether the scapegoating 
theory of succession is supported or whether there were adaptive and 
disruptive effects of succession that simply cancelled each other out to give 
the impression of no effect. My findings for the A&E and operating surplus 
models are at odds with the findings from Janke et al. (2018) who concluded 
that a change of NHS CEO makes no difference to organisational 
performance.  
The first hypothesis was simplistic and took no account of contingencies such 
as the baseline performance of the recruiting trust, which we might reasonably 
expect to have an impact when a new CEO takes over. By adding in such 
contingencies, it was hoped that support would be found for either of the 
theories of succession. Hypothesis H2 suggested that the impact of CEO 
successions would vary depending on the baseline performance of the 
organisation such that succession in organisations with poor baseline 
performance would see performance improve and succession in organisations 
with good baseline performance would see performance decline. The analysis 
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supported this hypothesis in the first year following a succession, but the effect 
did not last into year two. This drop in performance suggests that CEO 
succession is disruptive and this disruption is immediate but not sustained, 
which could be viewed as supporting the belief that a new CEO takes 12-18 
months to bed in (Hoggettbowers, 2009). The robustness checks included 
looking at year three of a new CEO’s tenure but found that there was still no 
effect in year three, but more importantly the performance had not started to 
improve. This could indicate that changing the CEO in a high performing trust 
ought to be avoided, although in many cases it is assumed that the CEO of a 
high performing trust chooses to leave rather than being pushed out by the 
board, thus the board is left with no choice but to replace them. The models 
using operating surplus and inpatient waiting times exhibited the opposite 
relationship though, with performance declining further after succession in a 
trust with poor baseline performance and improving following succession in a 
trust with high baseline performance. The A&E target is high-profile and oft 
cited in the media whereas operating surplus is more of an internal measure, 
of interest only to those running the trust.  
Using the lens of social capital theory, I proposed that a CEO’s insider status 
could be a proxy for having internal social capital since working in a trust prior 
to becoming its CEO would most likely mean that they had already developed 
social networks which would help them perform well when taking on the CEO 
role. Hypothesis H3 tested this by suggesting that the effect of succession on 
organisational performance would be moderated by insider status. I found 
support for this hypothesis when using A&E target attainment and MRSA 
infection rates as performance measures. In both cases an insider succession 
improved performance whilst an outsider succession worsened performance.  
The argument was extended in hypothesis H4 to suggest that the relationship 
between insider succession and organisational performance would vary 
across levels of baseline performance such that under conditions of low 
baseline performance an outsider successor would be expected to improve 
performance and under conditions of high performance an insider successor 
would be expected to improve performance. However, only the operating 
surplus provided support for this hypothesis and showed that an insider 
succession led to an improvement in performance under conditions of low 
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baseline performance but a decline in performance under conditions of high 
baseline performance. For outsider successions this relationship was 
reversed. The hypothesis expected insider successors to flourish when 
baseline performance was high yet I found performance declined. I expected 
outsider successors to flourish when baseline performance was low and found 
that this was the case. So, whilst I found strong evidence to support the 
assertion that the relationship between insider succession and organisational 
performance would vary across levels of baseline performance, the direction 
of these relationships only partially supported the hypothesis.  
The lens of social capital theory also allowed me to suggest that a CEO’s 
reputational social capital would be an important factor in post-succession 
organisational performance such that CEOs with high reputational social 
capital would lead to more of an improvement in organisational performance in 
the new trust than those with low reputational social capital. Not only was 
there no support found for this hypothesis (H5) but performance was improved 
more by CEOs with low reputational social capital. This could be the result of 
regression to the mean, that is, trusts performing relatively well are statistically 
more likely to experience a decline in performance and trusts performing 
relatively poorly are statistically more likely to experience an improvement in 
performance simply due to chance. However, it could also be because 
reputational social capital is not transferable. From the literature review we 
know that previous experience as a CEO is valued by recruiting organisations 
as they assume job-specific human capital is transferable (Hamori and 
Koyuncu, 2015) yet the evidence shows that this is not the case and CEOs 
with previous experience actually perform worse than those without such 
experience (Zhang, 2008; Elsaid et al., 2011; Bragaw and Misangyi, 2015; 
Hamori and Koyuncu, 2015). This is blamed on the negative transfer of human 
capital (Elsaid et al., 2011). Extrapolating from this, we could conclude that a 
similar argument might apply to reputational social capital in that it indicates 
where a CEO or member of the top management team has had success in a 
particular organisation but this is specific to that organisation and doesn’t 
mean a similar level of success will carry forwards to a new organisation.  
This chapter has explored the third of the three main strands of CEO 
succession research, that of post-succession organisational performance and, 
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as with the previous two empirical chapters, it has contributed to the body of 
literature in several ways. Firstly, my use of social capital theory is novel when 
applied to CEO successions. This allows for exploration into whether social 
capital can help explain any differences in performance observed when a new 
CEO takes the reins. Secondly, research into the impact of CEO successions 
has largely concentrated on private sector organisations or small public sector 
organisations in which the CEO might be expected to be able to effect change 
more readily (Janke et al., 2018). Thus far, the only research into large and 
complex public sector organisations has been limited to one NHS study, the 
aforementioned working paper from Janke et al. (2018) and several papers 
using data from English local authorities and the civil service (Boyne et al. 
2011a; 2011b; 2010a; 2010b; 2008; Petrovsky et al. 2017). Using the NHS as 
a case study, my research has made a valuable contribution to the literature 
by offering a different methodological approach to that favoured by Janke et 
al. (2018), which adds to the debate around the impact of CEOs in large and 
complex public sector organisations. Thirdly, unlike much of the research 
using the private sector, I have used multiple performance metrics to try and 
gain insight into which aspects of performance a CEO might be able to control. 
Whereas most previous research relies on financial measures, I have 
extended this to include operational, throughput, and clinical safety measures.  
The next chapter provides a conclusion to this thesis. It discusses what my 
analysis has added to the body of research into CEO successions and what 
this means for policy and practice.    
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Chapter 7: Discussion and conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis, bringing together the three main topics of 
CEO succession research in a broad discussion highlighting my contributions 
to theory, practice and policy. I also identify potential areas for future research 
that will build on my research and address the caveats applied to it. The aim of 
this thesis was to explore the three main topics in CEO succession research: 
the antecedents of CEO succession, the selection of a new CEO, and the 
impact a new CEO has on post-succession organisational performance, all 
through the lens of social capital theory. The English NHS was used as a case 
study for this research. NHS trusts represent a novel case study for this 
research given their status as large, complex public sector organisations 
which, unlike the smaller public sector organisations historically used in public 
sector CEO succession research, involve greater challenges in ensuring they 
are run cohesively (Janke et al., 2018). As a public sector organisation, the 
NHS publishes large amounts of data on performance, structural, financial, 
and operational measures which means a nuanced and granular analysis can 
be carried out on longitudinal datasets with relative ease. This enabled me to 
use a range of performance measures that permit the exploration of the 
interaction between CEO succession and different types of performance. 
Specifically, I used the average attainment of the A&E four-hour waiting time 
target, operating surplus, the standardised reference cost index, average 
inpatient waiting times, standardised MRSA infection rates, and standardised 
mortality rates.  
My research was carried out on an NHS that is radically different to that which 
exists today. The COVID-19 global pandemic, unprecedented in modern 
times, has seen the NHS transform itself to adapt to the needs of the 
pandemic. Staff have been recalled from retirement, standard care paused, 
and the country locked down for months during which our help-seeking 
behaviours changed to reduce the burden on the NHS. Performance data for 
2020/21, and possibly beyond, will forever reflect the impact of COVID-19. 
Death rates in hospitals have soared (NHS England, 2020c), A&E 
attendances have plummeted (NHS England, 2020a), funding has been 
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injected into the system to ensure the necessary adaptions can be made 
(Discombe, 2020), debts wiped clean (DHSC, 2020), and costs have spiralled 
with the need to invest in specialist intensive care unit machines and personal 
protective equipment (Brennan, 2020). Never has leadership been more 
critical. The toll on frontline staff and the need to have confidence in their CEO 
is paramount. Repeating my research to include this period of flux could yield 
different findings. Therefore, the results and conclusions from this research 
should be read with the understanding that the NHS environment has evolved 
and this study could well be the last of its kind for a prolonged period as we 
wait for NHS operations to return to normal.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 reviews the main 
findings from each of the three empirical chapters and discusses how my 
research has contributed to theory, research and policy. Section 7.3 identifies 
the caveats applied to my research and suggests how these might be 
addressed through a future research agenda. The final section, 7.4, concludes 
the chapter. 
7.2 Contributions to the literature and policy implications 
This section summarises the main findings from each of the three empirical 
chapters and discusses how my research has contributed to the body of 
literature on CEO successions and the implications for policy arising from my 
findings. The literature review in Chapter 2 identified a number of gaps in the 
extant literature on CEO successions and my research was intended to 
address two of these: the use of social capital theory as a lens through which 
to view CEO successions and the use of a public sector organisation as a 
case study. However, in addressing these gaps I have also been able to make 
contributions to other areas which lack consensus. Namely, the reasons why 
CEOs leave their posts, where CEOs exit to, and the validity of existing 
theories of succession. Each of these will be addressed in detail in the 
discussions in the following sub-sections.  
7.2.1 Social capital theory contributions 
The most significant contribution stemming from my research is the application 
of social capital theory to CEO successions. Although other types of capital 
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have been used to explore CEO successions in the extant literature there is 
an obvious gap when considering the impact that social capital might have on 
successions. I identified two proxies for social capital: insider status as a proxy 
for firm-specific insider social capital and organisational performance as a 
proxy for reputational social capital. Although insiderness has been widely 
studied in CEO succession research (Shen and Cannella Jr, 2002; Zhang, 
2008; Karaevli and Zajac, 2013; Nath and Mahajan, 2017), it has been done 
without making an explicit link to social capital. Only one paper was found 
which used reputational social capital, but this used membership of elite social 
networks rather than organisational performance as a proxy (Phan and Lee, 
1995). 
The first empirical chapter looked at the antecedents of CEO succession. It 
addressed the research question: how does social capital (internal and 
reputational) affect a CEOs ability to influence their tenure and their 
destination on exiting the CEO role? I hypothesised that CEOs with internal 
social capital would have a lower risk of exit to all non-retirement destinations 
and found some support for this in both the pooled and competing risks 
models. I further hypothesised that CEOs with reputational social capital would 
have a non-linear relationship to exit destinations such that CEOs overseeing 
poor performance would be more likely to exit to destinations that diminished 
their reputational social capital whilst CEOs overseeing high performance 
would be more likely to exit to destinations than enhanced their reputational 
social capital. Again, some support was found for this hypothesis. By applying 
social capital theory to this field I have advanced the research area on 
methodological grounds by looking at actual CEO exits as opposed to their 
intention to leave (Bertelli and Lewis, 2013), and by the inclusion of multiple 
exit destinations rather than a binary exit/stay outcome (McCabe et al., 2008). 
Whilst there has been some research using exit destinations (Petrovsky et al., 
2017), I have extended this by aligning the destinations with social capital 
theory through making a distinction between whether a destination will 
enhance or diminish a CEO’s social standing. 
The second empirical chapter looked at the appointment of a new CEO by 
addressing the research questions: is social capital valued by recruiting 
organisations, and does the baseline performance of the organisation affect 
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the value placed on social capital by the recruiting organisation? I found no 
evidence that recruiting organisations value social capital but did find evidence 
that the baseline performance of the recruiting trust was an important 
contingency factor with both relatively high and low baseline performance of 
the recruiting trust associated with the appointment of a CEO with internal 
social capital. I hypothesised that CEOs with reputational social capital would 
be more sought after by trusts with poor baseline performance but instead 
found that it was high performing trusts who were more likely to appoint CEOs 
with high reputational social capital. My contribution here is in the use of social 
capital proxies, a hitherto unexplored aspect of CEO selection research.  
The third empirical chapter looked at the impact a new CEO has on 
organisational performance and addressed the research question: how does 
social capital affect the impact a new CEO has on organisational 
performance? The extant literature suggests three theories of succession that 
apply here, those of adaptive effects, disruptive effects and scapegoating, but 
there is little consensus about which, if any, hold universally true. Therefore, 
researchers seek to identify the circumstances under which any of them are 
true and it is here that I have made a contribution to the body of research. I 
hypothesised that the effect of succession on organisational performance 
would be moderated by insider status, that is, by the presence of internal 
social capital. I found evidence to support this. I further hypothesised that the 
relationship between insider succession and organisational performance 
would vary across levels of baseline performance such that under conditions 
of low baseline performance an outsider successor would be expected to 
improve performance and under conditions of high performance an insider 
successor would be expected to improve performance. I found limited 
evidence to support this. When looking at reputational social capital I 
hypothesised that a CEO with high reputational social capital would lead to 
greater performance improvements than a CEO with low reputational social 
capital. However, I found instead that performance was improved more when 
the new CEO had low reputational social capital. My contribution here is, 
again, in the application of proxies for social capital and the exploration of how 
much of the variation in performance they can explain.  
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7.2.2 Public sector case study contributions 
Although my research uses the NHS as a case study, my findings are likely 
applicable to the wider public sector and thus have greater relevance. By 
using the NHS as a case study it has facilitated the exploration of CEO 
succession in the context of large and complex public sector organisations, a 
hitherto largely untapped sector for succession research (Janke et al., 2018). 
This has allowed me to test the external validity of theories so far only tested 
in the private sector or in smaller public sector organisational forms, which 
offers an important contribution to the existing body of research (Rowe et al., 
2005).  
Further, using the NHS as a case study has also allowed me to explore the 
dynamics of the internal labour markets created through NPM reforms (Ward, 
2010). Whilst labour market theory might lead us to expect that high 
performing CEOs are rewarded, by promotion to ‘better’ jobs’, my research 
into the antecedents of CEO succession has provided little evidence to 
support this. In fact, there is more support for the opposite effect, that poor 
performing CEOs are demoted. This could of course be explained by an 
individual’s desire to protect their social standing at all costs (Johnson et al., 
2011), which is particularly relevant in the context of the NHS where a culture 
of blame makes moving roles a risky prospect (Anandaciva et al., 2018).  
The use of a public sector organisation as a case study has also provided an 
opportunity to make a contribution in terms of the performance measures 
used. Whilst much of the existing research into CEO successions uses 
financial measure of performance, I have utilised a broader range of measures 
covering financial outputs, throughput measure and clinical safety measures. 
This has allowed a wider debate about how and when CEO performance is 
judged depending on the type of performance metric being used.  
7.2.3 Implications for policy 
My research has potential implications for policy. The current trend in the NHS 
is to remove CEOs of poor performing trusts, which clearly indicates that there 
may be a widespread belief that changing the leadership of an organisation 
will improve its performance. However, changing the CEO incurs transaction 
costs and often the same CEO will turn up in another leadership role in short 
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order, thus the problem, if there is one, is simply shifted elsewhere. This 
recycling of poor CEOs could be explained by boards simply wanting to be 
seen to be taking action, that is, they don’t actually believe that changing the 
CEO is the answer, or because the labour market for CEOs in the NHS is so 
small, due to individuals not wanting to put themselves forwards for a role 
known to be stressful and potentially damaging to their future career prospects 
(Anandaciva et al., 2018), that they have no choice but to recycle poor 
candidates. My research has highlighted the importance of social capital in 
determining CEO tenure and exit destinations. In particular, it has highlighted 
how the labour market for CEOs is not working effectively to reward good 
performance, but is instead penalising poor performance to such an extent 
that good CEOs may be put off from moving to other trusts. This means that 
good CEOs are not sharing their ability across the system, as they might 
otherwise have done if the labour market were working more effectively. Poor 
performing trusts are thus unable to attract good CEOs and enter a spiral of 
decline.  
NHS CEOs are judged on key deliverables, namely, the achievement of 
government targets for standards of quality service provision and managing 
finances (Hoggettbowers, 2009). My research suggests that boards should 
seek to retain CEOs overseeing good performance as this not only avoids the 
transaction costs associated with a CEO succession but also avoids the 
disruptive effects succession has on performance. Conversely, boards should 
seek to replace CEOs overseeing poor performance as the adaptive effects of 
succession are likely to lead to performance improvements.  
7.3 Study caveats and opportunities for future research 
This section describes the caveats that apply to my research and makes 
suggestions for future avenues of research arising from them. In addition to 
the future research opportunities identified in this section, there remain a 
number of avenues identified in the literature review in Chapter 2 that I did not 
address with my research. However, the opportunities arising from my 
research are discussed below.  
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Insider social capital was proxied using a binary dummy variable to denote 
whether the CEO worked in the trust immediately prior to becoming its CEO. 
This simplistic operationalisation of insider status could be perceived as a 
potential limitation of my research as it does not allow for any consideration of 
the length of time an individual worked in the trust prior to becoming its CEO. 
This definition credits an individual with a month of tenure the same amount of 
insider social capital as an individual with several years of tenure, which is 
unlikely to be the case as longer tenure is expected to be associated with the 
accumulation of greater social capital. My research does not differentiate 
between levels of internal social capital that might be expected to be held, 
hence factoring this in offers an opportunity for further research. It might be 
expected that those with greater insiderness, that is, those who worked in the 
recruiting trust for a longer length of time prior to becoming its CEO, would 
experience greater benefits or disadvantages from that insiderness than those 
with shorter pre-CEO tenures.  
My research was conducted on a longitudinal quantitative data sample which, 
by definition, relies on easily observable CEO and trust characteristics and 
measures of performance. This inevitably means that softer, qualitative 
measures are excluded from any analyses, which is a potential limitation of my 
research as observable factors alone are unlikely to fully explain the 
antecedents and consequences of CEO succession. Opportunities for further 
research could include the use of surveys or interviews to capture qualitative 
information about CEO performance or other factors such as perceptions 
about the organisational environment.  
For the antecedents chapter, the exit destination of each CEO was 
categorised as social capital enhancing or diminishing, yet this designation 
was by no means certain for all CEOs. For example, although it is well known 
that NHS CEOs are often moved into roles elsewhere in the wider public 
sector health system as a face saving measure to avoid the stigma of being 
sacked, this isn’t true for all CEOs. Whilst that exit destination was categorised 
as being social capital diminishing, there are notable cases where it is a clear 
promotion, such as Amanda Pritchard’s move from CEO of St Thomas’ trust to 
Chief Operating Officer of NHS England. Similarly, it was not always possible 
to tell whether an exit to the social capital diminishing destination of self-
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employment was the result of a CEO being pushed out or genuinely choosing 
to leave of their own accord. For example, Siobhan McArdle’s letter to staff at 
South Tees NHS Foundation Trust implied she had decided to leave of her 
own accord yet figures released in the subsequent annual report highlighted a 
substantial pay off indicative of a compromise agreement, often used when 
CEOs are pushed out. Therefore, a potential avenue for further research might 
be to collect qualitative data to capture the CEOs’ view on whether their 
destination was social capital enhancing or diminishing and whether their exit 
was voluntary or forced. This would allow the categorisation of exits to be 
more accurate as I have had to make assumptions based on limited 
information from media reports in some cases.  
For the chapter looking at the selection of a new CEO an obvious caveat is 
that I only had data on successful appointments and thus could only look at 
the difference between appointments with and without certain characteristics. 
Future research should look at the pool of applicants for a CEO post, that is, 
those that are unsuccessful in addition to those that are successful, as this will 
allow for a greater depth of analysis into the impact that social capital has on 
CEO selection.  
My analysis of the impact that a new CEO has on organisational performance 
relied on a limited set of performance metrics. Due to the long time period 
covered in my research, 15 years, some performance measures were 
unavailable in some years either because the metric did not span the full 15 
year period or because I was unable to obtain it from annual reports. 
Opportunities for further research include the use of alternative performance 
metrics that span the complete sample period or perhaps developing a 
composite performance measure to encompass many facets of performance. 
This final empirical chapter also used CEO successions within the previous 
two years but we know from the literature that it can take 12-18 months for a 
new CEO to bed in (Hoggettbowers, 2009), therefore it could be interesting to 
look at the impact over a much longer time period. 
The performance metrics used in my research were used either in their raw 
continuous format or categorised into high and low relative performance. A 
potential avenue for further research would include using different 
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operationalisations of performance such as persistently low performers, or 
considering levels of improvement or decline. A further research opportunity 
could include looking at the impact of the top management team on 
performance as per the Upper Echelons Theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) 
which suggests that it not just the CEO who determines the performance of an 
organisation but the entire top management team. Broadening research to 
include top management team turnover could enhance the findings from my 
own research and would contribute to the existing literature in this space, 
including the limited body of research into top management team turnover in 
the public sector (Boyne et al., 2010b). 
Finally, although my research has broadened the evidence base to include the 
NHS, a network of large and complex public sector organisations, it would be 
sensible to replicate my research in other public organisations to extend the 
evidence even further. This could include schools, prisons, councils and 
government bodies. The overriding contribution of my research is the 
application of social capital theory and it would also be of interest to replicate 
my research using private sector organisations to assess whether social 
capital has the same impact in that context.  
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has summarised the research presented in this thesis, 
highlighted the contributions I have made to the literature, identified 
implications for policy makers, and offered suggestions for future research, 
which, if taken up will surely be a useful addition to the body of evidence on 
CEO successions. At the start of my research I set out to determine whether 
social capital played any significant role in CEO successions. It is clear from 
my empirical analysis that social capital does help explain some of the 
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Appendix A: Alternative metrics results for Chapter 4 
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Table A-1 Operating surplus antecedents models 
Model A B C D E F 







Insider (dummy) 0.698* 0.251*** 1.142 0.524 0.726 3.246*** 
 (0.129) (0.104) (0.448) (0.387) (0.301) (1.440) 
Low performance relative to other trusts 1.102 0.810 1.176 0.573 1.133 1.141 
 (0.149) (0.199) (0.356) (0.362) (0.310) (0.369) 
High performance relative to other 
trusts 0.717** 0.979 1.125 0.766 0.635 0.757 
 (0.116) (0.281) (0.414) (0.503) (0.223) (0.302) 
Clinician (dummy) 1.073 0.691 0.813 1.401 1.210 1.264 
 (0.166) (0.200) (0.287) (0.617) (0.376) (0.452) 
Previous CEO experience (dummy) 1.041 0.796 0.848 0.876 1.083 2.293** 
 (0.137) (0.175) (0.239) (0.444) (0.297) (0.943) 
Acute trust (dummy) 1.252 1.341 1.155 1.357 1.067 0.665 
 (0.179) (0.348) (0.357) (0.836) (0.328) (0.207) 
Teaching hospital (dummy) 0.757 1.159 0.968 2.002 0.593 0.387* 
 (0.142) (0.390) (0.356) (1.130) (0.241) (0.188) 
Foundation Trusts status (dummy) 0.993 1.071 0.853 1.271 1.190 2.858*** 
 (0.127) (0.244) (0.255) (0.564) (0.300) (0.936) 
Male (dummy) 1.153 1.125 1.323 1.572 0.879 0.908 
 (0.160) (0.278) (0.427) (0.764) (0.251) (0.301) 
Overnight beds 1.000 0.999*** 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Region: Midlands & East 1.422** 0.695 1.529 4.724** 1.690 0.881 
 (0.224) (0.183) (0.601) (3.668) (0.558) (0.357) 
Region: London 1.249 0.538* 3.221*** 3.853 1.188 0.999 
 (0.252) (0.187) (1.302) (3.172) (0.530) (0.591) 
Region: South  0.998 0.487** 1.608 3.575 1.118 2.085* 
 (0.173) (0.142) (0.677) (2.885) (0.428) (0.826) 
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Model A B C D E F 







CEO spells 416 416 416 416 416 416 
Number of exits 304 101 62 21 70 50 
Observations 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,694 
Log pseudo-likelihood -1550.634 -549.162 -347.460 -114.759 -391.757 -263.475 
Hazard ratios reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
- 181 - 
Table A-2 RCI antecedents models 
Model A B C D E F 







Insider (dummy) 0.662** 0.263*** 1.333 0.440 0.596 2.921** 
 (0.119) (0.106) (0.496) (0.319) (0.239) (1.234) 
Low performance relative to other trusts 1.156 0.822 1.707* 0.747 0.544** 1.494 
 (0.161) (0.213) (0.503) (0.365) (0.163) (0.488) 
High performance relative to other 
trusts 0.995 1.249 1.119 0.899 0.704 1.079 
 (0.134) (0.295) (0.375) (0.490) (0.189) (0.388) 
Clinician (dummy) 1.049 0.664 0.815 1.227 1.414 1.113 
 (0.156) (0.184) (0.283) (0.527) (0.388) (0.397) 
Previous CEO experience (dummy) 1.026 0.881 0.964 0.754 0.937 2.112* 
 (0.126) (0.184) (0.255) (0.339) (0.226) (0.814) 
Acute trust (dummy) 1.368** 1.244 1.143 1.381 1.109 0.765 
 (0.192) (0.308) (0.334) (0.843) (0.319) (0.234) 
Teaching hospital (dummy) 0.711* 1.251 0.950 2.754** 0.515 0.335** 
 (0.125) (0.405) (0.300) (1.387) (0.214) (0.152) 
Foundation Trusts status (dummy) 0.966 1.058 0.901 1.426 1.051 2.899*** 
 (0.119) (0.231) (0.263) (0.573) (0.252) (0.939) 
Male (dummy) 1.196 1.093 1.389 1.670 0.982 0.771 
 (0.158) (0.253) (0.423) (0.772) (0.258) (0.246) 
Overnight beds 1.000* 0.999*** 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Region: Midlands & East 1.406** 0.669 1.604 5.182** 1.469 0.881 
 (0.216) (0.168) (0.602) (4.005) (0.438) (0.350) 
Region: London 1.343 0.615 3.033*** 3.903* 0.975 1.299 
 (0.250) (0.198) (1.152) (3.005) (0.394) (0.672) 
Region: South  1.036 0.445*** 1.740 3.735 1.107 2.099* 
 (0.172) (0.126) (0.683) (3.006) (0.371) (0.811) 
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Model A B C D E F 







CEO spells 444 444 444 444 444 444 
Number of exits 336 111 69 24 79 53 
Observations 1,847 1,847 1,847 1,847 1,847 1,847 
Log pseudo-likelihood -1756.517 -619.458 -393.908 -132.831 -451.267 -287.681 
Hazard ratios reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A-3 Inpatient waiting times antecedents models 
Model A B C D E F 







Insider (dummy) 0.666** 0.261*** 1.341 0.439 0.610 2.875** 
 (0.120) (0.107) (0.505) (0.312) (0.242) (1.199) 
Low performance relative to other trusts 0.885 1.632** 1.012 0.274* 0.858 0.425** 
 (0.121) (0.398) (0.320) (0.182) (0.224) (0.163) 
High performance relative to other 
trusts 1.012 1.193 1.187 1.049 0.751 1.043 
 (0.134) (0.306) (0.357) (0.456) (0.229) (0.333) 
Clinician (dummy) 1.057 0.665 0.811 1.217 1.407 1.160 
 (0.157) (0.184) (0.278) (0.521) (0.393) (0.402) 
Previous CEO experience (dummy) 1.043 0.850 1.002 0.801 0.916 2.333** 
 (0.128) (0.176) (0.266) (0.363) (0.223) (0.896) 
Acute trust (dummy) 1.314** 1.347 1.113 1.479 1.167 0.701 
 (0.181) (0.336) (0.334) (0.860) (0.336) (0.213) 
Teaching hospital (dummy) 0.729* 1.166 1.044 2.440* 0.505* 0.331** 
 (0.127) (0.373) (0.333) (1.315) (0.189) (0.158) 
Foundation Trusts status (dummy) 0.936 1.126 0.845 1.247 1.121 2.573*** 
 (0.116) (0.250) (0.260) (0.515) (0.282) (0.779) 
Male (dummy) 1.208 1.112 1.410 1.642 1.002 0.812 
 (0.159) (0.262) (0.435) (0.764) (0.262) (0.254) 
Overnight beds 1.000 0.999*** 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Region: Midlands & East 1.410** 0.685 1.565 5.648** 1.467 0.932 
 (0.216) (0.175) (0.578) (4.130) (0.468) (0.366) 
Region: London 1.382* 0.623 3.028*** 4.062* 1.087 1.382 
 (0.257) (0.196) (1.168) (3.115) (0.433) (0.706) 
Region: South  1.060 0.445*** 1.649 4.988** 1.108 2.577** 
 (0.176) (0.128) (0.657) (3.888) (0.377) (0.952) 
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Model A B C D E F 







CEO spells 447 447 447 447 447 447 
Number of exits 338 111 69 24 80 54 
Observations 1,853 1,853 1,853 1,853 1,853 1,853 
Log pseudo-likelihood -1767.715 -618.825 -395.925 -130.345 -459.393 -290.605 
Hazard ratios reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A-4 MRSA infection rates antecedents models 
Model A B C D E F 







Insider (dummy) 0.661** 0.270*** 1.313 0.448 0.589 3.187*** 
 (0.120) (0.109) (0.501) (0.322) (0.236) (1.326) 
Low performance relative to other trusts 0.943 0.787 1.022 0.778 1.186 0.544 
 (0.129) (0.201) (0.283) (0.388) (0.340) (0.219) 
High performance relative to other 
trusts 0.867 1.139 0.654 0.651 0.646 1.001 
 (0.117) (0.258) (0.213) (0.375) (0.188) (0.334) 
Clinician (dummy) 1.044 0.692 0.805 1.261 1.359 1.178 
 (0.155) (0.191) (0.281) (0.538) (0.384) (0.411) 
Previous CEO experience (dummy) 1.037 0.872 0.998 0.748 0.921 2.310** 
 (0.128) (0.179) (0.265) (0.338) (0.227) (0.893) 
Acute trust (dummy) 1.308* 1.347 1.082 1.405 1.165 0.687 
 (0.180) (0.335) (0.320) (0.843) (0.333) (0.210) 
Teaching hospital (dummy) 0.723* 1.223 0.983 2.656* 0.474* 0.380** 
 (0.126) (0.396) (0.316) (1.398) (0.182) (0.175) 
Foundation Trusts status (dummy) 0.964 1.056 0.910 1.472 1.166 2.529*** 
 (0.119) (0.230) (0.266) (0.621) (0.288) (0.770) 
Male (dummy) 1.202 1.094 1.436 1.696 1.018 0.817 
 (0.159) (0.252) (0.445) (0.787) (0.275) (0.255) 
Overnight beds 1.000 0.999*** 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Region: Midlands & East 1.376** 0.718 1.492 5.156** 1.511 0.850 
 (0.209) (0.177) (0.559) (3.893) (0.462) (0.339) 
Region: London 1.350 0.705 2.740*** 3.771* 0.956 1.491 
 (0.255) (0.225) (1.069) (2.971) (0.398) (0.776) 
Region: South  1.027 0.497** 1.554 3.720* 1.109 2.186** 
 (0.167) (0.136) (0.605) (2.899) (0.377) (0.818) 
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Model A B C D E F 







CEO spells 447 447 447 447 447 447 
Number of exits 338 111 69 24 80 54 
Observations 1,855 1,855 1,855 1,855 1,855 1,855 
Log pseudo-likelihood -1768.431 -620.048 -395.133 -132.838 -458.045 -292.192 
Hazard ratios reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A-5 Mortality rates antecedents models 
Model A B C D E F 







Insider (dummy) 0.664** 0.262*** 1.326 0.458 0.597 2.902** 
 (0.120) (0.106) (0.497) (0.334) (0.236) (1.254) 
Low performance relative to other trusts 1.284* 1.041 1.233 0.932 1.328 1.104 
 (0.167) (0.244) (0.378) (0.504) (0.339) (0.373) 
High performance relative to other 
trusts 1.060 1.029 1.306 1.492 0.979 0.497 
 (0.156) (0.259) (0.402) (0.724) (0.306) (0.214) 
Clinician (dummy) 1.038 0.678 0.793 1.152 1.387 1.178 
 (0.154) (0.187) (0.273) (0.475) (0.383) (0.417) 
Previous CEO experience (dummy) 1.038 0.869 0.986 0.733 0.915 2.335** 
 (0.128) (0.179) (0.258) (0.330) (0.225) (0.953) 
Acute trust (dummy) 1.330** 1.318 1.111 1.461 1.190 0.653 
 (0.183) (0.327) (0.329) (0.868) (0.341) (0.201) 
Teaching hospital (dummy) 0.752 1.166 1.012 2.298 0.558 0.424* 
 (0.134) (0.387) (0.324) (1.286) (0.211) (0.198) 
Foundation Trusts status (dummy) 0.958 1.095 0.874 1.406 1.104 2.821*** 
 (0.117) (0.242) (0.255) (0.567) (0.263) (0.842) 
Male (dummy) 1.213 1.085 1.398 1.625 0.982 0.823 
 (0.160) (0.251) (0.431) (0.757) (0.256) (0.258) 
Overnight beds 1.000 0.999*** 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Region: Midlands & East 1.370** 0.714 1.530 5.406** 1.517 0.836 
 (0.208) (0.178) (0.571) (4.132) (0.460) (0.334) 
Region: London 1.398* 0.631 2.858*** 3.415 1.142 1.585 
 (0.265) (0.204) (1.103) (2.579) (0.458) (0.795) 
Region: South  1.056 0.487*** 1.581 3.607* 1.197 2.463** 
 (0.173) (0.135) (0.627) (2.767) (0.401) (0.944) 
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Model A B C D E F 







CEO spells 447 447 447 447 447 447 
Number of exits 338 111 69 24 80 54 
Observations 1,855 1,855 1,855 1,855 1,855 1,855 
Log pseudo-likelihood -1767.071 -621.024 -395.758 -132.775 -459.213 -291.499 
Hazard ratios reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B: Alternative metrics results for Chapter 6 
Table B-1 Results for H1 using alternative performance metrics 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  









Lagged performance 0.242*** 0.368*** 0.575*** -0.020 0.654*** 
 (0.066) (0.048) (0.056) (0.051) (0.049) 
CEO succession one year ago 1,523.324** 0.186 0.212 0.015 0.005 
 (753.058) (0.340) (0.502) (0.019) (0.005) 
      
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  5,966.182*** 62.345*** 30.671*** 0.421*** 0.350*** 
 (2,103.596) (4.956) (4.944) (0.041) (0.050) 
Observations 1,652 1,966 1977 1,982 1,910 
F-test 13.20*** 6.23*** 179.01*** 11.96*** 11.74*** 
Groups/instruments 146/40 154/29 154/43 154/43 142/43 
AR(2) 0.621 0.149 0.190 0.874 0.049 
Hansen statistic 0.116 0.055 0.061 0.345 0.256 
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Table B-2 Results for H2 using alternative performance metrics 









Lagged performance 0.152** 0.374*** 0.522*** -0.060 0.658*** 
 (0.068) (0.078) (0.063) (0.100) (0.047) 
CEO succession one year ago 1,116.534 2.274 -4.340** -0.062 -0.011 
 (845.249) (38.742) (1.990) (0.277) (0.042) 
CEO succession x high baseline 
performance 0.393** -0.024 0.070** 0.177 0.017 
 (0.177) (0.392) (0.033) (0.505) (0.042) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -4,696.531*** 61.546*** 24.225*** 1.250*** 0.342*** 
 (1,597.169) (7.782) (3.422) (0.099) (0.047) 
Observations 1,652 1,966 1,977 1,982 1,910 
F-test 11.06*** 4.81*** 196.96*** 8.95*** 12.74*** 
Groups/instruments 146/40 154/43 154/57 154/42 142/57 
AR(2) 0.746 0.189 0.173 0.810 0.045 
Hansen statistic 0.105 0.065 0.166 0.039 0.108 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B-3 Results for H3 using alternative performance metrics 









Lagged performance 0.215*** 0.374*** 0.526*** -0.041 0.663*** 
 (0.066) (0.049) (0.064) (0.051) (0.045) 
CEO succession one year ago -12,821.867* 0.279 -0.077 -0.188* 0.003 
 (7,091.918) (0.386) (0.504) (0.096) (0.004) 
New CEO is an insider -9,769.607 -0.133 -0.760 -0.136* 0.009** 
 (5,960.786) (0.604) (0.687) (0.075) (0.004) 
CEO succession x insider 71,599.422* -0.203 1.475 1.100** 0.009 
 (36,233.026) (0.957) (1.238) (0.460) (0.009) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -2,655.332 61.718*** 24.492*** 1.300*** 0.336*** 
 (2,456.553) (5.037) (4.134) (0.095) (0.045) 
Observations 1,652 1,966 1,977 1,982 1,910 
F-test 4.60*** 4.08*** 138.23*** 7.20*** 11.10*** 
Groups/instruments 146/41 154/45 154/45 154/43 142/45 
AR(2) 0.437 0.162 0.182 0.866 0.050 
Hansen statistic 0.037 0.015 0.017 0.039 0.019 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B-4 Results for H4 using alternative performance metrics 









Lagged performance 0.179 0.510*** 0.526*** -0.007 0.719*** 
 (0.123) (0.167) (0.068) (0.239) (0.082) 
CEO succession one year ago -2,764.535 5.210 -0.536 -0.036 -0.083 
 (3,907.630) (33.372) (8.316) (0.234) (0.307) 
New CEO is an insider -2,600.899 47.855 2.588 0.092 0.412 
 (3,062.901) (57.278) (18.815) (0.261) (0.336) 
CEO succession x insider 28,044.223 94.336 -21.090 0.055 0.483 
 (18,796.804) (168.326) (43.350) (0.941) (0.989) 
CEO succession x baseline performance  0.209 -0.050 0.007 0.185 0.085 
 (0.173) (0.336) (0.119) (0.603) (0.306) 
Insider x baseline performance  0.491 -0.485 -0.056 -0.163 -0.395 
 (0.665) (0.580) (0.314) (0.615) (0.330) 
CEO succession x insider x baseline 
performance -3.090** -0.976 0.372 -0.354 -0.474 
 (1.463) (1.728) (0.658) (2.230) (0.981) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  5,853.414*** 48.450*** 27.075*** 1.247*** 0.278*** 
 (2,108.846) (16.395) (3.780) (0.106) (0.083) 
Observations 1,652 1,966 1,977 1,982 1,910 
F-test 5.71*** 1.87*** 116.53*** 6.02*** 6.04*** 
Groups/instruments 146/54 154/45 154/58 154/45 142/46 
AR(2) 0.539 0.259 0.182 0.765 0.086 
Hansen statistic 0.016 0.002 0.019 0.001 0.017 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
